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ABSTRACT
Continuity and Change in Municipal Budgetary Choice:
A Comparative Study of Two Cities
May 1979
Patrick J. Cowles, B.A.
, Marshall University
M.A., Marshall University, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Fred A. Kramer
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to develop and test
new operationalized definitions for the concepts of incremental and
non- incremental budgetary decisions. Previous definitions have been
quite rigid and simplistic. Thus, the ultimate proof of the validity
of incremental budgeting models, viz. that incremental systems result
in a predominance of incremental decisions, has not been adequately
demonstrated.
In order to resolve this dilemma, two independent sets of
operationalized definitions are developed. The first, a quantitative
indicator labelled the Ratio of Shares, is based upon the notion of
budgetary "fair shares." Patterned on the shift-share analysis used
in regional economics, this technique provides a model of an ideal
incremental decision. In turn, actual Ratio of Shares values may be
compared to this ideal value. Thus, to the extent that actual values
vary from the ideal value, evidence is obtained that an actual decision
varies from an ideal incremental decision. A measure of dispersion
v
(standard deviation units) is then used to separate probable incremen-
tal decisions from non- incremental ones.
The second set of definitions is based upon interviews with
individuals who have been directly involved in the making of specific
budgetary decisions. Labelled the "typical choice" approach, this
technique involves asking public officials a series of questions in
which they define how budgetary decisions are typically made. Fol-
lowing this series, they are then asked whether a specific decision
with which they were involved was made in a typical or atypical
fashion. On the whole, it is found that typical decisions appear to
correspond to incremental choices, while atypical decisions correspond
to non- incremental ones.
Using budget data from two Massachusetts cities, these two sets
of operationalized definitions are then compared, with the finding
that they generate high levels of agreement in their classifications
of specific decisions. Moreover, incremental decisions are found to
occur more frequently than non- incremental ones. However, non-
incremental choice appears to occur much more frequently than is often
presumed. Reasons for both incremental and non- incremental decisions
are analyzed with the conclusion that non- incremental decisions gen-
erally occur due to factors external to the decision-making hier-
archy' s control.
Finally, a variety of other operationalized definitions (such as
those suggested by Wildavsky and Fenno) are compared to the typical
vi
choice approach, and the resulting levels of agreement are compared to
the level of agreement found for the Ratio of Shares indicator. The
results of these comparisons are that the Ratio of Shares technique
and the approach suggested by Fenno appear to be the most reliable of
the quantitative classifiers. However, given the exploratory nature
of this study, the need for further research is recognized.
vii
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CHAPTER I
BUDGETARY CHOICE: THEORIES AND METHODOLOGIES
Introduction
With more than 70 percent of all funds for domestic programs
being expended by state and local governments, 1 with the critical mass
2
of our nation's social problems located in our urban centers, and in
view of the recent efforts to decentralize policy-making and expendi-
ture decisions down to those levels of government proclaimed "closer
3
to the people," the need for a close, in-depth analysis of municipal
budgetary choice seems evident. It is the goal of this thesis to
explore the utility of a new research design through which to accom-
plish such an analysis.
A Review of Current Theories of Budgetary Choice
In recent years, the study of government budgeting has been dom-
inated by the model of budgetary incrementalism. Derived from
Douglas Fox, The Politics of City and State Bureaucracy ,
Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc., 1974), p. 3.
2
For an excellent, brief survey of the "urban crisis" and its
causes, see Robert Lineberry and Ira Sharkansy, Urban Politics and
Public Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), Chapter 2.
3
Examples of the literature examining this trend include Herbert
Kaufman's excellent "Administrative Decentralization and Political
Power," Public Administration Review 29 (January/February 1969): 3-15;
Michael Reagan, The New Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press,
1972), especially "The Case Against Revenue-Sharing," pp. 102-132;
and
of recent appearance, Richard P. Nathan's fascinating The Plot
That
Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1975), especially Chapter 2 passim.
1
2Lindblom' s model of incremental policy choice, 4 the application of
incremental decision making to budgeting has been most fully elabo-
rated in Aaron Wildavsky' s The Politics of the Budgetary Process
(1964). 5 Where Lindblom saw policymakers making limited, marginal
changes in on-going policies, Wildavsky envisioned budget-makers
choosing to add or subtract a limited, marginal fair share of the
total of available new revenues to a funding base (i.e., the previous
year's total funding). 6
There have been two basic methodological approaches used to sup-
port the model of incremental budgeting. One group of studies has em-
ployed role analysis and interviews to establish the general, repet-
itive actions which appear to underpin much budgetary choice. Notable
works on incremental role systems include the Wildavsky study cited
above, Thomas Anton' s The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois
7(1966), and, to some extent, John Patrick Crecine's Governmental Prob-
glem Solving: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting (1969).
4Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through',"
Public Administration Review 19 (Spring 1959): 79-88.
5
Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process , 2nd ed.
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co. , 1974)
.
6
Ibid.
, pp. 16-17.
7 ...
Thomas J. Anton, The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois
(Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1966).
8
John P. Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving: A Computer Sim-
ulation of Municipal Budgeting (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co.,
1960) .
3The thrust of such works has been that different categories of
formal actors within the budgetary process tend to behave in patterns
that constitute limited, socialized sets of behavior. These behavior
sets mutually reinforce each other; and the acting out of these beha-
viors provides the individual with psychological satisfactions which
further reinforces his predispositions to continue to behave in the
9
accepted fashion. As Crecine, Sharkansky , and Jackson note, a major
implication of this model is that spending decisions are seen more as
a function of self-contained, largely insulated decisions within gov-
ernment than the result of pressures and inputs brought to bear on
government by external events and actors.''"
0
Another central point of the descriptive incrementalists is that
budgetary choice primarily involves questions concerning the size of
the annual "fair share" as opposed to questions concerning the size of
the funding base. As Wildavsky notes, the base ". . .is almost never
actively reviewed as a whole every year .... (Budgeting) is based
on last year's budget with special attention given to a narrow range
..11
of increases or decreases.
9
For a classic presentation of role system theory, see Talcott
Parsons and David A. Shils, eds. , Toward A Theory of General Action
(New York: Harper and Row, 1951), pp. 3-29.
10Crecine, Governmental Problems , p. 20 and pp. 218-219; Ira
Sharkansky, Spending in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally
and Company, 1968), p. 17; John E. Jackson, "Politics and the Budgetary
Process," Social Science Research 1 (April 1972) :42.
i:LWildavsky, Politics , p. 15.
4The second approach used to study incremental budgeting has
relied on the quantitative analysis of budget data. Works by Otto
12 ITDavis, M.A.H. Dempster, and Wildavsky, by Ira Sharkansky, and by
14Crecme have used correlation and regression analysis to establish
the degree of relationship between budget recommendations at one stage
of the process to another within a given year, and between budgets of
one year and budgets of the next and succeeding years. The great
majority of the simple and multiple coefficients of correlation which
have been generated in these studies exceed the .9000 level.
Initially, these descriptive and quantitative studies seemed so
convincing that even critics of pluralist politics accepted the valid-
ity of the theory.'
1' 5
It is not entirely facetious to claim that a
" Pax Lindblomica" has reigned over the study of budgeting since the
early I960' s.
Of course, a few dissenting works have appeared. In a case
study of budgeting in Cleveland, Ohio, John E. Jackson argued that
budgeting in municipalities involves not only incremental routines,
but also responses to external events (e.g., annual shifts in the
12Otto Davis, M.A. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of
the Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review 60
(September 1966) : 529-547.
13
Ira Sharkansky, Spending in the States .
14
Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving .
15
E.g. , see Allen Schick, "Systems Politics and Systems Budget-
ing," Public Administration Review 29 (March/April 1969 ): 137-151 ; and
James O'Connor, The Fiscal CrisisTof the State (New York:
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1973), pp. 76-77.
5number of robberies, changes in the number of families) and inputs
from political factors as well (e.g., a mayor's electoral plurality,
changes in chief executives). Utilizing a multiple regression model,
Jackson concludes that, while "in the short run
. . . this expenditure
process would exhibit all the bureaucratic characteristics reported by
Crecine
.
.
.," nevertheless over time (1945-1970), "... the results
implied by the significant and nearly significant coefficients are
quite consistent with the economic-determinants model and the hypoth-
esis about administration differences expounded here." 16
Unfortunately, Jackson's study is marred by his overreliance
upon interval- scale variables which are of questionable importance or
comprehensibility in explaining the budget shifts he identifies.
Moreover, his study focuses on expenditures only for "major services."
As a result, his investigation focuses only upon some of the expendi-
tures for some of the city's agencies. The proportion of the total
budget left unexamined is not indicated. Finally, Jackson ignores the
question of whether the different services studied received either
incremental or non- incremental shifts as a result of his environmental
or political variables. All that is established (and tenuously at
that) is that different services fare differently under different
administrations in terms of their annual growth rates.
Focusing on federal budgeting, 0. E. Williamson used the statis-
tical results of Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky on non-defense budgeting
1 c.
Jackson, "Budgetary Process," p. 45.
6to argue, similarly to Jackson, that changes in chief executives often
meant significant changes in the rates of budgetary growth or declir.ne
for major agency budgets. 17 Turning his sights upon defense spending,
Arnold Kantor has maintained that the efforts of Congress and its
appropriations committees have been both fiscal and programmatic in
1
8
nature. In essence, both Williamson and Kantor (and Jackson as
well) challenge the non- rational, routinized role descriptions pro-
vided by Wildavsky and others. Unfortunately, their desire to reestab-
lish a place for politics or for rationality in budgeting does not
lead them to challenge whether the choices being made by the process
are incremental or not. Simplifying the question, their debate might
be described as one between advocates of a rational, incremental
decision process vs. advocates of a mechanistic, non-programmatic one.
In 1973 a major attack upon the explanatory adequacy of incre-
mentalism per se was launched with the publication of Peter Natchez
19
and Irvin C. Bupp' s "Policy and Priority in the Budgetary Process."
To date, it appears to have generated little interest among scholars
1
7
0. E. Williamson, "A Rational Theory of the Federal Budgetary
Process," Papers on Non-Market Decision Making 2 (1967 ): 71-90
I Q
Arnold Kantor, "Congress and the Defense Budget: 19
American Political Science Review 66(March 1972 ): 129-143.
I Q
Peter Natchez and Irvin C. Bupp, "Policy and Priority in the
Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review 67 (September
1973) :951-963.
7beydnd (at most) some discussion as to how its findings might be
incorporated into the incremental model. 20
In brief, the two authors charge that the incrementalists are
guilty of overemphasizing budgeting at the agency level of choice in
their quantitative research. Accordingly, all the incrementalists
accomplish is to",
. . capture
—
quite accurately—
. . . the great
stability of the administrative structure of government
. . .
.
"
21
According to Natchez and Bupp, a more realistic understanding of bud-
getary decision making is obtained by focusing on budgeting at the
program level, i.e., at the level of the various activities and
services which are carried out within the agency.
Natchez and Bupp develop an hypothesis that budgeting at the
program level tends to exhibit a highly variable pattern in which com-
petition for scarce resources and non- incremental decisions are common.
Using a quantitative technique which they label a prosperity score,
they offer support for their hypothesis by an examination of twenty-
three programs within the Atomic Energy Commission over a fifteen year
period. The results of their data manipulation appear to support their
hypothesis. Although funding for the AEC (the agency ) grew marginally
In some recent budgetary literature, John J. Bailey and Robert
J. O'Connor mention it in a footnote; see their "Operationalizing
Incrementalism: Measuring the Muddles," Public Administration Review
35 (January/February 1975) :66; John Wanat does not mention it, see his
"Bases of Budgetary Incrementalism," American Political Science Review
(September 1974) : 1221-1228; and William Morrow attempts to synthesize
it with incrementalism; see his Public Administration: Politics and
the Political System (New York: Random House, 1975), pp. 220-222.
Natchez and Bupp, "Policy Priority," p. 955.
8during the fifteen year period, they found that five of the twenty-
three programs within it "were cancelled altogether" and that funding
for most of the other programs apparently "fluctuated widely." 22
As an explanation of their findings, Natchez and Bupp present an
alternative theory of budgeting entitled the "policy entrepreneur"
model. They suggest that the reason program-level budgets appear to
fluctuate so greatly from year to year is due primarily to the polit-
ical salesmanship of program executives. While "programs . . . sup-
ported at the Commission, the Office of Management and Budget, presi-
dential and congressional levels are prosperous . . .," the chief
determinant of a program's prosperity are "... energetic division
directors (who) successfully build political support to withstand con-
23tinuous attacks upon a program's resource base by competing claims."
In short, budgeting for programs is " . . . very much like the compet-
itive ideal in nineteenth century capitalism.
"
In their quest for funding and political authority, (policy
entrepreneurs) use every available weapon: pressure from var-
ious constituencies and groups, aggressive selling inside govern-
ment, attracting congressmen as innovators or as protectors
. . .
,
pressuring the White House as well as receiving pressure
from the White House, and so on . . . . 2 ^
In light of this research and that of the other dissenters, the
degree to which the dominant model of budgetary incrementalism provides
an adequate explanation of budgetary decision making is under serious
22
Ibid.
,
pp. 960-962.
23
Ibid.
,
p. 963.
24
Ibid.
,
p. 956.
9question. Accordingly, an exploration of budgeting at the municipal
level will be undertaken here in an effort to establish a more compre-
hensive understanding of budgetary choice.
A Critique of Major Methodologies
in the Study of Budgeting
The first task following the decision to seek a more comprehen-
sive model of budgeting was to create a research design through which
a more accurate picture of budgeting could be obtained. As a step
toward this end, an analysis of the major established approaches was
undertaken.
Several objections can be noted concerning the manner in which
role analysis has been employed by the incrementalists. First, such
studies almost exclusively focus upon establishing general (or typi-
cal) behavior patterns of actors in the budgetary process. Little
attention has been paid to non-general (or atypical or deviant) be-
havior. If the extent of such non-general behavior were insignificant,
such an approach might be warranted. However, whether to exclude such
behavior from analysis is in fact warranted has not been satisfac-
torily established.
Some of these authors have, of course, attempted to ascertain
the relative frequencies of incremental vs. non- incremental decisions.
One often used device has been to set forth a percent annual funding
change which separates the two categories of choice. Thus for example,
Wildavsky argues that an annual funding change (afc) of more than ±30
10
percent constitutes a non- incremental choice, while Fenno has
claimed that an afc of ±20 percent or more is the true dividing line. 26
While such an approach poses several problems, its most crucial weak-
ness is that it divorces budgetary choice from how decision makers are
distributing the total of available "new" revenues in any given year.
Accordingly, whether the annual budget choices being made reflect
"fair" or "unfair shares" added to agency bases becomes obscured.
More elaboration on this point will be presented later.
A further criticism of the role analysis authors is that they
have uniformly violated a central rule of scientific inquiry: viz.,
that the validity of general hypotheses should be tested by their
ability to explain, at the least, a scientifically chosen sample of
specific cases. Even within the context of their own flawed quanti-
27
tative approach, Wildavsky, Fenno, and others have failed to follow
their investigations through to such a test.
One objection to this last criticism might be that it fails to
take into account the quantitative studies of incrementalism which have
relied upon correlation and regression analysis of annual expenditure
2 5
Wildavsky, Politics , p. 14.
26
Ri chard Fenno, The Power of the Purse (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1966), p. 352.
27
E.g., Bailey and O'Connor who see budget changes of ±10 percent
or less as incremental, ±11 percent to 29 percent as "intermediate,"
and ±30 percent or more as non- incremental; see "Measuring the
Muddles," p. 64.
11
levels. Such studies have been widely viewed as conclusive evidence
(or tests) that budgetary choice is indeed a form of incremental
choice.
Unfortunately, it has been less than widely noted that the quanti-
tative incrementalists have a different focus for their research than
the role system incrementalists. The quantifiers have concentrated
upon the funding base of government agencies whereas the role analysts
have concentrated upon the question of " fair shares ." The use of
agency funding bases as a unit of analysis results in three serious
weaknesses in the research of the quantitative incrementalists.
First, as Natchez and Bupp note, these works (and, less expli-
citly, those of the role analysts as well) ignore an important, perhaps
crucial arena of budgetary choice: viz
. ,
budgeting for the programs
which comprise agency budgets. Do program-level budgets shift greatly
from year to year, while agency budgets shift only marginally? If so,
why? Such questions have not been explored by the quantitative incre-
mentalists, nor can they be explored by focusing exclusively upon total
agency budgets. Since agency budgets are often the aggregated sums of
identifiable programmatic components, it seems advisable, if not
28
For example, see Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, "A Theory of
the Budgetary Process"; their "On the Process of Budgeting II: An Em-
pirical Study of Congressional Appropriations," in R.F. Byrne,
A. Charnes, W.W. Cooper, 0. A. Davis, and Dorothy Gilford (eds.),
Studies in Budgeting (New York: North-Holland Publishing Company,
1971), pp. 292-375; and their "Toward a Predictive Theory of Government
Expenditures: U.S. Domestic Appropriations," British Journal of Polit-
ical Science 4 (October 1974) : 419-452; Wanat, "Bases of Budgetary Incre-
mentalism"; Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving ; and Sharkansky,
Spending in the States .
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essential, that program- level choices be studied when seeking to
establish a general theory of budgetary choice.
A second criticism of this literature involves its utilization
of agency budget bases in correlation and regression analysis. As
noted earlier, Natchez and Bupp charge that such analysis unavoidably
reflects the "... massive stability of the administrative structure
29
of government." Phrased less eloquently, the problem here is that
the budget figures whether for agencies or programs tend to be skewed.
Relatively large agencies with larger budgets tend to persist in
retaining larger budgets over time whereas relatively smaller agencies
persist in exhibiting relatively smaller budgets over time.
Accordingly, the correlation analyses of the incrementalists
heavily reflects the rank order (or "weight") of the funding bases of
the agencies they are observing. Lost is any meaningful investigation
of the annual funding changes (or "fair shares") of these agencies.
Figure 1 illustrates this problem. Despite the fact that two of the
hypothetical programs undergo an annual funding change which the de-
scriptive incrementalists would view as non-incremental (Programs A
and B), while a third declines to a degree some would see as a non-
incremental choice (Program C), the simple coefficient of correlation
remains extremely high.
Admittedly, it is impossible to claim that the agency budgets re-
viewed by the quantitative incrementalists do not in fact exhibit a
29
Natchez and Bupp, "Policy Priority," p. 955.
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Year T Year T + 1
Annual Funding
Changes
Agency A $ 10 $ 14 40%
Agency B $ 20 $ 28 40%
Agency C $ 30 $ 24 -20%
Agency D $ 40 $ 42 5%
Agency E $ 50 $ 57 14%
Total Budget $150 $165 10%
N = 5
r = .94323
r
2
= .88968
Figure 1. An Hypothetical Illustration of How the Weights of Agency
Funding Bases Can Obscure the Nature of Choices being made
as Reflected by the Magnitude of the Annual Funding Shifts
for Individual Agencies
pattern of incremental choice. However, on the basis of their work,
it is quite difficult to conclude that incremental decisions were
necessarily being made. All that has been demonstrated is that the
funding bases of agencies do not greatly shift from year to year in
terms of their relative magnitude.
Finally, the third criticism of the statistical incrementalists
is that their focus upon total agency budgets ignores the fact that
the descriptive incrementalists have persuasively demonstrated that
budgetary decisions generally involve issues and questions concerning
the annual funding change to be added or cut from a total funding
14
base. As a result, in addition to their other problems, the statis-
tical incrementalists have undermined the explanatory utility of their
research by employing a unit of analysis (i.e., total budgets) which
does not accurately reflect the focus of the decision process (i.e.,
the annual funding change rates) which they are investigating.
Serious problems have also been uncovered in the Natchez and
Bupp approach to budgeting. In its current state of development, it
is impossible to determine whether or not the policy entrepreneur
model has any relevance in explaining budget choice. Natchez and Bupp
present it in merely hypothetical, speculative terms and do not support
it with empirical evidence through interview or other sources. None-
theless, in light of the questions raised by Natchez and Bupp, some
effort will be made here to explore the influence of program heads in
the decision making process.
A second criticism of Natchez and Bupp concerns their quantita-
tive methodology, the statistical indicator entitled the prosperity
score. A formula for deriving this statistic is presented in Figure
2.
The prosperity score provides a standardized figure which shows
the ratio of a program's proportion of an agency budget in any specified
year to the averaged proportion of the agency's budget which the program
30
E.g., see Wildavsky, Politics , p. 15 and p. 60; Anton, Expen-
diture in Illinois , pp. 34-36 and pp. 100-101; and Fenno, Purse ,
pp. 318-319. A recent quantitative research piece offers further sup-
port on this point. See Wanat, "Bases of Incrementalism, " pp. 1225-
1226.
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P
Prosperity Score = — •
^
• loo
P it
where P = a program' s budget
i = a program
t = time expressed as a year
p
it
= the budget for any given program in any given year
£p
^ t
= the total agency budget in any year
p = the mean proportion a program represents of an
agency's budget over all years under consideration
Figure 2. Natchez and Bupp' s Prosperity Score
constitutes over an entire set of years. At best, it provides a very
blurry analytic window through which to view budgetary choice
.
Basically, the problems of the prosperity score arise from using
funding bases as a unit of analysis and an averaged proportion as a
denominator. As with the statistical incremental ists , the use of
funding bases in the numerator of the formula necessarily makes their
statistic an indirect approach by which to study budget choices. As
noted, budgetary decision makers appear to view budget choices in
terms of the amount which should be added to or cut from a budget.
Assuming the descriptive incrementalists are correct on this score,
then it follows that the statistical approach used to explore budget-
ary choice should (and can) more directly reflect this fact; i.e., the
formula should be based upon annual rates of change in budgeting, not
upon total budgets.
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Concerning Natchez and Bupp' s denominator, which is composed of
the proportion of a program's funding to an agency's funding averaged
over an entire set of years, the obvious criticism is that such a
denominator results in the loss of information, information which may
well be of considerable value. In tests of the prosperity score, it
was found that it established only the extent to which an annual pro-
portion of a program' s base to its agency budget fell above or below
the average proportion of those two items over time. In other words,
the apparent pattern of annual growth or decline of budget items was a
pattern of growth or decline related to the mean proportion, not to
the actual annual growth rates of either the program's or agency's
base funding.
In concrete terms, this means that a prosperity score of 88.0
signifies only that the proportion of a program's base to the agency's
base was 88 percent of the averaged proportion of these two values
over a set of years. This might signify that the program suffered a
cut in that year or it might signify that the program's funding base
simply grew more slowly than the agency's base. Relying on the pros-
perity score, it is impossible to determine which was the case.
Moreover, it is also impossible to determine either the size of the
program' s or agency" s shift or to obtain any direct sense of the
relationship between these two values for a given year. In short, the
prosperity score removed the quantitative study of budgeting from the
direct observation of annual choice, plus made the actual annual
patterns of budgetary growth or decline quite obscure.
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Towards a New Research Design
Issues to be considered
. In light of the above cited problems of the
literature on budgetary decision making, several issues were derived
which must be taken into account when constructing an adequate research
design for the empirical study of budgeting.
First, the design should include an investigation of budgeting
at both the agency and program levels of choice.
Second, the quantitative methodology employed should be directly
focused upon annual choice patterns. If possible, it should provide a
tentatively reliable indicator as to whether incremental or non-
incremental decision making is occurring, to include some notion of the
extent to which such types of choice are being made.
Third, interviews with formal actors should be conducted to deter-
mine not only general attitudes and behavior patterns common to budget-
ing, but also the attitudes and behaviors brought to bear on specific
decisions.
Fourth, the specific decisions explored should be scientifically
chosen random samples of the different types of decisions which the
quantitative analysis indicates are being made. This will serve to
insure the consistent focus between the quantitative and interview
analyses. In addition, it should also provide evidence on the extent
to which general attitudes and behavior patterns are reflected in spe-
cific, concrete choices, as well as evidence concerning the types of
factors and variables which influence or determine specific decisions.
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The research design
.
Bearing these points in mind, the following
research design has been constructed and implemented:
steP ! • First, municipal budget data for a ten-year period has
been obtained from two municipalities of similar size, but with dif-
ferent types of executive-legislative structures. The data base has
been limited in this fashion because of both limited resources and the
exploratory nature of this work.
The two cities chosen are highly typical of the moderate-to-
large sized central cities found in the Northeastern United States. 31
Compared to similar- sized cities in this region, both are relatively
old, exhibit low growth rates, possess relatively large ethnic popula-
tions, and have an established but declining manufacturing and indus-
32
trial economic base. One is atypical of the region in that it
possesses a manager-council form of government. However, for all cities
nationwide in the population range of these two cities, the percentage
possessing manager-council vs. mayor-council structures is roughly the
33
same.
31
In order to maximize frankness in the interviews, the author
has promised not to reveal either the names of the cities, nor of
individuals during the course of this work. In subsequent chapters,
the two cities will be referred to only as City A and City B.
3 descriptions of the economic base of each city were found in
Donald J. Bogue and Calvin L. Beale, Economic Areas of the United
States (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961); statistical
documentation of the decline in both cities of employment in manufac-
turing and other industrial sources of jobs was provided by U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, States and Areas,
1939-1974 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).
33
For cities with populations over 100,000 but less than 250,000,
a recent count was that seventy-two of such cities had mayor-council
19
For the sake of simplification and because of a primary interest
in investigating only those expenditure choices over which city offi-
cials have direct and annual control, the data gathered was limited to
the cities* general fund accounts. Such budgets allocate only locally
budget figures and federal and state categorical grants are thus
excluded from the analysis, except to the extent that a city contrib-
utes money to such enterprises from its general funds
.
Step 2
.
In the second step, the budget data was broken down by
major municipal agencies. Furthermore, two agency-level budget items
in each city (the General Government category and the Department of
Public Works) were broken down into their program-level components.
The analysis of program- level data is limited to these two agency-
level funding units because of the ready availability of comparable
program-level data for these agencies and because of the frequent non-
availability and/or non-comparability of the program-level data for
other agencies.
For the purposes of this research, the term agency or agency-
level is defined as follows:
a. The "agency- level" refers to those relatively large adminis-
trative structures of municipal governments which exist to fulfill a
general function and which are characterized by a relatively tall
raised-revenues plus, in recent years, revenue-sharing funds. Capital
governments while seventy had the council-manager form. See I
national City Management Association, The Municipal Year Book,
(Washington, D.C. : International City Management Association,
in.
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hierarchy and by several specialized administrative units which fulfill
fairly specific services peculiar to the general function of the parent
agency. For example, the policy department fulfills the general func-
tion of law enforcement; it is marked by a fairly elaborate hierarchy
;
and (possibly) it contains specialized administrative units to fulfill
such functions peculiar to law enforcement as patrolling, traffic con-
trol, homicide/drug/robbery investigations, policy laboratory testing,
anti-riot action, recruit training, internal security, police communi-
cations, and so forth.
b. The "program level" as used here refers to categories of
municipal expenditure which refer either to relatively specialized,
administrative sub-units of agency- level structures, or to some long or
short-term activity for which an agency- level structure is responsible.
One possible illustration of the former (i.e., the "sub-units") would
be the specialized offices of a police department cited above. A
further example are such common city offices as the city clerk,
treasurer, tax assessor, auditor, and so forth. Within most municipal
budgets, these offices are classified as administrative sub-units of an
agency-level budget category entitled "general administration" or
"general government," which in toto constitutes the overhead, or sup-
port service agencies of a city.
Exemplifying long or short-term activities are expenditures in
urban budgets for a variety of services. For instance, public works
departments frequently seek funds for such items as road repairs, snow
removal, sewer installation, and so forth. Such activities could be
21
undertaken by special offices within the department, but might also be
accomplished by general labor crews at special times of the year.
Thus, budget requests are presented as the services to be rendered, not
only by the specialized, sub-unit structure of the agency.
Step_3. The third step in constructing a research design has
been to develop a quantitative indicator by which to categorize budget
choices tentatively as either incremental or non- incremental
. Working
from the critique of the existing quantitative literature, two points
were used to guide and structure the development of a useful indicator.
These were as follows:
a. As nearly as possible, the indicator should reflect the gen-
eral manner in which decision makers make their choices: i.e., by
focusing their attention upon the amount to be added or cut from a
previous year's funding levels. Accordingly, it was concluded that the
indicator should in some manner be based upon either the dollar or
percent rate of annual change absorbed by agencies or programs. Since
percent rates of change are more comparable, it was decided to employ
that representation of change rather than the total dollar amount.
b. Next, some way had to be developed to relate the budget
choices being made to the general availability of additional revenues
in a given year. As noted earlier, severe problems in analysis can
arise when one simply assumes that a percent annual funding change by
itself provides a useful indicator of the types of choices being made.
As will be recalled, the notion of incremental budget choice
involves providing a program or an agency with a "fair share" of a
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total budget change. This "fair share" is presumedly added to or sub-
tracted from the program's or agency's funding base . In a very impor-
tant sense the question of whether incremental or non- incremental
decision making is occurring is a question involving the share of avail-
able funds which an agency or program receives in relation to the amount
of new monies available to a total budget. In other words, whether an
incremental or non- incremental decision is made depends on whether a
program or agency receives either a fair or unfair share of available
dollars in relation to other programs or agencies.
In order to determine an agency's or program's annual "share,"
the first step in constructing an indicator was to calculate the percent
annual funding changes (afc' s) for every budget item under analysis.
The formula for the afc is found in Figure 3.
P. - P
(1) afc = J~ • 100%
p it- 1
Ag
it "
Ag
it - 1
(3) afc. = —~r — ~ ' 100%
Ag Ag
t _ 1
where P = a program' s annual budget
Ag - an agency' s annual budget
r = any program or agency
t = time expressed as a year
1 = one year
afc
P
=i a program' s annual funding change
af c
Ag
= an agency* s annual funding change
Figure 3. Formulae for Program and Agency Annual Funding Changes
(afc' s)
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As noted earlier, Wildavsky, Fenno, and most recently, Bailey
and O'Connor have all maintained that the percent afc for programs or
agencies provides a reliable indicator of whether incremental or non-
incremental choices are being made. 34 The percent afc does provide us
a direct representation of the annual growth or decline of budget
items. However, there is a flaw in using this statistic as an indi-
cator of the types of decisions being made: namely, it ignores the
relationship of the afc' s to the general availability of new revenues
for a total budget. For example, if an agency's budget increases by
40 percent in a given year, Wildavsky, Fenno, and Bailey and O'Connor
would all claim that a non- incremental decision had occurred. But, if
the municipal budget of which that agency is a component also obtained
a 40 percent total increase, is the decision on that agency actually a
non- incremental distribution or does it represent simply an incre-
mental distribution of a fair share of available additional revenues to
that agency? The argument here is that such a case would indicate an
incremental decision, indeed a case of perfect or ideal incremental
decision making.
Theoretically, assuming a perfectly mechanistic incremental
decision process, every program or agency should absorb a percent afc
equal to the afc received by the city budget. This would represent a
perfect or ideal fair share of available new revenues, a share which
34
Wildavsky, Politics , p. 14; Fenno, Purse , p. 354; Bailey and
O'Connor, "Measuring the Muddles," p. 64.
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permits all programs or agencies within the city to command exactly the
same proportion of the total budget from one year to the next.
Derived from the shift- share analysis of students of regional
35
economic development, a statistic has been developed to gauge the
degree of variation which exists between the afc of a program or agency
to the afc of the total budget. This statistic will be referred to as
the Ratio of Annual Shares. In Figure 4 is a formula which may be used
to calculate this ratio.
Using this formula, we might find that an afc
p
has a 1.00 to 1.00
ratio to the afc
M
-
!n such a case, as noted before, the program has
received a perfect fair share of available new revenues. Moreover, to
the extent the ratio varies from a 1.00 to 1.00 relationship we have
evidence that decisions are being made which vary from a perfect or
ideal incremental decision process .
For example, in a hypothetical city where municipal revenues rise
by 10 percent in a given year, we might also find that four programs
within a given agency have obtained budget increases of 5 percent,
10 percent, 30 percent, and 40 percent. Applying the formula in
In a brief, shift- share analysis is used to explore which sec-
tors of a region' s economy appear to be responsible for the overall
economic growth or decline of that region. The literature employing it
(or debating its merits) is fairly extensive. However, some of the
basic articles dealing with it are: H. James Brown, "Shift-Share Pro-
jections of Regional Growth: An Empirical Test," Journal of Regional
Science 9 (1969) : 1-18; Edgar S. Dunn, Jr., "A Statistical and Analytical
Technique for Regional Analysis," Papers and Proceedings of the Regional
Science Association 6 (1960) ; 97-112; James Franklin, Jr. and James
Hughes, "A Test of Shift and Share Analysis as a Predictive Device,"
Journal of Regional Science 13 (1973) : 223-231; and H.S. Perloff, E.S.
Dunn, Jr., E.E. Lampard, R. F. Muth, Regions, Resources and Economic
Growth (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1960).
25
Program- level Agency-level
p
it "
p
it + i A9 it. - Ag
P
it A9<
M. - M.it it + 1
^it + 1
it
M. - M.it it + 1
M
it
afc
P afcAg
afCM ~ afc.
MM
'
R
s
where P = a program's budget
Ag = an agency's budget
M = a municipal budget
i = a program, agency, or city
t = a given year
1 = one year
afCp = a program's annual funding change
afc = an agency's annual funding change
afc = a city's annual funding change
M
R
s
= the ratio of annual change in a sub-unit's budget to
the annual change in a unit's budget
Figure 4. Formulae for Calculating the Ratio of Annual Shares (R )
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Figure 5 to these afc' s, we calculate R^s of
.5, 1.0, 3.0, and 4.0,
respectively. From these R
g
's, we have thus established the relative
extent by which the actual afc
p
's agree with or vary from the "ideal"
afc
p
which those programs would be expected to receive as an "ideal"
fair share in an "ideal" incremental process. Respectively, the four
programs have received one- half, perfect unity, three times, and four
times more money than one would predict in a theoretically "perfect"
incremental choice process.
An important question concerning the formula for R is why afc
s p
and afc
ftg
are divided by afc^ If we are attempting to determine the
differences between program- level and agency-level budgeting, why not
divide the afc by its relevant afc while continuing to divide the
afc ' s by the afc ?
Ag M
The reasons for dividing the annual funding change of programs
by the annual funding change of the total municipal budget is fairly
straightforward. By following this procedure, all budgetary choices
within the city may be viewed within the context of the revenue con-
straints facing the city as a whole. Both Crecine and Anton have
emphasized the importance of this general context, arguing in effect
that the concern for minimizing increases in tax rates leads both
chief executives and legislators to seek to hold increases in public
36
expenditures to a minimal rate of growth. Accordingly, since the
"3 fc*.
See Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving , p. 40 and T.J. Anton,
"Roles and Symbols in the Determination of State Expenditures," Midwest
Journal of Political Science ll(February 1967):30-31.
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summed result of these efforts is reflected in the afc for the total
municipal budget, then logically, it is the afc
M
which should be used
as the denominator for calculating the R
g
's for both programs and
agencies.
Moreover, to use the afc 's as the denominator for calculating
the program-level R
s
's is to assume that budgetary decision makers
provide a budget boost to an agency which in turn is passed on and
divided up among the program- level components of that agency. For the
urban (and even state levels) of government, such a presumption borders
the absurd, riding in face of both common and scholarly knowledge of
how budgets are overwhelmingly handled at this level. As suggested by
both Crecine and Anton, state and local budgetary processes center
37upon the review of line-item requests, which, in turn, comprise
either the program-level budgets of agencies or an agency budget
itself, depending upon the size and nature of the agency. This means
that the total boost or cut absorbed by an agency is simply the sum of
the increases or cuts absorbed by the line- item amounts which comprise
either its own budget directly or its program-level elements, which,
when summed, equal the total agency budget. Consequently, when an
agency with identifiable program- level components obtains, for example,
a 10 percent afc, that afc represents the dollar sum of the boosts
received by those various components, which in turn may have received
a variety of afc' s reflecting cuts or boosts in their own sums. To
37
Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving , p. 41; Anton, Expendi-
ture in Illinois, pp. 186-188.
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calculate these program's R ' s by dividing them by the afc wouldS Ag
produce very misleading results, providing us only with indications of
how the programs within that agency stacked up against one another
rather than with all other programs or agencies within the city.
Moreover, if, for example, all of these programs received non-
incremental boosts then logically so too would the agency's budget.
Accordingly, dividing their afc 's by the resultant afc would serve
P Ag
only to cancel out the non- incremental nature of the program- level
shifts. To prevent such an error, it becomes evident that the afc
p
's
as well as the afc ' s must be divided by the afc in calculating
Ag M
their R ' s.
S
Step 4. Another important question is how to determine the
level of R at which a non- incremental choice might be said to have
S
occurred. As noted earlier, if R
g
= 1.00, it seems likely that an
incremental choice is indicated. The next step is thus to determine a
ratio at which we may assume that such is not the case. As a first
step to establish an R
g
indicative of non- incremental choice, criteria
guiding the choice should be stated. The desired ratio of non-
incremental choice will be chosen in light of the following consid-
erations:
a. It should be at sufficient variance from a ratio of 1:1 to
suggest that a decision has been made to provide a program or agency
with a probable "unfair" share of the available revenues.
b. It must be sufficiently large so as to reflect the
obvious
fact that some degree of variation is unavoidable for reasons
found
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within the incremental model (e.g., an agency head might be a poor
advocate; the cutting bias of a budget officer may fall somewhat dis-
proportionately upon different agencies, etc.).
The standard deviation of the ratios which are obtained in any
given year for any given set of budget items meets this criteria. How
much variation from a ratio of 1.00 to 1.00 is normal due to factors
within the incremental model? One answer is to assume that such
normal variation will vary from year to year given varying levels of
new available monies and given random factors which will arise from an
incremental decision process. Standard deviation units around a mean
ratio provide a fairly flexible way by which to determine the amount of
variation which will occur in any given year due to such factors.
Of course, standard deviation units cannot be assumed to be
definitive indicators of the normal degree of variation which might
arise in an incremental budget process. Nor may it simply be taken
for granted that the budgetary processes of the two cities to be
investigated are basically or consistently incremental processes of
choice. These are matters for empirical investigation. Therefore,
the use of standard deviation units as a mechanism by which to cate-
gorize specific decisions as either incremental or non-incremental
38
will serve as the basis of the following three hypotheses:
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It must be noted that the standard deviations for the Rg 's
will
be calculated around a hypothetical mean of 1.00. This procedure will
be followed because in the model of "ideal" incrementalism, every case
should have a R of 1.00 and, therefore, the mean of all cases should
be 1.00. Accordingly, the standard deviations presented in this
research will in essence provide measure of deviation from the model,
not from the actual mean of the distribution. This is a necessary step
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Hypothesis 1: R
g
«
s which fall within plus or minus one standard
deviation unit of the mean R
g
for a given year will indicate probable
incremental decisions.
Hypothesis 2: r ' s which fall beyond plus or minus one standard
deviation unit, but which do not exceed plus or minus two standard
deviation units around the mean R
g
for a given year will indicate pos-
sible non- incremental decisions.
Hypothesis 3: R 's which fall beyond plus or minus two standard
deviation units around the mean R
g
of a given year will indicate prob-
able non- incremental decisions.
A more detailed discussion of this "s unit" approach is presented
in later chapters. For now, the manner by which the usefulness of
these hypothetical categories will be determined takes us to our fifth
step in constructing a new research design for the study of budgetary
choice.
Step 5 . Using stratified random samples of budget choices cate-
gorized in accordance with the hypotheses, municipal officials involved
in the making of the samples decisions will be questioned about the
values and behaviors which underpin budgeting in general, and about
the factors which led to those specific decisions. This data will pro-
vide two ways to refute the hypotheses. First, if budgeting in
general is not viewed as occurring in incremental terms, then the
because, as will be made clear in Chapter II, actual means tend to re-
flect the incremental or non- incremental nature of the decisions being
made in any given year.
31
categories of incremental and non- incremental choice may have no
validity. Accordingly, the hypotheses, which assume such validity,
would have to be rejected.
Secondly, if budgeting in general is perceived in incremental
terms, the respondents' opinions as to whether specific decisions were
the result of incremental or non- incremental factors assumes great
importance. In essence, these opinions will yield a set of classifi-
cations by which sample decisions may be classified as incremental or
non- incremental. These classifications will, in turn, be compared to
the classifications of the data yielded by the three hypotheses.
Agreements and disagreements between the sets of classifications can
be calculated. And, by this means, a tentative estimate of the utility
of the standard deviation approach can be obtained. A more detailed
discussion of this methodology and of the assumptions which underpin
it will be provided in Chapter IV.
Step 6. Assuming that standard deviation units are found to
possess some degree of utility, an important question remains: Does
this approach have more or less utility than other conceivable tech-
niques? Accordingly, the final step in this research design will be
to compare the "s unit" approach to other devices for classifying
budgetary decisions, devices such as those suggested by Fenno,
Wildavsky, and others.
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An Outline of the Remaining Chapters
The structure of the balance of this dissertation will be as
follows:
In Chapter II, a methodological digression will be explored. As
will be seen, the R
g
statistic generates assumptions not only about
ideal incremental decisions, but also about ideal incremental pro-
cesses. Using the hypothetical mean of such a process, tests of means
will be used to classify whole arrays of budget data as incremental or
non- incremental. Employing other techniques for classifying such
arrays, the utility of this approach will be examined and evaluated.
In Chapter III, the application of the research design discussed
in this chapter begins in earnest. Here, the findings from the inter-
views will be discussed. These findings will be compared to a behav-
ioral model of municipal budgeting in order to determine whether bud-
geting in general within the two case cities conforms to the roles,
values, and behaviors one would expect in an incremental process.
The comparisons of the respondents' classifications of the
sample decisions with the classifications generated by the "s unit"
approach will be presented in Chapter IV. Here, we will seek to
determine the utility of the "s unit" technique, and to test the three
hypotheses generated by that technique.
Next, in Chapter V, the utility of the "s unit" approach will be
compared to a number of other techniques for classifying budgetary
choice. Here, an effort will be made to determine whether the "s
unit" approach is less, equally or more useful as a choice classifier.
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And finally, a summary of the methodological conclusions and the
substantive findings will be presented in Chapter VI. The ability of
other models of urban policy analysis to account for budgetary incre-
mentalism will also be examined.
Summary
In sum, this research project will attempt to make a significant
contribution to our understanding of municipal budgeting as a political-
bureaucratic process. In part, this contribution will consist of an
analysis of a new technique for classifying budgetary choice, i.e.,
for operationalizing the concepts of incremental and non-
incremental decisions. And, in part, this contribution will also con-
sist of efforts to confirm or deny the validity of the incremental
model as a means for comprehending urban budgeting. This latter
contribution rests, of course, upon the ability to demonstrate that
incremental rolo systems do in fact generate a predominance of incre-
mental choices, a causal linkage never satisfactorily tested because
of the failure to adequately operationalize the different types of
decisions.
In closing, it must be stressed that no statistically valid
inferences will result from this study. Using a two city case study
approach, the purpose of this research is largely confined to an
initial exploration of an obviously costly and time consuming research
design. However, this is a necessary first step because, given the
cost, a more ambitious study of a sample of cities within a state,
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region, or the nation would be justified only if this design shows
promise as an aid to our comprehension of urban budgeting. In short,
no final truths are expected to emerge here. However, it is hoped
that new directions for the pursuit of "political reality" will be
found.
CHAPTER I I
THE RATIO OF SHARES AS AN INDICATOR OF INCREMENTALISM
:
SOME STATISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Introduction
In this chapter, the focus will be upon the utility of the ratio
of shares (R ) formula as a statistical indicator of increraentalism in
budgetary processes. To accomplish this, a model of an ideal incre-
mental process based on the R
g
formula will first be presented. From
this model an hypothesis will then be developed by which to gauge the
extent to which R
g
' s obtained from sets of budget data approximate
this ideal. In addition to presenting the tests of this hypothesis,
this chapter will also present an analysis of the correlation coeffi-
cients between sets of R * s from one year to the next.
As discussed in Chapter I, the ratio of shares for any particular
municipal budget choice is equal to its annual funding change divided
by the annual funding change for the entire city's budget. In sym-
bolic terms, this appears as follows:
s
An Ideal Model of an Incremental Budgetary
Process and an Hypothesis
afc
.
1
R
S
whore R = the ratio of shares
S
afc. = the annual funding change for any particular agency or
program of a given city,
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and afc
M
= tne annua l funding change for an entire municipal
government.
Moreover, as was further noted, an ideal incremental choice is
said to occur when the result of this formula equals 1.00 (or a ratio
of one to one). Thus, for example, a municipal program which receives
a ten percent boost in a city where expenditures rise by ten percent
would constitute an ideal incremental decision. Again, to the extent
that the R varies from a value of 1.00, we have evidence of a budget
choice which varies from an incremental one .
In other words, R^ = 1.00 represents a standard of incremental-
ism against which actual budget choices may be compared. Chapter V
will seek to determine the extent of variation from an R^ of 1.00
which an individual R
g
must manifest in order to be labelled a non-
incremental decision. Our concern in this chapter is whether a model
of ideal incrementalism may be constructed in order to establish an
indicator by which to decide whether a complete set of budget choices
is incremental or non- incremental in nature.
The model of an ideal incremental process (not decision) which
has been devised is a somewhat simplistic extension of the notion that
an ideal incremental choice is an Rg
of 1.00. In brief, if R
g
= 1.00
constitutes an ideal incremental choice, then logically an ideal
incremental process is one in which all decisions are ideal incre-
mental choices.
Thus, by way of illustration, such a process would operate as
shown in Figure 5.
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Year 1 Year 2
Budget Base Budget Base %afc R
- s-
$ 100 $ 110 10% 1.00
$ 200 $ 220 10% 1.00
$ 300 $ 330 10% 1.00
$ 400 $ 440 10% 1.00
$ 500 $ 550 10% 1.00
Total =$1 , 500 $1, 650 10%
Figure 5. An Ideal Incremental Process
If we accept that an ideal incremental process is one in which
each decision has an R of 1.00, then it follows that the mean of an
S
ideal incremental process is 1.00 as well.
This value constitutes a standard against which the R
g
actually
obtained from a set of budget data may be compared. As will be shown,
the distribution of R
g
values tends to roughly approximate a normal
curve. Accordingly, the t-score formula to test differences between
means may be used to demonstrate whether the Rg
of an actual set of
budget data is statistically different from the ideal mean expected
from an ideal incremental process.
Before setting forth the formulae to be used, one adjustment in
the formula for obtaining R
g
values should be established. In order
to simplify calculations and to bring the data in line with the concept
of a normal (or test) distribution, all Rg's have been linearly trans-
formed by subtracting the value 1.00 from them. This means that the
adjusted R
g
of an ideal incremental choice is now 0.00, while,
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concomitantly, the mean R
g
of an ideal incremental process is also
0.00. The formula for an adjusted R
g
appears as follows:
af c
.
adj. R = ——- - 1.00
S af c
M
The situation of experimental interest here is whether the R of
S
an actual set of data may be used to determine if that set is signifi-
cantly more non- incremental than another. Stated in formal terms,
this results in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: For a given set of budget data, there will be a
significant difference between the obtained mean (adj. R ) and the
s
ideal adjusted mean of 0.0.
H = For a given set of budget data, there will be no signifi-
cant difference between the obtained mean and the expected mean of
0.0.
It is the null hypothesis of Hypothesis I which this research is
most interested in "proving" valid. That is, if the model of ideal
incrementalism has any validity then a high percentage of tests should
indicate no significant difference between the ideal and the obtained
means. This suggests that, in terms of persuasive argumentation, it
would be more costly to fail to reject a false HQ than it would be to
fail to accept a valid HQ .
Thus, the significance level for testing
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the null hypothesis will be set at both .05 and .10 in two two-tailed
tests.
The formula used to test the hypothesis is as follows:
M
.
- E (M) adj. r - E(adj. R )
t = —-— or 2_
est. O est. oM M
where t = the resultant t- score
M. = the obtained mean
l
E(M) = the expected mean of 0.00
est. o = the estimated standard error
M
adj. R = the obtained mean for any particular set of adjusted R 'sb S
and
E(adj. R ) = the expected adjusted mean of 0.00.
As noted, two two- tailed tests will be employed, letting a = .05 and
.10, respectively.
There is a crucial point which needs to be made regarding the
use of this formula. In this context, the t test is not being used as
a true test of significance. If it were, the question under review
would be whether the findings drawn from a sample of data may be
justifiably inferred to hold for a real, but unmeasured population.
Indeed, the formula itself is a modified version of the formula for
testing whether a mean obtained from a sample is significantly dif-
ferent from a grand mean.
1
See the discussion of "Type I" and "Type II" errors in Linton C.
Freeman, Elementary Applied Statistics For Students in Behavioral
Science (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 154-56.
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In short, what is being done here is to use this t test-derived
formula as an indicator
.
The formula is not being applied to a sample,
but to a complete array of annual budget data for particular organ-
izational categories. It is not being used to determine whether a
sample mean is significantly different from a grand mean but to
determine if a population's mean is significantly different from the
presumed mean of a hypothetical, but non-existent ideal array. To the
extent that this formula "tests" the hypothesis, all that is being
revealed is that one set of data may be tentatively classified as
incremental, while another may be tentatively classified as non-
incremental. Neither the hypothesis nor the null hypothesis can be
rejected in the normal sense on the basis of this test, because we are
not dealing here with a true test of significance.
Before proceeding with the application of the formula to the
data, a discussion will be provided on the program and agency-level
budget data drawn from the two cities. This will help to explain why
a t test formula is being used as an indicator, as well as to improve
the reader's general understanding of the nature of the data being
examined.
A Description of the Data from
the Two Case Cities
As noted in Chapter I, budget data from the general fund
accounts of two Massachusetts cities were gathered for the period
ranging from FY1967 to FY1976. This resulted not in ten budgets per
city but in nine due to a one-time state-mandated changeover in the
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fiscal year format to bring the state fiscal year in line with the
federal fiscal year. Occurring during 1973 and 1974, the adjustment
resulted in one budget period lasting for eighteen months. The data
for this period, labelled herein as FY1973, was prorated over a twelve
month period to make it comparable to the data obtained for the other
twelve month periods. Following this procedure leaves us without a
FY1974.
With nine budgets, we have eight funding change periods and for
each of these, annual funding changes were calculated for each agency-
level category and for the programs within the "general government"
and public works categories. In order to retain the true relationship
between the sum of the programs, the total agency funding, and the
total general fund budget, no program was omitted from the calculation
of adj. R 's because of size.
S
Graphs showing the distribution of adj. R^s for each city are
found on the next several pages. Figures 6 and 7 show the distri-
bution of all the adj. R
g
's calculated for City A and City B, respec-
tively, over the eight funding change periods. Figures 8 and 9 ex-
hibit the adj. R ' s for the agency- level categories of City A and
City B, respectively. Figures 10 and 11 compare the distributions of
the general government programs of each city, while Figures 12 and 13
2
compare the adj. R
g
distributions for their public works programs. A
complete list of the agencies and programs for each city is found in
2
The choice of an R value of .5 for interval width was based
upon a desire to retain the sense of whole R values in the graphs.
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Appendix A along with their afc's and adj. R 's for each funding
change period. Appendix B presents the distribution graphs for each
category within each city by funding change periods.
Several points concerning these graphs should be made. While
too peaked, Figures 6, 7, 10, and 11 show the strongest resemblance to
a normal distribution. The first two of these show the distribution
for all of the Rg's calculated in the two cities, while the other two
show the distribution for the programs in the general government
category. Figures 8 and 9 show a somewhat skewed distribution.
However, the agency-level distribution of City A is skewed toward an
R
g
of -1.00, while that of City B is skewed with almost mirror-like
exactness toward an R of +1.00. Based only upon these data, this
suggests that particular factors were at work in each city's budget
process to slow or to promote growth over this time period. It does
not strongly suggest that the distribution for the entire universe of
R 's for the agencies in each city is of a naturally skewed nature.
s
The agency- level graphs in Appendix B offer additional support for
this point.
Whether anything approaching a normal distribution is applicable
to the programs in the public works agencies of each city (especially
City B) is difficult to say. It is a matter of debate whether the
Since whole R values were considered too large, and since intervals of
.25 were founo. to be too small according to the standard formula for
calculating interval widths, .5 interval widths were chosen as a viable
middle-ground position. In regards to the standard formula for calcu-
lating interval widths, see Lawrence L. Lapin, Statistics : Meaning and
Method (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1975), pp. 23-25.
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patterns presented reflect the true nature of their distribution
throughout time, peculiarities arising from the manner in which the
data is grouped, or factors affecting choice peculiar to this ten-year
period. The annual DPW graphs in Appendix B offer little further
enlightenment.
In any event, the distributions generally appear to be unimodal,
fairly smooth, and with modes which would probably fall within plus or
minus one standard deviation of the mean. While significantly differ-
ent statistically from a normal distribution, they are probably
"close enough" to warrant the use of a t test approach, at least as an
indicator. As William L. Hays states concerning t tests,
... So long as the sample size is even moderate for each
group quite severe departures from normality seem to make little
practical difference in the conclusions reached. . . . (T) he
departure from normality can make more difference in a one-
tailed than in a two- tailed result. ... By and large, how-
ever, this assumption (of normality) may be violated almost
with impunity provided that sample size is not extremely
small. 4
Hayes' comments refer, of course, to the use of t tests as tests
of significance wherein the problem being resolved is whether the
findings drawn from a sample may be extrapolated out to an entire pop-
ulation. As noted, this application of the tests, the question of
statistical significance is of no real concern. Here, we are simply
seeking to use the t tests as indicators of whether or not a complete
3Chi-square goodness of fit tests were applied to the data to
make this determination.
4William L. Hays, Statistics for the Social Sciences , 2nd ed.
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1973), p. 410.
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set of annual budget data for a particular organizational category may
be labelled as incremental or non- incremental . Logically, if the data
under review is data to which, in terms of distribution, a t test
might be applied, all that is resolved is that the case for using
t tests as indicators is made stronger than it otherwise would be. In
sum, the use of the t tests is justifiable both because the distri-
bution of the data is adequate for their application, and because they
are being used here as indicators, not as true tests of significance.
Further information concerning the data is presented in Tables 1
and 2, tables which present some descriptive statistics for the Rg's
from City A and City B, respectively. As may be seen, the tables
first present these statistics for the three major categories (i.e.,
the agencies, general government programs, and public works programs)
for the entire ten-year period (1967-1976). These summary materials
are then followed by the same statistics for each funding change
period. It should be noted that the statistics were calculated ex-
cluding R
g
values greater than ±6.00.
5
As may be seen, over 80 percent of the R ' s obtained fall within9
±1.00 of the E(adj. R ). And skewness is less than a ±1.00 in over
60 percent of the cases.
In addition, it should also be noted that the Rg 's
exhibited in
the tables demonstrate considerable variation from the E (adj . Rg )
.
5
This value was chosen because the graphs strongly suggest that
the vast majority of R values tend to fall between ±6.00. Beyond this
point, the incidence of R values tends to become increasingly sporadic
and random.
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR R DATA OF CITY A WITH
VALUES > THAN AN R O^ 6.0 EXCLUDED
Mean Standard
Error
Standard
Deviation
Skewness
For Each Category: All Years
Combined
Agencies . z by . Joz i o q i n An— I . /4 /
Gen. Govt. Programs . bU O O Q l riQ ci . uy D JOT. JO /
DPW Programs .249 .173 .693 .197
For City A Agencies by Year
1967-68 1.954 .500 1.500 - .640
1968-69 2.831 .674 2.022 - .631
1969-70 -.506 .380 1.262 -1.864
1970-71 -.910 .370 1.172 1.355
1971-72 .100 .195 .617 .137
1972-73 -.270 .138 .436 - .211
1973-75 .930 . Z. Z <L 703 - . 340
1975-76 -.758 .465 1.472 -1.591
For City A Gen. Govt.
Programs by Year
1967-68
1968- 69
1969- 70
1970- 71
1971- 72
1972- 73
1973- 75
1975-76
.794
.912
.145
-.789
-.412
-.955
.250
-.573
.635
.729
.288
.179
. 347
.435
.301
.343
2.540
2.827
1. 320
.860
1. 514
2.042
1.413
1.535
-
.823
.461
1.978
.134
-2.088
-
.145
1.377
1.563
For Citv A DPW Programs by Year
1967-68
1968- 69
1969- 70
1970- 71
1971- 72
1973-75
1975-76
.869
2.364
-.833
-.241
-.461
.786
-.625
.877
.761
.378
.446
.273
.350
.237
3.163
2.636
1.513
1.726
1.059
1.308
.856
- .537
- .484
- .485
2.526
.128
- .321
.481
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR R DATA OF CITY B
WITH VALUES > THAN AN R„ of 6.0 EXCLUDED
Mean Standard Standard Skewness
Error Deviation
For Each Category: All Years
Combined
Agencies .165 .304 1.052 -1.483
Gen. Govt. Programs .680 .144 .642 .338
DPW Programs .305 .608 1.721 .551
For City B Agencies by Year
1967-68 .936 .527 1.748 .403
1968-69 1.517 .727 2.299 .786
1969-70 -.485 .347 1.150 -1.154
1970-71 .204 .310 1.030 -1.346
1971-72 -.211 . 544 1.805 - .466
1972-73 .180 .349 1.048 1.000
1973-75 -.537 .878 2.483 - .314
1975-76 -.246 .586 1.853 - .816
For City B Gen. Govt. Programs
by Year
1967- 68
1968- 69
1969- 70
1970- 71
1971- 72
1972- 73
1973- 75
1975-76
1.230
.496
-.214
-.639
.326
1.288
.707
-.143
.493
.518
.151
.245
.248
.658
.709
.403
1.907
1.795
.524
.949
.991
2.631
2.745
1.611
1.321
1.592
1.239
.340
1.836
- .288
-
.456
-1.188
For City B DPW Programs by Year
1967- 68
1968- 69
1969- 70
1970- 71
1971- 72
1972- 73
1973- 75
1975-76
-.662
1.539
-.576
-1.358
-2.046
-.629
.410
-.272
.601
1.029
1.217
1.184
.611
1.984
1.446
.413
1.202
2.722
3.219
2.368
1.366
2.867
3.234
1.013
-
.536
.329
-
.310
- .936
.146
- .407
.650
- .651
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With a range extending from 2.831 to -2.872, it is at least safe to
state that budgetary decision processes clearly diverge from the ideal
incremental process to varying degrees depending upon both time and
the particular decision process being focused upon. If nothing else,
the R
g
format helps to highlight such yearly variation.
This completes the presentation of an overview of the data. We
now proceed to the "testing" of the hypothesis.
A "Test" of the Hypothesis
To repeat, the hypothesis states the following:
Hypothesis : There will be a significant difference between the
obtained adj. R for any given set of data and the E(adj. R ) of 0.00.
D S
The assumption underlying this hypothesis is that the finding of
a significant difference indicates that the decision process gener-
ating such an adj. R is a non- incremental one, given a unimodal
,
s
roughly normal distribution of the data. Conversely, in the event
that no significant difference exists between the obtained and ex-
pected mean, then we have an indication that the process is incremen-
tal in nature, again given a unimodal, roughly normal distribution.
As stated, the formula used to test this hypothesis was:
X - E(X) _
adj. R
s
-
E(adj. R
s
)
1 SE SE
Since the null hypothesis was expected to prove valid far more
frequently than the hypothesis itself (i.e., it seemed likely that
most sets of data represent the outcomes of an incremental decision
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process) the problem of accepting a false null hypothesis was believed
to outweigh the problem of rejecting a valid null hypothesis. There-
fore, to make the analysis more sensitive to the possibility of sig-
nificant differences between the obtained and expected means, two
relatively low levels of significance were employed by which to eval-
uate the t- scores. There were a .05 level and a .10 level.
A further problem arose concerning whether to include or to
exclude outlyers in calculating the means. Excluding them seemed
likely to result in a pattern of findings over-representing the pres-
ence of incremental decision making. However, including the outlyers
at full value presented the danger that an extreme case could so
affect the mean that the results would appear more non-incremental
than they really were.
In light of this problem, it was concluded that the tests of
significance should be run on the data as manipulated in a variety of
ways. Therefore, the tests were first applied to the data with
outlyers greater than 6.0 excluded. Next, the tests were applied to
the data with the outlyers included but with their values "corrected"
to an R
g
of no greater than 7.0 or 30.0, respectively. By this tech-
nique, it was hoped that the danger of the extreme outlyer (i.e., with
true values greater than 7.0 or 30.0, respectively) could be offset.
However, at the same time, more of the "full flavor" of the entire
distribution would hopefully be retained than was the case with the
outlyers excluded altogether. Finally, the tests were applied
to data
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with the full value of all outlyers retained. The logical expressions
for these four manipulations of the data are as follows:
(a) If R > 6.0, then R =0.00
B S
(b) R
g
< 7.0
(c) R < 30.0
The results of the tests of significance for each of the four
data manipulations are presented in Table 3 (for City A) and Table 4
(for City B). The number of "No's" presented indicate that there was
no significant difference between the actual and ideal means. For
each annual set of data, there is a total of eight possible "No's," a
figure derived from the four types of data manipulations listed above,
multiplied by two levels of significance (.05 and .10).
Overall, Tables 3 and 4 strongly suggest that most of the budget
choices of both cities during the 1967-1975 period were made within
incremental processes. As can be seen, there is a clear trend where-
in, for each year' s data, a majority of the tests indicate that there
is no significant difference between the actual and the ideal means.
Table 5 summarizes these two tables by classifying each organi-
zational category's annual data according to the number of "no signif-
icance" results generated. To facilitate an understanding of this
table, it should be kept in mind that data for the organizational
categories of each city were collected for eight funding change per-
iods. Three organizational categories multiplied by eight funding
change periods yields an N of twenty- four change periods per city.
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The percentages presented in the third and sixth columns of the table
were calculated by dividing the numbers appearing in the second and
fifth columns, respectively, by the N of twenty-four.
TABLE 5
THE INCIDENCE OF THE NUMBER OF TESTS OF MEANS OUT OF A TOTAL
OF EIGHT TESTS PER ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORY OF DATA INDICATE
AN INCREMENTAL DECISION PROCESS (AS DERIVED FROM
TABLES 3 AND 4)
City A City B
C c
O rH o
tji rotn <u tr nJtf) -H <u
C 3 0) in ui C 2 0) U) U)
•h C V) *H d) ---I C (J) -HO)
+j qt/)(/i o,c -p c m « ox:
J) H fSQJrH (DEH Oj rH < <D rH <j) H
u m ocu Q CO) Q
rH
(0
(1)
U
(/) U5
O rH
u 0)
0 >
0 H 0)
Cm r^
0)
o C 0)
w c 0 y)
U) 0) H OJ
0) T> M x;
u •H •H
0 U U
V-l c OJ +j
a> H Q <d
H 4J >4-l O -P -H -P ^ O > 4J
•OC ^0) rHfd T3C OMQ) H id
CO) urJ OJ CO) J *J
o3 ucq) co) a) uc<u co)
cnhw COU) Ctf) ui M to COf G, w4JUU) <D-H0> <£(/)(/) 4-)UU) 0) -H (1) <C (/) U)
U) C
-O 01 £ CD rH (/) C <D D W X <DrHQJHU -H-HH H-IOO) 0)HU -H-HH 4-1 O 0)HO uu oo> h 5 ou oo>
V-i OJ CM COJ+J HO)
J « id h HQrrJ dfi 0< iH
8 15 62. 5% 8 18 75.0%
7 2 8. 3 7 1 4.2
6 3 12. 5 6 2 8.3
5 1 4.2 5 1 4.2
0 3 12.5 4 1 4.2
1
N=24 100.0% N=24 100.1%
Making an arbitrary assumption that an incremental decision
process is indicated when at least five of the eight tests show no
significant difference between the obtained adj. Rg and the
E(adj. R
g
),
we find that 87.5 percent of the funding periods for City
A are
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possibly incremental processes, while 91.7 percent of the funding per-
iods for City B fall in that category.
Unfortunately, such findings cannot be taken at face-value
because we have no way of knowing for certain whether the tests pos-
sess any empirical validity. Clearly, their value as indicators needs
to be double-checked against other possible approaches for indicating
whether a budget process is incremental or not.
One alternative type of indicator would be to calculate the
incidence of non- incremental decisions occurring within a process.
Logically, it can be maintained that an incremental budgeting process
should exhibit a lower incidence of non- incremental decisions than a
non- incremental process.
In order to calculate the rate of non-incrementalism, each
adj. R was classified as probably incremental (Pbl)
,
possibly non-
incremental (PsNI), and probably non- incremental (PbNI)
,
according to
the criteria set forth in the three major hypotheses presented in
Chapter I. Those Rg's classified as PsNI and PbNI were then summed
and divided by the appropriate number of cases for their organiza-
tional category and year to yield the percentage of (estimated) non-
incremental choices by year. This procedure generated an array of
"rates of non-incrementalism" for each annual set of Rg's for each
city' s organizational categories.
For the sake of discussion, rates of non-incrementalism greater
than 40 percent were arbitrarily designated as indicating that a
budgetary process had operated non- incrementally for a given year.
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Table 6 compares the results of this procedure against the classi-
fications derived from the earlier procedure (used in Table 5) in
which a process was classified as non- incremental if at least four of
the eight tests of significant differences concurred that a process
was non- incremental.
TABLE 6
A COMPARISON OF THE RATE OF NON- INCREMENTALISM APPROACH (RATE OF NI)
TO THE TEST OF MEANS APPROACH (T OF M) FOR CLASSIFYING ANNUAL
BUDGETARY PROCESSES AS INCREMENTAL (I) OR NON-INCREMENTAL (NI)
City A
T of M Apx^roach
(Data Sets Classified as
)
Rate of NI I NI MT
Approach
(Data Sets I 15 4 19
Classified as)
NI
_5 _0 _5
MT 20 4 24
City B
Rate of NI I NI MT
Approach
(Data Sets I 12 1 13
Classified as)
NI 10 11
MT 22 2 24
The tables clearly show that those sets of data categorized as
NI by the tests do not possess the highest rates of non-incrementalism.
In City A, where four of the data sets were labelled
non-incremental
by the tests, none of those four possessed rates of
non-incrementalism
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equal to or greater than 40 percent. However, five of the data sets
labelled incremental did. Similarly, in City B, only one of two data
sets classified non-incremental had a rate of non-incrementalism
greater than 40 percent, while a full ten of the processes labelled
incremental possessed such rates of non-incrementalism.
Three distinct interpretations of these problematic results seem
plausible. First, the manner in which non-incremental choices are de-
fined is erroneous. Second, the tests of significance are poor indi-
cators of non- incremental processes. Third, the assumption that non-
incremental processes should necessarily contain more non-incremental
choices than incremental processes is too simplistic.
Whether or not the first interpretation is valid will be the
subject of the fifth chapter. Therefore, assuming for now that this
is not the problem, our attention will focus upon the second and third
interpretations. Deciding between these two possibilities requires
that an answer be given to the question of what the tests of means are
measuring. Comparing the results of the tests to the graphs of the
annual funding changes found in Appendix B gives us some guidance in
this matter.
The graphs indicate that three types of distributions generate
means which are significantly divergent from the E(adj. R ) of 0.00.
The first type of distribution is one in which nearly all of the
choices are more or less normally distributed, but considerably to the
left or right of a mean of 0.00. An example of this is found in the
graph for the general government programs of City A for the 1970-71
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funding change period. In this situation, a heavy proportion of the
programs received little to no funding boost or were cut in their
funding.
The second (and most common) pattern for a non-incremental
process is one in which the data is distributed somewhat normally, but
where the distribution is centered slightly to the left or right of
the E(adj. R
g
) of 0.00, and the non- incremental choices are nearly all
positive or negatives values. Examples of this pattern are found in
City A* s public works programs during the 1968/69 and 1969/70 periods
and in City B' s general government programs for the 1967/68 and
1972/73 periods. Clearly, such slightly "off-center" distributions
combined with the rather skewed nature of their non- incremental
choices produce obtained means considerably at variance from the
expected mean.
An important observation about such "non- incremental" distribu-
tions is that they are quite similar to many presumably incremental
distributions in which the non- incremental choices are fairly evenly
split between positive and negative values. For example, in City B'
s
general government category, compare the graphs of the non-incremental
distribution for 1972-73 with the incremental distribution of 1976-76.
The major distinction between the two is that the non- incremental
choices of the incremental distribution are more extreme in their
variance from the center, but are almost evenly divided on the left
and right sides of the vertical axis.
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A third type of non- incremental distribution is actually non-
normal in character. This distribution is low, indeed virtually flat
with decisions appearing at rather random, widely spaced intervals.
In addition, the great bulk of the R f s lie to the left or right of
0.00, thereby generating a mean considerably at variance with the
E(adj. R
g
). The distribution for City A's public works programs in
1968/69 illustrates this pattern. All in all, the peculiarly flat and
dispersed nature of this distribution compared to most others strongly
suggests that this pattern is quite properly designated as non-
incremental. Similar distributions, which differ only in that their
R ' s are more evenly distributed between positive and negative values,
may likewise be viewed as atypical and non- incremental . However,
their low, near- zero means lead them to be labelled as incremental.
It seems evident that the t tests have produced rather mixed
results. On one hand, they appear to err by labelling as non-
incremental fairly typical distributions wherein the one unusual trait
is that their non- incremental choices are almost entirely of a posi-
tive or negative nature. On the other hand, they also appear mistaken
by labelling as incremental, flat, widely dispersed distributions in
which the R ' s are fairly evenly split to the left and right of the
s
0.00 axis. This second type of error is to be expected. After all,
the tests used are applicable primarily to unimodal, roughly normal
distributions. However, the first type of error is of a more serious
nature, raising fairly strong doubts as to the reliability of the
tests when applied to the more typical type of distribution. This
66
suggests, of course, that the second interpretation may be correct,
i.e., the tests are poor indicators.
However, comparing the graphs to the test results strongly sug-
gests that the tests are primarily sensitive to the clustering of the
data around the expected mean of 0.00, and secondarily sensitive to
the incidence and value of non- incremental choices. This suggests
that the third interpretation, that non- incremental processes neces-
sarily possess more non- incremental decisions, may be too simplistic.
In other words, a non- incremental process may be one in which a rela-
tively high rate of non- incremental choice is combined with incre-
mental decisions which are also quite divergent from an adj . R of
0.00 relative to the incremental choices of incremental processes.
Accordingly, a final judgment on the value of the tests as indicators
of incremental vs. non- incremental processes should hinge upon the
extent of central clustering, as well as the rate of non-incremental
choice.
The major question arising at this point is how this second
alternative, based upon both the rate of NI and the rate of central
clustering (rates of CC), should be operationalized. In regards to
the rate of NI, a decision was made to calculate it in exactly the
same manner as before. However, since it is being assumed that a non-
incremental process requires only a relatively high rate of non-
incremental choice, an arbitrary decision was made to set this cri-
terion at a 30 percent level, as opposed to the 40 percent rate used
above.
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Turning to the second half of this approach, the rate of CC was
defined as the percent of decisions in a distribution which fall with-
in the adj. R
g
values of ±1.00. A review of the graphs demonstrates
that most Rg's fall within these limits. For the purpose of defining
a "non- incremental" rate of CC, an arbitrary decision was made to set
it at a 50 percent level, i.e., if the rate of CC is equal to or less
than 50 percent, then a data set meets one of the two criteria for
being classified as non- incremental.
To summarize this second alternative, a data set will be classi-
fied as non- incremental if it possesses a rate of NI equal to or
greater than 30 percent, and a rate of CC equal to or less than 50
percent. Conversely, data sets will be designated as incremental if
they fail to meet one of the two criteria, or if they possess a rate
of NI less than 30 percent and a rate of CC greater than 50 percent.
In checking the congruence of the test of means approach against
the "two rates" (of CC and of NI) approach, it was found that the
closest fits were generated when adj. R ' s of 6.00 were omitted (i.e.,
if adj. R > 6.00, then adj. R 0.00) and when no modifications of
S "
the data were undertaken (i.e., Rg
- R
g
) . Accordingly, in the
following table, only the comparisons done for the data manipulated in
these two ways are shown.
This table (Table 7) shows the number and percent of agreements
between the two approaches. Agreements occur when both the test of
means (TM) approach and the "two rates" approach concur in their
classifications for a particular set of budget data. For example, if
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TABLE 7
THE NUMBER AND PERCENT OF AGREEMENTS GENERATED BETWEEN THE TEST OF
MEANS APPROACH AND THE "TWO RATES" APPROACH FOR EACH ORGANIZATIONAL
CATEGORY' S BUDGET DATA FOR THE EIGHT FUNDING CHANGE PERIODS
A. adj. R
g
> 6. 00 = 0.00
1. Public Works
2. General Govt.
3. Agencies
4. Combined
City A
# Agreements
6
3
8
17
N*
8
3
8
24
% Agreement
75.0%
37.5%
100.0%
70.8%
B. adj. R
g
= adj. R
g
1. Public Works
2. General Govt.
3. Agencies
4. Combined
5
7
6
18
8
8
8
24
62.5%
87.5%
75.0%
75.0%
City B
A. adj. R > 6. 00 = 0.00
1. Public Works
2. General Govt.
3. Agencies
4 . Combined
4
4
7
15
8
8
8
24
50.0%
50.0%
87.5%
62.5%
B. adj. R
s
= adj. R
s
1. Public Works
2. General Govt.
3. Agencies
4. Combined
3
7
6
16
8
8
8
24
37.5%
87.5%
75.0%
66.7%
*N = the number of annual funding change periods per
organizational
category
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both approaches indicate that City A's Public Works data for the 1967-
68 funding change period is incremental, then that constitutes one
agreement. As noted in the table's title, there are eight funding
change periods per organizational category. Therefore, for each
organizational category, there is a maximum of eight possible agree-
ments, and for each city there is a maximum of twenty-four agreements.
The results of these comparisons provide some interesting (if
tentative) insights into the usefulness of the tests of means as
indicators of non- incremental processes. Assuming that agreements
signify valid classifications, one intriguing finding is that the
tests in which values greater than ±6.00 are excluded are consistently
better than the tests excluding no values in discriminating between
incremental and non- incremental processes within the public works and
agency-level data of both cities. Conversely, the tests excluding no
values are superior indicators for the general government distri-
butions of both cities. It is not entirely clear as to why this
occurs. However, the major distinction between the general government
vs. public works and agency- level data is that the former has a con-
siderably larger number of cases. Therefore, the effects of non-
incremental outlyers upon the means appear to be far more muted in the
general government distributions. As a result, it appears that
omitting such outlyers from the general government data too greatly
reduces the incidence of non- incremental choice. This results in
making the tests omitting such values less reliable indicators than
the tests including all values. On the other hand, given their
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relatively small number of cases, the public works and agency data are
apparently better served by omitting their outlyers because they exert
too great a weight in calculating the means.
Overall, the level of agreement generated by the two approaches
in both cities combined is equal to 66.7 percent (thirty-two of
forty-eight) when outlyers are excluded, and to 70.8 percent (thirty-
four or forty-eight) when all values are retained. These levels
improve when City B' s public works data are excluded. It will be
recalled that these particular distributions were uniformly flat and
widely dispersed making them technically inappropriate for test of
means analysis. In any event, excluding this category of data, agree-
ment levels for both cities combined reach a 70.0 percent level
(twenty-eight of forty) when outlyers are excluded, and a 77.5 percent
level (thirty-one of forty) when they are not. Moreover, the agree-
ment level for City B alone climbs to 81.2 percent (thirteen of six-
teen) when the outlyers are maintained.
Admittedly, comparing the level of agreed-upon classifications
between these two approaches does not constitute a scientifically
sound test of the validity of either. Conversely, both approaches
possess a degree of intuitive appeal as indicators of incremental and
non- incremental budgeting. Accordingly, an assumption that their
agreement may constitute a valid indication of type of decision
process is not unreasonable.
Of course, such an assumption should not rest entirely upon
intuitive reasonableness. Thus, at the least, it is appropriate to
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demand some form of empirical test to determine whether the validity
of these indicators can be disproven.
In response to this demand, an assumption was first made that if
the two indicators were perfect indicators, then they should be in
perfect agreement in classifying sets of data. Based on this assump-
tion, it therefore follows that if there is a significant difference
between the level of agreement generated by them and a perfect (or
near-perfect) level of agreement, then the validity of the indicators
(one or both) becomes suspect.
This in turn means that the following null hypothesis can be
tested.
Null Hypothesis: If the level of agreed-upon classifications
generated by the two indicators is not significantly different from a
perfect (or near-perfect) level of agreement, then the validity of the
two indicators is not disproven.
In order to test this null hypothesis, chi square tests of sig-
nificant differences were employed. Since this test cannot be used
when there are no cases in any cell, the "perfect agreement" column of
all tables became a "near-perfect agreement" column wherein one dis-
agreement was hypothesized. Aside from technical considerations, this
single disagreement was justified on the grounds of permitting random
factors to intervene at least once in the classification process. In
other words, it was assumed that perfection, even for valid indi-
cators, was less likely than near perfection.
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Given the moderately sizeable number of cases required for a
valid chi square test, 7 near perfect distributions were compared only
to the cumulative data for an entire city; i.e., the organizational
categories of each city were collapsed yielding an N per city of
twenty- four (three organizational categories per city times eight
funding change periods per organizational category). For most tables,
this yielded a total N of forty-eight cases (twenty-four per city plus
twenty- four hypothetical cases). However, since the public works data
of City B is technically invalid for the test of means indicator,
additional City B tables were constructed for which there was an N of
thirty-two (sixteen cases per city plus sixteen hypothetical cases).
The results of these tests are reported in Table 8.
TABLE 8
IS THE ACTUAL LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO INDICATORS
IN EACH CITY SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM A
"NEAR-PERFECT" LEVEL OF AGREEMENT?*
City A City B City B w/o
Public Works
1. If adj. R
g
> 6.0, then
adj. R
g
= 0.0 Yes Yes No
2. adj. R
g
= adj. R
g
No Yes No
*Chi square tests were employed with the level of significance set
at .05.
The need for a fairly sizable number of cases becomes obvious
when one considers the results of dealing only with the organizational
category data. With a small N (16: 8 actual pairings and 8 hypothet-
ical ones) requiring the use of the Fisher Exact Test, it was found
that only actual distributions with three agreements or less were sig-
nificantly different from a perfect (not near-perfect) distribution.
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Disregarding City B with its public works data included, the
table shows that when no outlyers are omitted
, the actual level of
agreement is not significantly different from the ideal. On the other
hand, when outlyers are omitted
, the results are mixed: no signifi-
cant difference resulted in City B (without its public works data),
but a significant difference did occur in City A. Therefore, it
appears that agreements obtained omitting no outlyers are better
indicators of type of decision process.
However, such a conclusion may be premature. As will be re-
called, the "T of M" and "Two Rates" approaches generated consistently
higher levels of agreement for the "general government" data when
outlyers were retained, than they did when the outlyers were omitted.
Conversely, when outlyers were omitted, they generated consistently
higher levels of agreement for the public works and agency-level data.
This suggests a possibility that, in City A, the "general government"
data might have unduly depressed the level of agreement generated when
outlyers were omitted.
Accordingly, the agreements found within City A's public works
and agency- level data were compared to a near-perfect level of agree-
ment. The resulting chi squares indicated that no significant differ-
ence occurred, with the outlyers omitted . However, a significant
difference did result when the outlyers were retained .
This "differences spread" was viewed as so large as to make these
tests pointless.
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These findings suggest that, when organizational categories of
data are being analyzed as to type of decision process, the method-
ology used here may be more valid if outlying R values are excluded
s
when dealing with relatively small sets of R values. Conversely,
when the organizational categories contain a relatively high number of
R
S
values
'
then tne methodology may be more valid if the outlying R
g
values are retained. Clearly, a failure to take the number of R
S
values per category into account appears to increase the probability
of mistaken, invalid conclusions.
In closing, two points must be stressed concerning the 'level of
agreement' methodology. First, regardless of the test of "non-
validity" just discussed, its acceptance as an indicator depends upon
the acceptance of its definition of a non- incremental process: i.e.,
the idea that such a process is characterized by both a low rate of CC
and a relatively high rate of NI. Ultimately, the acceptance of this
definition rests only upon intuitive reasonableness. Thus, it can
only be assumed to be valid, it cannot be proven so.
Secondly, even if we make this assumption, it must be stated
frankly that the "level of agreement" methodology outlined here is
still too unrefined to warrant immediate use. The margin of error
(i.e., of disagreements between the "T of M" and "Two Tests"
approaches) is quite high, ranging from 20 percent to 30 percent.
Even if the two approaches are successfully capturing some dimensions
of non- incremental processes, such a margin of error strongly suggests
that one or both approaches is failing to capture other significant
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dimensions. Accordingly, the "level of agreement" methodology is at
best a crude tool for classifying decision processes, and, at worst,
too error-prone to be considered sufficiently dependable.
In short, the fact that the two approaches agree to the extent
they do suggests that types of annual decision processes can be classi-
fied. The fact that they disagree so often strongly indicates that
more research is required.
The Correlations Between Funding Periods
This section will explore the statistical relationship between
the annual funding change periods. For this purpose, Pearson's simple
coefficients of correlation will be employed. This operation will not
be used to demonstrate that the data is incremental, in the sense of
change being small and marginal. A relationship between change rates
(i.e., the R
s
's) will shed no light upon this question, since such a
relationship has less to do with the absolute size of the rates of
change than with their relative magnitudes across time. Instead, the
value of this procedure will be to establish the consistency (or lack
thereof) of the funding priorities used by decision makers. That is,
are the same programs doing better than others over time? Or is there
a shifting pattern of "winners" and "losers"? Indeed, is there any
pattern of priorities at all?
Table 9, on the following pages, presents the coefficients for
the program areas of both cities. To maintain some continuity with
the preceding section, the coefficients were calculated with Rg's

TABLE 9
PEARSON 1 S COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION FOR THE RATIO OF SHARES OF
A GIVEN ANNUAL FUNDING CHANGE PERIOD (FCP) WITH SUCCEEDING
ANNUAL FUNDING CHANGE PERIODS
City A
Public Works
City A
Gen. Govt.
1. 1967/68 by 1968/69
a. Data where if
R_ 6.0, R = 0.0
S S
b. Data when R = R
o o
2. 1968/69 by 1969/70
a. Data where if
R 6.0, R = 0.0
b. Data when R = R
3. 1969/70 by 1970/71
a. Data where if
R
s
6 " 0, R
s
= °'°
b. Data when R = R
4. 1970/71 by 1971/72
a. Data where if
R
s
6.0, R
s
= R
s
b. Data when R
g
= R
g
5. 1971/72 by 1972/73
a. Data where if
R 6.0, R = 0.0
b. Data when R
g
= R
g
6. 1972/73 by 1973/75
a. Data where if
R 6.0, R = 0.0
s ^
b. Data when R
g
= R
g
7. 1973/75 by 1975/76
a. Data where if
R 6.0, Rc = 0.0S >3
b. Data when R
g
= R
g
3871
2861
.2205
,8740
.8904
.9201
.4312
.5954
.7172
.0875
.3651
.0988
-.0507
-.6726
.4196
.8858
.0114
.4044
-.1889
.2958
-.1264
.0540
.1611
.7412
.0562
.1499
-.3347
-.5217
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TABLE 9—Continued
City A City B City B City B
Agencies Public Works Gen. Govt. Agencies
.1830
. 9809
. 5936
. 8859
- .7013
. 7680
-.2990
-.2990
. 3759
. 3759
-.6037
-.6037
.4075
.4075
. 7598
.7160
-.7764
-.7764
.8448
. 5190
-.3914
-.1653
-.1538
.2450
.6803
.6469
-.6054
-.6779
.5272
-.1246
.2649
-.7918
-.5165
-.5030
.0702
.0854
-.3041
.4905
-.2427
.4566
-.8403
-.2414
.4983
.8056
.6813
-.6734
-.5565
-.5580
-.2567
-.2611
-.0802
-.1354
-.1389
-.7071
.4732
-.5750
78
greater than 6.00 omitted (i.e., if R > 6.00, then R = 0.00) and with
^ S
no values omitted or modified (i.e., R = R ) . since Pearson's r's are
particularly sensitive to the weighting problems posed by outlyers, it
should be borne in mind that the relationships with values omitted are
probably the better estimators of the overall, relative similarity
between sets of Rg's. On the other hand, the coefficients omitting no
values provide us with useful information concerning the fate of out-
lying programs which constitute the high or low priorities of any given
funding period.
Table 9 provides us with evidence of a highly fluctuating pattern
of decision making. Both in terms of the direction and the strength of
relationships, no pattern emerges within the program areas of either
city which holds for the entire time period (1967-1976) . In City A,
50 percent of all coefficients are positive and 50 percent negative.
For City B, 45.2 percent and 54.8 percent are positive and negative,
respectively. As for strength of relationships, only 23.8 percent (ten
of forty-two) of all of City A's coefficients exceed a .70 level, while
only 21.4 percent (nine of forty-two) of City B's coefficients do the
same. Of these "strong" relationships, 70.0 percent (seven of ten) of
City A's and 55.6 percent (five of nine) of City B's occurred when cor-
relating the data with outlyers included (i.e., when Rg = Rg ).
Moreover, from the 1967/68 funding period through the 1971/71
period (i.e., rows 1 to 3 in the table), 80 percent (eight of ten) of
City A's "strong" coefficients and 77.8 percent (seven of nine) of
City B's are found. The obvious similarity of these results suggests
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the possibility of a common event which affected both cities at this
time. Such an event did in fact occur. From 1967 to 1970, the state
government phased out the welfare operations of municipalities and con-
solidated them at the state level. This resulted in a considerable
amount of freed funds which city officials were able to invest as they
best saw fit.
The impact of these "welfare bonus" budgetary choices varies from
program area to program area and from city to city. Both with outlyers
omitted and with outlyers included, more than forty percent of these
coefficients possess negative values, suggesting in varying degrees
reversals or marked changes in one year's priorities with the next.
Conversely, the positive coefficients indicate varying degrees of pri-
ority continuity from one year to the next, but only eight of a total
of twenty positive coefficients exceed a .7 level of relationship and
therefore could be considered strong. Moreover, every organizational
category of data contains either one or more negative coefficients
and/or very low positive coefficients, both of which indicate priority
shifts. In short, the general pattern of priorities even during this
"welfare bonus" period is highly unstable.
For the most part, we see the strength of the coefficients de-
clining rather dramatically for both cities in item 4. The incidence
of moderate- to- strong relationships becomes much more sporadic from
this point on. Moreover, the pattern of the direction of the relation-
ships continues to be quite random. Priorities are weakly-to-moderate ly
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reaffirmed from one funding period to the next, or they are weakly-to-
moderately reversed.
The general picture that emerges from Table 9 is principally one
of shifting priorities. At times, the same priorities are continued
from one funding period to the next, but seldom are the same prior-
ities maintained for longer than three such periods. Sometimes, the
decision makers appear to alternate their high and low priorities,
thereby producing moderate- to- strong negative relationships between
periods. In still other instances, the major "winners" and "losers"
occur randomly, resulting in relationships of little strength. Dif-
ferent decision strategies are suggested, but with no one strategy
consistently dominant.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, a hypothetical model of an ideal incremental
process was discussed. On the basis of the model, a modified t test
for significant differences between obtained and ideal means was
developed. Overall, the tests appear to be somewhat useful in differ-
entiating between incremental and non- incremental decision processes.
However, the particular nature of a given distribution is capable of
producing misleading conclusions, thereby raising doubts about the
utility of the tests.
In light of this problem, an alternate methodology was
developed
in which incremental and non- incremental decision
processes were indi-
cated by the agreement in classification made by the
"T of M" and "Two
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Tests" approaches. Assuming that an incremental process could involve
a number of non- incremental decisions equal to or greater than the
number found in a non- incremental process, this technique suggested
that the key distinction between the two was that a non-incremental
process combines a relatively high rate of non-incremental choice with
a more dispersed pattern of incremental choices than is the case in an
incremental process. Put another way, many incremental decisions of
non- incremental processes tend to be relatively borderline in their
classification as incremental. Unfortunately, the level of disagree-
ment generated by comparing the "T of M" and "Two Test" approaches sug-
gests that more research is necessary before a strongly dependable
indicator of decision-process types will be available.
Finally, the chapter concluded with an analysis of priority pat-
terns in funding, using simple coefficients of correlation for this
purpose. To reiterate, funding priorities in both cities appear to be
quite variable, with coefficients shifting in terms of both strength
and direction of relationship from year to year.
In the next chapter, an analysis of the role patterns and
decision rules found in both cities will be provided. As will be
seen, this chapter will serve as a necessary prerequisite for Chapter
IV, where the major hypotheses presented in Chapter I will be tested.
CHAPTER III
GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
IN CITY A AND CITY B
Introduction and Methodological Considerations
This chapter's purpose is to determine whether budgetary partic-
ipants in Cities A and B perceive their actions in terms compatible
with the incremental model as defined by the works of Wildavsky,
Anton, and Crecine.
For this purpose, a number of public officials in both cities
were interviewed, and their responses classified and placed within
various frequency distribution tables. The chi-squared test was
employed to determine whether significant variation occurred between
the response patterns found in the two case cities. In addition, chi-
squares were also tabulated to see if the response patterns of each
city were significantly different from an arbitrarily defined "ideal
incremental" response pattern. These methodological procedures are
discussed in more detail below.
The respondents were selected program and departmental heads,
both chief executives, both budget directors, and both council pres-
idents. All of these, except for one council president and one budget
director, were part of a randomly chosen stratified sample, the
design and purpose of which will be discussed in the next chapter. In
all, twenty officials in City A and twenty-three officials in City B
were interviewed. The breakdown of these officials by general
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category is presented in Table 10. A complete listing by position
title is found in Appendix C.
TABLE 10
INTERVIEWEES BY GENERAL CATEGORY
City A City B
a. Overview Officials 3 3
b. "General Government"
Program Heads 9 10
c. Public Works Program
Heads 4 4
d. Agency Heads 4 6
N=20 N=23
Each of these individuals underwent an interview based on a
three-part questionnaire. The first part employed a combination of
open-ended questions and agree/disagree statements designed to solicit
their impressions on the budgetary behavior, roles, and goals charac-
teristic of different categories of actors. The second part consisted
of additional agree/disagree statements which concerned the use of
selected incremental decision rules within the budgetary systems of
both cities. Finally, in the third part, interviewees were asked
about specific budget decisions for their own programs or agencies
during FY1975 and/or FY1976. The interviews were conducted during the
Spring and Summer of 1976 and each lasted between one and two
hours
apiece. A facsimile of the questionnaire is presented in
Appendix D.
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The results of the third part of the questionnaire will be the
subject of the following chapter. Here our concern is with parts one
and two, which is to say, with the respondents' general perceptions of
budgetary decision making.
This perhaps artificial division between general perceptions of
decision making and specific memories of particular choices was based
on methodological considerations. As noted in Chapter I, "role-
system" incrementalists have employed interview and participant-
observer approaches in order to develop a general overview of how bud-
getary decisions are typically made. Such researchers have concluded
that decision making behavior overwhelmingly conforms to the incremen-
tal model.
This somewhat impressionistic finding was not, unfortunately,
bolstered by attempts to develop defensible, operationalized defini-
tions of incremental choice. Consequently, there has been a general
and unavoidable failure to determine empirically whether, and to what
extent, these presumedly incremental systems actually produce a pre-
dominance of incremental decisions. Hence, we are left with the
rather fuzzy impression that virtually all choices are incremental,
and left without any sense of the factors which operate against such
choice (or of the frequency that such factors occur).
Accordingly, the failure of the "role-system" incrementalists
has been to study budgetary choice in a way which gives us a helpful,
highly generalized grasp of budgeting, but which fails to develop a
methodology for determining the validity and limitations of their
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model's application. It is, of course, these latter failures which
this work hopes to correct.
However, these "corrections" will be of little use unless we
first ascertain whether (and to what extent) the two cities under
study here possess behavior patterns, role systems, goals, and decision
rules compatible with the incremental model. If the ultimate purpose
of this work is to elaborate and improve upon the methodologies em-
ployed to study budgeting, it seems well advised to determine whether
the cities under review are "typically" incremental or yet-to-be de-
fined deviant (i.e., non- incremental) cases. Therefore, before
turning to an examination of the specific choice data, this chapter
will present findings concerning participants' perceptions of budget-
ing as generally or typically practiced.
Evidence from the preceding chapter offers some support for the
assumption that budget choice in both cities is largely incremental in
nature. As we saw there, funding decisions for most years tended to
cluster around an adjusted of 0.00, thereby indicating that most
programs and agencies receive annual funding changes which are rela-
tively close to an ideal "fair share" of revenue increases.
However, such evidence provides indirect support at best. Fund-
ing choices within the constraint of the general availability of
revenues suggest the possibility of an incremental budgeting system.
However, by themselves, they do not prove its existence. An incre-
mental budgeting system consists not only of a high incidence of
(presumedly) incremental decisions, but also of incremental behaviors,
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goals, and decision rules. In other words, it is conceivable that
incremental outputs (i.e., relatively small, marginal changes) could
flow from budgetary processes which, strictly speaking, fail to con-
form to the incremental model.
Accordingly, our attention now turns to these other components
of an incremental budgetary system. The next section provides us with
a brief comparison of both cities' formal budgetary processes. This
short section will be followed by a much longer one in which a model
of municipal incremental budgetary systems will be developed and
explained. Here, the behavior patterns, roles, and goals of various
actors in such systems will be defined in accordance with the findings
of previous research. Moreover, the elaboration of this model will
provide the reader with a clearer understanding of why various ques-
tions were asked during the interviews. Finally, the results of the
interviews will be discussed, and the response patterns of the two
cities on each item will be compared to each other and to an "ideal"
expected response pattern. A brief summary of these findings is
provided at the end of this chapter.
The Formal Budgetary Processes
Although the two cities possess different governmental forms
(City A has a strong mayor system while City B has a council-manager
system) , there appears to be little substantive difference in the
budgetary authority possessed by their chief executives or in the
mechanics of each city's budgetary process.
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In the late fall, budget instructions and forms are issued by
the chief executive's office to each department. After a period of
internal review and, as necessary, in- house coordinating meetings,
departmental estimates are formulated. These budget requests consist
of budgets for sub-units (or programs), if applicable, and are broken
down into the broad line- item categories of salaries, ordinary mainte-
nance and supplies, and capital budgets. 1 Normally, only capital
requests are prioritized by their perceived importance. Moreover,
since the capital budget is funded by bond versus general revenues,
such funding decisions are dealt with as " . . .a generally indepen-
dent problem . . . ," separate from the general fund or operating
budget.
^
By the end of January, the agency estimates are submitted to the
chief executive, along with descriptive justificatory material. Fol-
lowing the submission of the estimates, the chief executive and his
budget staff review them and then initiate a series of closed meetings
with each department head. At these meetings, items may be challenged,
justified, modified, or cut altogether. Although department heads may
request follow-up meetings in order to appeal the decisions made at
this time, these initial meetings generally serve to provide each ad-
ministrator with a fairly clear idea of what his/her area can expect
for the next year's funding.
"^These categories are the same as those used in Pittsburgh,
Cleveland, and Detroit. See Crecine, Governmental Problem- Solving ,
p. 40.
2
Ibid.
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At the conclusion of these meetings, the executive budget is
formulated and printed. The precise time for its release to the city
councils varies between the two communities. In City A, the city
council must be given the executive budget no less than ninety days
before the end of the fiscal year (i.e., by roughly the beginning of
April at the time of this research). City B's council must receive
the document by no less than forty-five days (i.e., the middle of May)
prior to the fiscal year' s conclusion.
During these legislative review periods a series of open public
hearings are held at which time councilmen, the media, and the public-
at- large may question, support, or challenge the need for various
proposed expenditures. Interestingly, the councilmen are not required
to attend these sessions, and, reportedly, a majority in City A fre-
quently failed to do so.
Following these "question hour"-like meetings, the council then
engages in a second series of business meetings at which time the
final budgets for each department are enacted. Neither council pos-
sesses an independent budget staff. Indicative of the strong-executive
charters in both cities, the councils have the power only to_ cut or to
accept executive budget proposals. They are forbidden by charter to
increase funding over the level "recommended" by the chief executive.
Like most other cities, a major constraint on budgetary choice
„3
in both cities is the problem of "uncontrollable expenditures. A
3
Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary
Processes (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), p. 114.
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full 60 percent of respondents in both cities (twelve of twenty in
City A; fourteen of twenty- three in City B) volunteered remarks on
this subject during the course of the interviews. Aside from infla-
tion, two of the other most frequently cited sources of this problem
stemmed from legally-mandated organizational procedures. The most
important of these was the collective bargaining process which has
been mandated by state law. The second source, also imposed upon the
cities by the state, involved the local departments of education.
Absorbing over 30 percent of all locally-controlled general
revenues in both cities, the school systems possess largely autonomous
budgetary processes in which funding decisions are made by indepen-
dently elected boards of education. Somewhat peculiarly, while pos-
sessing the power to make authoritative budget choices, such boards
lack autonomous taxing powers. Consequently, they must send their
budgets to the cities, and the cities in turn are required to provide
the full amount demanded, regardless of the implications these demands
have for other municipal services. This rather advantageous position
within the budget process is, however, presumedly constrained by the
presence of each city's chief executive during the boards' budget
hearings. While possessing only the advisory powers of an ex_ officio
member, the chief executives do attempt to warn the boards of the
impact of their decisions upon the tax rates and/or other services.
The general impressions of both chief executives was that the boards
reacted "reasonably" or "responsibly" to their "advice." However,
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many other respondents in the two communities clearly viewed the
school departments as a problem or with distrust.
To summarize, we have seen that the formal budget processes of
both cities are quite similar, with some minor exceptions. Since the
chief executives initiate the process, have the power to increase as
well as maintain or cut budget requests, possess budget staffs, and
serve as the single major constraint upon the departments of educa-
tion, it is evident that their formal (and informal) authority is
potentially greater than that exercised by the city councils. Like
most other cities, City A and City B are plagued by the problem of
"uncontrollable expenses," a problem due not only to inflationary
forces, but also to externally imposed organizational procedures like
collective bargaining.
An Incremental Model of Municipal Budgetary Systems
An incremental approach to budgeting usually is described by a
short time perspective and, essentially, as a maintenance of
the basic budget.
^
Wildavsky captures here two essential aspects of incremental
budgetary systems. But like most short definitions, it conceals more
than it reveals. Such budgetary systems consist of a sizable number
of interlocking facets. Perhaps because of this complexity, budgetary
incrementalism is highly adaptable to a variety of organizational
conditions ranging from the cabinet- dominated government of the
4
Ibid., p. 127.
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5United Kingdom to the city-manager system of Oakland, California. 6
And yet, despite their variations, incremental systems possess more
similarities than differences.
The combination of the complexity of its shared elements and the
particularism of its manifestation in different levels of governments
makes the expression of a general, all-encompassing model of budgetary
incrementalism quite difficult. For this reason, the discussion below
will focus upon developing a general model applicable to American
municipalities.
As a first step in developing this model, a logical starting
point is with the basic components of incremental budgeting systems.
Based on a review of the literature, such systems appear to share four
common characteristics: (a) constraints on decision making create a
need for (b) simple and simplifying decision rules which are employed
with (c) well-cntrenched role systems resulting in (d) decisional out-
puts which represent limited, marginal change from the status quo.
Two points about these elements should be kept in mind. First,
in practice, they are tightly interwoven. Thus, their interaction is
not as simplistically linear as it appears above. In other words,
their separation into distinct components is an artificial separation
See Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of
Public Money: Community and Policy Inside British Politics (London:
The Macmillan Press, Ltd. , 1974)
.
6
See A.J. Meltsner and A. Wildavsky, "Leave City Budgeting Alone!
A Survey, Case Study, and Recommendations for Reform," in J. P. Crecine
(ed.), Financing the Metropolis (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, Inc.,
1970), pp. 311-358.
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which aids analytic clarity, but which over-simplifies the complex
reality of their actual operation.
A second point to remember is that the components developed here
are solely those of the author. In all likelihood, other analysts
might break the system down in other ways and/or add or subtract
categories. However, for the purposes of this discussion, the above
classification is viewed as adequate.
Constraints on Decision Making . Within the municipal context, the
constraints on decision making may be sub-divided into analytic and
institutional constraints. In part, analytic constraints include such
universally present problems as shortages of time and money, and the
cognitive limitations on the human capacity to define and analyze
7
alternatives. In addition, analysis at the municipal level is fur-
g
ther constrained by the simple lack of trained analysts. Together,
these limitations on analysis mean that complex issues, problems, and
calculations must be dealt with in a relatively simple, non-analytic,
9
and non- theoretical manner. Consequently, analytically-constrained
budgeting systems have come to rely upon widely used, but largely
inarticulated " decision- rules. " These serve to simplify the problem
7
This point is stressed in Lindblom, "Muddling Through," p. 84;
in Wildavsky, Politics , p. 10; and in Crecine, Governmental Problem-
Solving
,
p. 41.
8
See Wildavsky, Budgeting , pp. 116-117; and Crecine, Governmen-
tal Problem- Solving , p. 41.
9
The classic formulation of this conclusion is found in
Lindblom, "Muddling Through," p. 81.
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of the decision maker and may result in simplified (and perhaps sim-
plistic) decisions. 10
A second important sub-type of constraints on decision making
are institutional in nature. These appear to reinforce and to sup-
plement the effects of the analytic constraints. One form of such
constraints are bureaucratic routines. The inability to effect ade-
quate analysis of complex problems leads to a general reliance upon
not only simple decision rules, but also upon intra-organizational
routines. 11 Such routines serve to provide a sense of certainty and
predictability among participants and thus aid in reducing role
12anxiety, conflict, and confusion with the process. However, the
annual repetition of these routines results in the psychological
entrenchment of both the incremental decision rules and the routinized
behaviors (i.e., roles). As a result, reform of budgetary systems as
13
a whole becomes highly difficult, and the capacity to engage in non-
14incremental and/or innovative decisions becomes quite limited.
10
E.g., see Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving , p. 219.
11
See Crecine* s discussion of "Governing by Precedent," Govern-
mental Problem- Solving
,
p. 41; and also Allen Schick's discussion of
"The Routine of Budgeting," in his Budget Innovation in the States
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 206-208.
See Wildavsky's discussion of role systems as "a firm anchor
in a sea of complexity," in his Politics , pp. 160-161.
1 3
Schick, Budget Innovation , pp. 206-208.
1
Anton, Expenditure in Illinois, p. 202.
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In addition to the development of bureaucratic routines, another
institutional constraint on decision making characteristic of munici-
palities is the revenue constraint, a problem for urban budgeting
equally emphasized by Anton, Crecine, and Wildavsky. 15 The causes of
this constraint are at least twofold. On one hand, cities are almost
universally required by state mandates and their charters to produce
balanced budgets. Thus, expenditures must be equal to or less than
revenues. On the other hand, the structure of urban taxes, especially
the property tax, generally prevents city revenues from keeping pace
with inflation, thereby necessitating annual decisions to raise tax
rates. However, since such raises are politically unpopular, munic-
ipal leaders are inclined to keep such tax hikes as small as possible
1
6
(i.e., to "hold the line on taxes"). Thus, not only must expend-
itures be balanced against revenues, but a combination of economic and
political forces operate against the availability of easily expanded
revenues. As a result, expenditure growth becomes tightly constrained
by slow revenue growth.
To use a phrase Wildavsky coined in another context, the conse-
quence of this revenue constraint is not simply incrementalism, but
15
Thomas J. Anton, Budgeting in Three Illinois Cities (Urbana:
Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois,
1964), p. 18; Wildavsky, Budgeting , p. 117; and Crecine, Governmental
Problem- Solving , p. 219.
16Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving , pp. 39-40; Wildavsky,
Budgeting, pp. 10-11.
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17
"incrementalism with a vengeance." in Anton's opinion, this con-
straint means that
. . .
the first step (in budgeting) ... is to determine how
much money will be available, rather than how much will have
to be spent. In effect, this forces local officials to think
of their "budgets" as nothing more than a representation of
"what we did last year" or "what we are doing now." 18
Similarly, Crecine remarks that,
"Last year's" budget represents a sort of equilibrium solution
to the municipal resource allocation problem.
. . . "This
year's budget" represents marginal adjustments to "last year's"
solution to obtain "this year's" solution. 19
In short, the impact of the revenue constraint upon municipal
expenditure decisions is that such decisions tend to be far more
incremental (i.e., marginal, and non- innovative) than are the decisions
20
made by the federal and some state governments. As stated by
Wildavsky
Although (municipal- level) participants will argue for marginal
increases, no one expects there to be enough money for a dra-
matic change in any particular budget. The acceptance of the
"no-money" premise reinforces . . . incremental budgetary
behavior.
Incremental decision rules . What constitutes the "incremental budget-
ing behavior" cited by Wildavsky above? First, there is the wide-
spread employment of incremental decision rules. Against the backdrop
17
Heclo and Wildavsky, Private Government , p. 238,
18
Anton, Three Cities , p. 18.
19
Crecine, p. 219.
20
Wildavsky, Budgeting , pp. 10-11.
21
Ibid., p. 120.
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of analytic and institutional constraints on budgetary choice, a con-
siderable number of decision rules have developed which are common to
incremental systems generally. Among the many reported by various
observers, the following list cites several which seem to be among the
most fundamental:
1. Base funds (i.e., the previous year's budget) are seldom
analyzed or even questioned. Consequently, line managers can gener-
ally expect to receive at least the same amount of funds for a coming
22year as they did for the year previous to it. This is the "safe
base" rule.
2. The focus of decision makers tends to be upon budgetary
"margins"; i.e., upon requests for increases in expenditure cate-
23gones. We will call this the "increase focus" rule.
3. In light of the constraints on analysis, most agencies can
expect roughly the same percentage increase as others. In other
words, most agencies can expect a "fair share" of additional available
24
revenues to be added to their budget "base. " This we will call the
"fair share" rule.
22
Wildavsky, Politics
, p. 17.
2 3
Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving , p. 41, pp. 62-63, and
p. 73; Wildavsky, Politics , pp. 14-15.
24
Wildavsky, Politics , p. 17. See also Crecine' s reference to
"reasonable share," Governmental Problem-Solving , p. 39. It must be
acknowledged that Crecine rejects the validity of his own definition
of "fair share," which was that "... over time . . . each depart-
ment's fair share of the budget total increases is constant . . . ."
That he rejects this rather peculiar and quite rigid definition is not
surprising. See Ibid., p. 207.
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4. In light of both analytic and institutional constraints on
budgetary choice, there is a strong tendency for decision makers to
make decisions which maintain the "status quo" in regards to the pro-
vision of services and programs. In other words, incrementally-
inclined decision makers tend to maintain on-going services as opposed
to taking the time and/or risks to explore or implement innovative
25
alternatives. We will label this the "maintenance" rule.
5. Given the fair share rule and the maintenance rules, decision
makers will tend to provide marginal increases to the previous year's
26
allocations of most departments. This will be called the "marginal
growth" rule.
Undoubtedly, other decision rules of a general nature could be
added. However, these five are felt to encapsulate the most basic and
essential rules which result in incremental- type decisions.
Many other frequently used decision rules have a role-specific
as opposed to a general nature. Accordingly, our attention now turns
to these roles.
The incremental role system . Like other incremental role systems, the
one characterizing urban governments may be broken down into the dis-
tinctive roles played by the occupants of different organizational
25
See Crecine's remarks on "historical inertia" in Ibid., p. 241;
also see Anton Expenditure in Illinois , p. 180, and Wildavsky,
Budgeting
,
p. 120.
26
Such growth is assumed to be a function largely of inflation
and salary boosts; see Wildavsky, Budgeting , p. 117.
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positions; i.e., into the roles played by the chief executive and his
budget staff (if any), the legislature (i.e., city council), and the
agency heads. A key point to remember regarding these roles is that
they only provide us with broad guidance as to how specific actors
might respond to a particular situation. As Anton notes, "... none
of the roles are so precisely defined as to determine the exact nature
27
of their (i.e., the participants') reactions."
With this caveat in mind, let us proceed to the first actor in
the municipal process: the chief executive. The centrality of this
position within the municipal budgetary process has been demonstrated
28
by both Crecine and Wildavsky.
Although some variations in his budgetary power have been
29
found, it appears that municipal chief executives are a dominant
decision-making force within their realms.
Within the municipal context, the chief executive often armed
with a small budgeting staff fulfills the function of a central
review agency. In the view of a number of authors, such agencies
universally fall into the role category of budget cutters versus
27
Anton, Expenditure in Illinois , p. 194; also Wildavsky,
Budgeting
,
p. 9.
28
See Wildavsky, Budgeting , p. 128; and Crecine, Governmental
Problem-Solving , pp. 38-39.
290ne recent study argues that city councils pursue a far more
active role in budgeting than suggested by Wildavsky or Crecine. See
Lewis B. Friedman, Budgeting Municipal Expenditures: A Study in
Comparative Policy Making (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975),
pp. 76-80.
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30
, . ,spenders. As Schick expressed it, "there is so much built-in pres-
sure for expansion that there must be a specialized agency with the
31task of saying 'No'."
This "cutter" role can also be related to the special revenue
constraint confronting American cities. In the words of Wildavsky,
Since it is difficult to discover painless methods of raising
money, top (municipal) officials have every incentive to hold
down expenditures. Their motivation is clear: the more they
can cut, the less they have to worry about finding new
sources of revenue. 32
However, the role of urban chief executives extends beyond that
of mere cutter. In his comparative study of Cleveland, Pittsburgh,
and Detroit, Crecine points out that
The . . . (chief executive' s) problem is largely one of recom-
mending a budget that (1) is balanced, (2) at least maintains
existing service levels, (3) provides for increases in city
employee wages if at all possible, and (4) avoids tax in-
creases (especially property tax increases in the belief that
increased property taxes cause business and industry to move
from the city, reducing its tax base). 33
Thus, at its core, the role of the chief executive involves
34 _
efforts to balance tax restraint against service maintenance. In a
30
E.g., see Wildavsky, Budgeting , pp. 7-8; and Schick, Budget
Innovation
, pp. 174-175.
31
Schick, "Control Patterns in State Budget Execution," Public
Administration Review 24 (June 1964) , p. 99.
32
Wildavsky, Budgeting , p. 118.
33Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving , p. 30.
34
As noted earlier, both salaries and the "cost of doing busi-
ness" rise each year. Therefore, the costs of maintaining services
also rises. This, in turn, means that the simplest strategy of "hold-
ing the line on taxes," which is to maintain a constant budget, cannot
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world without inflation and other economic forces such as stagnation,
this might be a simple task. However, such a world does not exist.
To maintain services, expenditures must rise. And yet to forestall
both political and economic calamity, tax hikes must be minimized.
Clearly, in order to fulfill both of these objectives, the chief
executive is scarcely able to be an axe-wielding cutter. No doubt,
chief executives are cutters, but in line with the "marginal increase"
rule, their cutting bias must be limited if they are to satisfy the
"service maintenance" rule. After all, to eliminate all increases
means a cut in real spending power and thus a reduction in services.
Hence, it seems likely that urban executives follow Wanat's scheme by
cutting requests for increases due to non- inflationary reasons, while
35generally allowing those due to inflation. Accordingly, both taxes
and expenditures gradually rise, so long as the chief executive clings
to the dual and conflicting goals of tax restraint and service mainte-
nance.
In light of this scenario, the role of the chief executive
within an incremental municipal budgeting system will be labelled as
"revenue/service balancer." This rather unwieldy term is felt to be
more descriptive than the simpler label of "budget balancer" suggested
36
by Anton and Wildavsky.
be pursued, unless city officials are willing to permit services to
deteriorate.
35Wanat, "Bases of Incremental ism, " p. 1225.
36
Anton, "Roles," p. 34; Wildavsky, Budgeting , p. 118.
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Turning now to the role of municipal legislatures, it is here
that we find the most marked difference between the role systems of
urban and federal budgetary processes. From the writing of Fenno and
Wildavsky, it seems evident that the Congressional Appropriations Com-
mittees are the most decisive and powerful actors in the determination
of federal expenditure decisions. 37 Indeed, in Anton's study of state
budgeting, the legislative Budget Commission seems at least as powerful
as the Governor, in practice if not in potential. 38 Such is not the
case at the municipal level. Here, what Wildavsky has labelled as
39
"executive dominance" seems the rule, with the role of the typical
city council largely confined to that of a "rubber-stamp" for the
executive budget.
In part, this "legislative subservience" can be explained because
city councils, unlike their federal and (sometimes) state counterparts,
lack the greater time, manpower, staff support, and (as in the case of
Cities A and B) legal authority characteristic of (some of) these
others. As Crecine points out, "because of the complexity and detail
in the mayor's budget and lack of council staff, the council's
37
Wildavsky, Politics
, pp. 53-54; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The
House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of
Integration," American Political Science Review 66 (June 1962), p. 323.
38
Anton, Expenditure in Illinois , pp. 184-185.
39
Wildavsky, Budgeting
,
p. 128.
40
See, ibid. ; and Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving ,
pp. 99-101.
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options are limited largely to approving the . . . (chief executive's)
41budget.
Of course, other factors can be suggested which support the
council's rubber stamp orientation. Assuming that it is generally
expected that the chief executive will both balance the budget and
maintain services, and assuming further that most councilors possess
at least a partial grasp of the various constraints on choice con-
fronting the city, then it seems plausible that councils have little
reason or stake to seek deeper involvement in the process. Unlike the
better and more massively financed Federal government, there is far
less room for innovation and far more emphasis on relatively routine
decisions at the municipal level. Thus, unless the executive is
failing to do an adequate job at "holding the line on taxes" while
maintaining services, the council members have little substantive
reasons to intervene on a regular and active basis. Accordingly, the
council would tend to pursue a "rubber-stamp" orientation.
Virtually all studies concur that the role of agency heads
within incremental systems is that of "spender" or "advocate," regard-
42
less of level or type of government. In brief, this role may be
defined as a set of actions undertaken by service area managers (a) to
insure the maintenance of on-going services at least at current levels
^Ibid.
,
p. 39.
42
Wildavsky, Politics , p. 18; Wildavsky, Budgeting , pp. 120-21;
Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving , pp. 38-39; Schick, Budget Inno-
vation, pp. 170-72; and Anton, State Expenditures , p. 184.
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and (b) if possible to obtain additional funds to permit expansion,
service upgrading, or small-scale innovation.
In addition to this maintenance/growth orientation, however, is
a third and conflicting goal, the development and preservation of
trust and credibility with the central review authorities (be they
executive or legislative in nature). The implication of this "trust"
goal is that "agencies do not usually request all the money they feel
they could
. . .
use . . . (because) no one will trust an agency that
43
repeatedly comes in too high.
"
Thus, in light of these conflicting goals, the "advocate" role
as exhibited at the municipal level is probably compatible with the
description provided by Crecine.
The problem is generally considered by department heads as com-
piling a budget request that (1) assures the department of
funds to carry on existing programs as part of a continuing
attack on existing problems, (2) is acceptable to the (chief
executive's) office, (3) and provides a reasonable share of
any overall budget increases to the department to enable it
to attack new problems (if any). 44
What prompts agency heads to adopt this "advocate's" role? In
part, the role is undoubtedly an outgrowth of what Wildavsky refers as
45
"the interaction between spending and cutting roles . . . . " In
short, just as the chief executive expects the agencies to submit
budgets that must be cut, so too do the agency heads expect to be cut
43
Wildavsky, Politics , p. 21.
Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving , pp. 38-39,
45
Wildavsky, Budgeting , p. 7.
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and therefore pad their budgets. This form of preemptive behavior may
presumedly be linked to their desire to maintain their services and to
establish premises for the possibility of growth. As Anton notes,
Failure to ask for more money . . . represents a serious chal-
lenge to existing role definitions and, as a result, occurs
only infrequently. Agencies continue to request increases,
in short, because cuts have to be made. 46
Of course, the advocate's role involves more than this simple
and mechanical interaction between spenders and cutters. It must be
recalled that an administrator's power, status, and future ambitions
hinge upon the power, status, and growth of the department he heads.
As Anton notes in another piece,
To request a smaller budget than the current budget is to sug-
gest that the job being done by the agency is not sufficiently
important . . . and that the administrator in charge of that
job is not sufficiently aggressive (or competent) to make the
claim.
4
7
Thus, a combination of social and psychological forces come to bear
upon department heads to be advocates. If they respond appropriately
to these forces, they receive the positive reinforcements of maintain-
ing and/or expanding their services, of obtaining the trust and re-
spect of their superiors, and of receiving the gratifications of high
status, (perhaps) power, and good career prospects. Failure, on the
other hand, to play the advocate can damage not only the department's
capacity to provide services, but may also result in lowered esteem
46
Anton, Expenditure in Illinois , p. 184.
47
Anton, "Roles," p. 99.
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and diminished career prospects. Accordingly, it seems quite likely
that the program and agency heads to be interviewed will be advocates.
To summarize our expectations on the role systems likely to be
found in Cities A and B, the chief executive will be a revenue/service
balancer who will fulfill these conflicting goals by engaging in
limited cuts from requests for funding increases; the program and
agency heads will be advocates who seek to maintain or expand services
by padding their requests, but who also want to establish trust and
credibility with the chief executive, and therefore defer from over-
padding; and the city councils will be rubber-stamps for the executive
budget due to their lack of knowledge, time, and staff support.
Incremental outputs
. What sort of impact should the constraints on
decision making, the use of incremental rules, and the presence of an
incremental role system have upon budgetary decisions? Obviously,
they should be incremental in nature; i.e., funding decisions which
provide relatively small, marginal increases, the size of which are
largely determined by the interaction of the safe base and fair share
48
rules with the revenue constraint. Unfortunately, because of the
4 8
It should be noted again that the operationalized definition
of an incremental decision provided by the R
g
formula makes no assump-
tion about whether such a decision will comprise a "small, marginal"
percent to be added to or subtracted from a budgetary base. Its pri-
mary focus is upon the notion of a "fair share." Consequently, if the
amount of revenue to be added to (or subtracted from) the previous
year's expenditure "base" is large, the "fair shares" should be large
as well. However because of the assumption concerning the "revenue
constraint" which confronts municipalities, incremental decisions at
the municipal level will indeed constitute "small, marginal" shifts.
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failure of the "descriptive" incrementalists to adequately operation-
alize this concept of incremental choice, such a definition is largely
a matter of assumption. Whether or not such types of decisions actu-
ally predominate as the output of presumedly incremental budgetary
systems will be discussed in Chapter IV.
For the present, let us turn now to an examination of the two
case cities and of the results of the interviews conducted in them.
Decision Rules and Budgetary Roles
in Cities A and B
As indicated in this chapter's introduction, the questionnaires
administered in each city were explicitly designed to examine decision
rules and role systems. The omission of items designed expressly to
explore the presence of the constraints was purposeful. First, as
developed in the literature, some of the constraints, such as the
revenue constraint, are seen as underlying reasons for the existence
of the rules and roles. However, it is conceivable that such pre-
49
conditions might exist without giving rise to incremental budgeting.
The precise nature of the causal linkages is frankly rather cloudy,
largely because they are difficult to prove and because there may be a
number of other unperceived causal and/or intervening factors which
49
For example, Wildavsky notes that "third world" nations also
are plagued by a revenue constraint. However, in such cases the prob-
lem is compounded by a high degree of uncertainty as to how much rev-
enue to expect in any given year. Lacking this "touchstone," such
nations are prone to engage in highly speculative, "unrealistic" bud-
geting, budgeting which tends to be quite non-incremental. See
Wildavsky, Budgeting , Chapter 7 passim.
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should also be included. Ultimately, the "real proof of the pudding"
that an incremental budgeting process exists is that incremental
decision rules and incremental role systems are present. Accordingly,
the questionnaire sought to focus upon these essential ingredients.
This consideration strongly reinforced a second, more technical
concern. As the questionnaire was developed, it became obvious that
the interviews would be fairly lengthy. Consequently, since the
interviews were to be conducted with public officials while they were
at work, explicit questions concerning the constraints and their
impact were deleted in order to minimize the time burden requested of
the subjects. In short, the questionnaire was shortened and focused
on more essential matters in the hopes of minimizing hostility and/or
unresponsiveness.
This is not to say that the constraints are entirely ignored.
Constraints such as bureaucratic routines are essentially comprised of
routinized decision rules and behavior patterns (i.e., roles). Since
these were the focus of the questionnaire, considerable information
concerning them was obtained. Moreover, as part of the research on
roles, the subjects were asked about the goals of different actors
within the process. As shall be seen, considerable, if indirect
support for the presence of a revenue constraint was obtained through
such questions.
All officials originally slated to be interviewed were in fact
interviewed, although in one important case, the chief executive in
City A, the interview consisted of an initial short, interrupted
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session, concluded by an exchange of letters. The quality and nature
of the responses varied considerably, ranging from the detailed to
simple shrugs of the shoulders. In order to build rapport with the
interviewees and to maintain a true record of their responses, little
or no pressure was applied to obtain a response when the individual
demonstrated a lack of either knowledge or willingness. Terms and
concepts were clarified for them upon request. However, the incre-
mental model was never discussed nor were the respondents given any
indication as to the "correct" or desired answers to any of the items.
Respondents were often asked to clarify and/or elaborate their
answers, as was thought necessary.
As noted, the interview items were formally divided into open-
ended questions and agree/disagree statements. However, many respon-
dents treated both types of items as open-ended questions and thus
frequently volunteered comments to support their responses to the
agree-disagree statements. These unsolicited remarks were duly re-
corded. For the most part, they constituted elaborations to themes
touched on during the open-ended questions.
Additional methodological considerations, pertinent to the
treatment of the different types of data, are presented below. First,
the data concerning the perception of the general incremental decision
rules will be presented. This is followed by an examination of the
findings related to the roles of various actors.
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Incremental decision rules. Data concerning the presence of the gen-
ral incremental decision rules discussed in the previous section was
obtained through six agree-disagree statements, each of which were
focused upon one particular such rule. Again, these rules were the
"safe base," "increase focus," "fair share," "maintenance," and "mar-
ginal growth" rules.
Every city official interviewed had these statements put to
them. Possible responses included "agree," "disagree," "other (please
specify)," and "don't know/no response." With the exception of one
individual in City B who refused to answer one question, all inter-
viewees replied to the statements in a fashion which could be classi-
fied as falling within the first three of these categories.
The format used here will consist of the name of the rule in-
volved and the agree/disagree statement, followed by the percent and
number of replies in each response category by city. Regardless of
whether it was "agree" or "disagree," the response congruent with the
incremental model is presented first in each table to simplify com-
parisons. Finally, the chi-square test was used to determine whether
the two cities were significantly different from each other. The size
of the chi-square plus whether it was significant at the .05 level is
noted at the bottom of each table. The abbreviation "sig." indicates
a significant difference, while "n.s." indicates non-significance. As
necessary, the "other" and "D.K./N.R. " responses were added to the
"anti- incremental" responses in calculating the chi-squares.
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In addition to the data presented in the tables, additional chi-
square statistics were calculated to determine whether the response
patterns of each city were significantly different from that which
might be obtained in an "ideal" incremental process. This "ideal"
process was arbitrarily defined as one in which responses concurring
with the presence of an incremental decision rule occurred at a level
of 90 percent of the number of cases in each city. "Other" responses
were omitted from these calculations. Theoretically, this may be jus-
tified because such cases were generally ambiguous in nature, indi-
cating both partial acceptance and partial rejection of the rule (the
most typical type of "other" response was some variation of "it de-
pends"). Consequently, the "other" responses tended to neither con-
firm nor negate the presence of any given decision rule.
At a more practical methodological level, the "other" responses
were omitted because their inclusion always resulted in a six-cell dis-
tribution table for which less than 80 percent of the cells contained
expected frequencies of at least five. According to G. David Garson,
this type of frequency distribution invalidates the reliability of the
50
chi- square statistic. Thus, on both theoretical and methodological
grounds, the "other" responses were omitted from the calculations, and
the "ninty-percent" rule was applied to the actual number of cases
found in the agree-disagree categories. Fortunately, no more
50
G. David Garson, Handbook of Political Science Methods (Boston
Holbrook Press, Inc., 1971), p. 134.
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(and generally less) than 25 percent of the total number of cases per
city had to be omitted.
In any event, whether either city was significantly different
from this arbitrarily defined model was calculated for each item using
the chi-square statistic and employing a significance level of .05.
The results of these tests are reported in the text accompanying and
explaining each item. In light of the need to omit the "other" re-
sponses, these "tests" possess no more than a usefully suggestive
quality. They cannot per se be interpreted as statistically valid.
If the reader is interested, the data presented below is broken
down into the sub- categories of "overview officials" (i.e., the chief
executive, the budget director, and the council president), "agency
heads," "public works program heads," and "general government program
heads" in Appendix E. The tiny N's in most of these sub-categories
make useful and reliable statistical analysis unlikely. However,
noteworthy variations between these sub- categories will be discussed
as appropriate.
Solid majorities in both cities endorse the "safe base" rule.
Unsurprisingly, support for the concept is slightly weaker in City B
where the city council reportedly had been manifesting a "cutting"
bias during the past two years (FY1976 and FY1977)
.
Speaking generally, the four "other" respondents argued that the
safety of the budget base varied depending upon the times, economic
conditions, and/or federal/state intervention (in the form of aid).
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TABLE 11
THE SAFE BASE RULE
Statement: "In most cases, a department or program head can assume
that their current year's funding level will be continued with little
question or challenge from one year to the next.
"
City A
# %
City B
# % #
Totals
%
Agree 15 75% 15 65.2% 30 69.8%
Disagree 3 15% 6 26.1% 9 20.9%
Other 2 10% 2 8.7% 4 9. 3%
D. K./N. R. 0 0%
_0 0.0%
_0 0.0%
20 100% 23 100. 0% 43 100.0%
2
x* - 0. 1324 (n.s.)
Based on revised N's of eighteen and twenty-one, respectively
,
neither City A nor City B differed significantly from the 90 percent
acceptance level of the "ideal" incremental response pattern.
TABLE 12
THE INCREASE FOCUS ROLE
Statement: "In the budgetary review process, more time is spent jus-
tifying and questioning a department's entire request than is spent on
its requests for increases only" (emphasis added verbally).
City A
# %
City B
# % #
Totals
%
Disagree 13 65% 12 52.2% 25 58.1%
Agree 5 25% 6 26.1% 11 25.6%
Other 2 10% 4 17.4% 6 14.0%
D.K./N. R. 0 0% 4.3% 2.3%
Totals 20 100% 23 100.0% 43 100.0%
X
2
= 0. 14037 (n. s.
)
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A solid majority of respondents in City A accepted the "increase
focus" rule. However, only a slight majority did so in City B. This
difference in support appears to be linked not to stronger support for
a "total focus" norm in City B (City B: 26.1 percent vs. City A: 25
percent), but rather to a higher number of "other" and "no response"
replies. The reasons for this difference are unclear. Part of the
explanation might be related to the greater sense of uncertainty found
in City B due to its council's alleged "cutting" bias. On the other
hand, a partial answer might also be linked to the impression of less
education and professionalism among the City B's public works program
heads, who accounted for two of its four "other" respondents. If this
impression is correct, it might suggest that these two respondents
were less informed about decision rules because they are less involved
with or committed to their budgetary roles. Conversely, it may simply
be that budgetary decision making is less predictable or certain in
City B.
At any rate, the "other" respondents in both cities largely took
the position that the application of an "increase focus" or "total
focus" rule depended upon such contingencies as the mood of the re-
viewers, the nature of the times, and so forth. Hence the application
of one rule or the other was seen as varying from year to year. In
other words, the "increase focus" rule was not rejected, but its use
51
was seen as dependent upon the intervention of random circumstances.
51
The single "no response" came from the city clerk of City B,
who laughed and suggested I ask the chief executive.
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Finally, based on revised N's of eighteen for both communities,
the response patterns of neither City A nor City B were significantly
different from the 90 percent acceptance level of the "ideal" response
pattern.
TABLE 13
THE FAIR SHARE RULE
Statement: "The budgets of most departments (or programs) grow or
decline by
decline.
"
roughly the same percent that city revenues grow or
City
#
A
% #
City B
% #
Totals
%
Agree 3 15% 10 43.5% 13 30.2%
Disagree 12 60% 11 47. 8% 23 53.5%
Other 5 25% 2 8. 7% 7 16.3%
D. K./N. R.
_0 0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Totals 20 100% 23 100.0% 43 100.0%
X
2
= 1.8198 (n.s.
)
On the surface, these response patterns plainly negate the idea
that the "fair share" rule is of importance. However, as Appendix E
shows, it is here that we find one of the most interesting splits
between the sub- categories of officials. Whereas both cities' agency
and program heads tend to reject the "fair share" rule, overview
officials (i.e., chief executives, budget directors, and council
presidents) tend to accept it. All three of these individuals in
City B accepted the statement, while both the budget director and
council president of City A did likewise. City A's chief executive
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responded by stating that "this is probably true in many cases, but
there are always a lot of important exceptions." This somewhat
ambiguous though supportive remark resulted in an "Other" classif-
ication for him.
There are a number of interpretations of this split between the
overview and manager categories. For instance, the overview officials
could be wrong and the "fair share" rule irrelevant.
However, it seems more likely that from their "macro-level
perches" these officials are not in error, but rather are in a better
position to perceive general patterns than are the line officials.
The latter individuals conversely are like the trees forming the
forest and from their vantage point fail to see the forest for the
other trees. In non-metaphorical terms, this means that the line
managers may be more aware of and more sensitive to their peers who
get the exceptional boost (while they go relatively lacking), than
aware of the relative equality with which the bulk of agencies and
programs are treated.
Some tangential though inconclusive support for this scenario
was uncovered. In the course of the interviews, a number of officials
in both cities expressed frustration or active resentment toward other
departments which were perceived as forging ahead in funding at the
expense of all other departments and/or of their own department. In
City A, the departments of education and of parks and recreation were
most frequently the target of such observations. In City B, the
"villains" most often cited were the education department, those
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departments (unspecified) which can generate outside aid (this, of
course, includes the school system)
, and those departments (again
unspecified) which are involved in service delivery rather than over-
head functions.
Further support of the fair share rule can also be found in the
preceding chapter and among the annual R^s presented in Appendix A
(depicted graphically in Appendix B). These show a general pattern of
adjusted R
g
' s clustering closely around the "ideal" mean of 0.00.
This suggests that the agencies and programs in both cities are in
fact being treated in a roughly even-handed manner when it comes to
annual budget increases. At the least, it indicates that City A's
chief executive is correct when he suggests that many programs are
receiving a "fair share" even though there are "a lot of exceptions."
Obviously, this is a rather tangential re- interpretation of the
interview data. However, the point being made is that, given the
overview/managerial split, and given the clustering of R
g
scores, it
is not possible at this time to simply conclude that the "fair share"
rule is not being used in both cities.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that there was an obvious
and significant difference between the response patterns for each city
and the 90 percent level of acceptance for the rule.
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TABLE 14
THE MAINTENANCE RULE (A)
Statement: "The city government is just as concerned with determining
the need for and establishing new services as it is with maintaining
existing services at acceptable levels. It
City A City B Totals
# % # % # %
Disagree 11 55% 10 43. 5% 21 48.8%
Agree 7 35% 8 34. 8% 15 34.9%
Other 2 10% 5 21. 7% 7 16.3%
D- K. /N. R.
_0 0% _0 0. 0% _0 0.0%
Totals 20 100% 23 100. 0% 43 100.0%
X
2
= 1.2012 (n.s.
)
The results of the interviews are rather mixed here. A slight
majority in City A concurs with the "maintenance" rule, while an even
smaller plurality agree in City B. At least a partial explanation for
these findings is available through comments volunteered by the par-
ticipants.
In regards to those who agreed that establishing new services
was of equal importance to maintaining existing services, none indi-
cated that the latter was of any less importance. Of the fifteen
respondents who fell into this category, eight pointed to programs or
services which had been established within roughly the previous five
years (e.g., in City A, the civic center, the community development
department, the human services division were noted by different
respondents; in City B, the planning department and the human rights
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commission were cited); three noted recent changes within their own
areas designed to improve internal efficiency (e.g., both cities'
treasurers noted reducing bill mailings from four to two times per
year, while City A's traffic engineering department pointed to the use
of apparently expensive, but low-maintenance thermal plastic traffic
signs, etc.); two others discussed growth in their staffs due to an
increased demand for their services (e.g., City A's data processing
department and City B's law department); and the remaining two volun-
teered no support for their viewpoint.
Among the seven interviewees in the "other" category, three
indicated that the emphasis on new services varied depending upon
financial conditions or opportunities. The balance were simply uncer-
tain as to whether the "innovation" norm was of equal importance with
the "maintenance" rule.
In sum, the "dissident" responses to the statement reveal a
rather wide range of interpretations regarding what constitutes "new
services." For some, a relatively few instances of new programs or
departments established in recent times "proves" that the "innovation"
rule is of equal concern. For others, it is demonstrated by "internal
efficiency" changes or by the growth of their own area's staff.
Altogether, it can be suggested that these respondents' notion of
"proof" depends a bit too heavily upon the occasional innovation or
upon limited and relatively minor internal changes. In short, (re-
turning to our earlier metaphor) it appears that the random new or
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improved tree leads many respondents to lose sight, once again, of the
larger forest.
There are, of course, other possible explanations of the find-
ings. First, the respondents in the "agree" and "other" rows might
have been giving socially acceptable responses. Logically, many pub-
lic officials may be unwilling to admit to an outsider that "deter-
mining the need for and establishing new services" is a lesser pri-
ority. Secondly, it might also be that the statement is poorly or
inappropriately worded. Although an effort was made to frame the ques-
tion as unemotionally and as plainly as possible, the topic may be one
which has unavoidable emotional significance to many of the respondents.
And finally, the possibility must be raised that the "innovation" rule
is, in fact, of equal importance with the "maintenance rule," at least
to many public officials. It cannot be ruled out that their rather
limited examples of innovation were simply limited examples, and that
many other uncited examples might be uncovered upon further investi-
gation.
In any event, it must be remembered that the response pattern in
this table provides weak to moderate support for the "maintenance"
rule. After all, a majority in one city and a plurality in another
disagreed with the statement. Moreover, based only upon the "agree"
and "disagree" responses (i.e., excluding the ambiguous "other" re-
plies), neither city was significantly different from the "ideal"
incremental response pattern of 90 percent support for the rule.
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Thus, the importance of the rule, and the incremental nature of the
two cities cannot be ruled out on the basis of Table 14.
TABLE 15
THE MAINTENANCE RULE (B)
Statement: "In the budgetary process, there is a major emphasis upon
maintaining the services of existing departments and programs at
existing levels."
City A City B Totals
# % # % # %
Agree 20 100% 20 87. 0% 40 93.0%
Disagree 0 0% 1 4.3% 1 2.3%
Other 0 0% 2 8.7% 2 4.7%
D. K./N. R. 0 0% _0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Totals 20 100% 23 100. 0% 43 100.0%
X
2
- .14396 (n.s.)
Unlike the previous statement, this one does not pose the issue
in terms of a choice between the "maintenance" rule and an "innovation"
rule. Instead, it is phrased in a deliberately unambiguous fashion in
order to re-check the support levels for the "maintenance" rule. This
re-checking was viewed as necessary in order to control for the possi-
bility that interviewees would support the "innovation" rule out of a
sense of social correctness.
The responses to this statement reveal extremely high support
for the "maintenance" rule, when posed unambiguously and in
terms of a
"strong emphasis."
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Taken together, the support for the "maintenance" rule found
here and in the preceding statement strongly indicates that the rule
is in operation in both cities. Yet more support for the rule will be
presented later when we turn our attention to the goals and roles
employed by the service area heads and the chief executives. As we
shall see, the impact of the revenue constraint upon decision making
tends to reinforce a maintenance goal among both of these categories
of actors. As summarized by the Budget Director of City A, we shall
see that "... municipal revenues are mostly used to maintain our
services. The tax rate is the bottom line."
As simply "eyeballing" the data suggests, there was no signif-
icant difference between either city's response pattern to this state-
ment and the "ideal" incremental response pattern.
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TABLE 16
THE MARGINAL GROWTH RULE
Statement: "In general, departments and programs can expect a limited
amount of additional funds for a coming fiscal year over what they
received during a current fiscal year.
"
City
#
A
%
City
#
B
%
Totals
# %
Agree 18 90% 18 78. 3% 36 83.7%
Disagree 2 10% 4 17.4% 6 14.0%
Other 0 0% 1 4. 3% 1 2.3%
D.K./N.R.
_q 0% _0 0.0% _0 0.0%
Totals 20 100% 23 100. 0% 43 100.0%
X
2
=
. 39180 (n. s.
)
Strong to very strong support for this decision rules is found
in both cities. Like most of the other rules, support is slightly
weaker in City B than in City A. As in the case of the "safe base"
rule, a plausible explanation for this particular deviation is the
reported "cutting bias" which City B's council has developed in recent
years. Logically, such a cutting bias might mean either no increase
however small or even a reduction in one's base funds. Those fearing
or experiencing such eventualities would obviously doubt the validity
of any "marginal growth" decision rule.
On the other hand, it must be noted that there is no statisti-
cally significant difference between the response patterns of
the two
cities. Thus, in a formal sense, the slight difference found
here is
of minor concern. Of greater importance is the strength of
support
for the rule in both communities.
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This common support has interesting implications concerning the
alleged "cutting bias" of City B's council. In combination with the
City B support for the "safe base" rule (65.2 percent of respondents),
it suggests that this "bias" is apparently limited to requests for in-
creases in funds, and that, even there, the cuts are having a limited
impact. Further ramifications which the acceptance of these rules
have regarding the role of City B's council will be elaborated later.
For now, it will suffice to note that the "marginal growth" rule
is widely perceived in both cities. Based upon revised H's of twenty
for City A and of twenty- two for City B, neither city possesses a
response pattern that significantly differs from the 90 percent accep-
tance level specified for an "ideal" incremental pattern. Indeed, the
tabulated chi- squares are so small (City A: 0.0000; City B: .19298) as
to suggest perfect or near perfect fits with the model
Decision rules: a summary . The results of this analysis of the per-
ception of incremental decision rules clearly indicate that such rules
are being utilized in both cities. The strongest support was found
for the "safe base" rule, the "marginal growth" rule, and for the
unambiguously stated "maintenance" rule. Weaker, but majority support
was found for the "increase focus" rule in both cities, and for the
more ambiguous statement of the "maintenance" rule in City A. While
a plurality in City B supported the "maintenance" rule in this more
ambiguous statement, there was also more uncertainty or contingent
acceptance of the rule expressed there. On the other hand, the
support for the equal importance of an "innovation" rule (accepted by
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roughly 35 percent of all respondents) in both cities appears to hinge
upon a rather unscientific definition of proof or upon a rather limited
notion of what constitutes "new services."
The only rule rejected as valid in both cities was the "fair
share" rule. Two interpretations of this finding are possible. First,
the rule is in fact irrelevant. Or secondly, given the managerial/
overview official split, the rule is being employed, but is not widely
perceived by the agency and program heads. In light of the general
tendency for annual change rates to cluster around an adjusted RJ S
value of 0. 00 (noted in the previous chapter) , this latter inter-
pretation seems more likely.
Having more or less established the perception of general incre-
mental decision rules in both cities, it is now necessary to proceed
to an examination of whether or not incremental roles are also in
evidence. This is the subject of the next section of this chapter.
The role systems . As stipulated in the discussion of the municipal
incremental budgeting model, incremental systems involve not only the
use of incremental decision rules, but also the presence of incremen-
tal role behavior. Incremental roles may be viewed as a sub-form of
organizational roles, which may be defined as a set of attitudes and
behaviors that an individual in a given type of organizational position
adopts because of the nature of the interpersonal and other environ-
mental forces which impact upon him/her as a result of occupying that
position.
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The key elements of this definition are "attitudes" and "beha-
vior." As applied to incremental roles, attitudes may be translated
into goals, while behavior may be defined as predictable behavior.
For the various categories of officials involved in municipal budgeting
the appropriate labels, goals, and predictable behaviors are summarized
in Figure 14.
Position Label Goals Behaviors
1 . Chief Revenue/ "Hold the line on Engages in
Executive Service taxes" and marginal cuts
balancer "maintain of requests
services" for funding
increases
2 . City Rubber Any number of Approves exec-
Council stamp things
:
utive budget
variable with little or
no revisions
3 . Agency/ Advocate Maintain and/ Will tend to
Program or improve (or pad budget
Heads expand) services requests
Figure 14. The Budgetary Roles of Municipal Officials
Every respondent was provided (a) open-ended questions on the
budgetary goals of the different categories of officials and (b)
agree/disagree statements regarding the relevant behaviors of each.
As before, possible responses to the agree/disagree statements included
"agree," "disagree," "other (please specify)," and "no response/don't
know.
"
The format for presenting the data will include a brief discus-
sion of the expected goals and behaviors of each category
of official,
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followed by tables showing the response patterns of both cities to the
items. The chi-square test was again employed to determine if there
were any statistically significant differences between City A and
City B. The size of these chi-squares and an indication of whether
they are significant (sig.) or insignificant (n.s.) at the .05 level
of confidence is included at the bottom of each table.
In addition, in the discussion accompanying each table, there
will be an indication of whether or not each city is significantly
different from an ideal response pattern of 90 percent support for the
predicted "incremental" reply. For the agree/disagree statements,
these particular chi-squares were calculated in the same fashion used
on the earlier agree/disagree statements. For the data obtained from
the open-ended questions, slightly varying procedures were used for
the calculations. These varying procedures are briefly explained in
the discussions that follow the tables. Due to the need to manipulate
the data by either omitting cases or by collapsing categories, these
chi-square "tests" are viewed as largely suggestive, not definitive.
Finally, before turning to the findings, it should be noted that
classifying the open-ended responses generally posed no methodological
problems because most officials used fairly simple and largely compat-
ible terminology in answering the "goal" questions. For example,
whereas one subject might remark that official X's goal was "mini-
mizing tax increases," another respondent would claim X's goal was
"holding the line on taxes." It required no great effort at semantic
interpretation to conclude that both respondents saw officials X's
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goals as one and the same. In those few cases where uncertainty about
classification arose, the responses were usually placed in an "other"
category, unless later comments clarified the respondent's earlier
remarks.
The first category of official we shall look at is the chief
executive. As suggested by our incremental model and as summarized in
Figure 14, these officials are viewed as revenue/service balancers
whose goals should be "holding the line on taxes" and "maintaining
services," and whose relevant behavior should be to cut agency re-
quests (which are presumedly padded)
.
In response to the open-ended question, "What would you say are
his (i.e., the chief executive's) basic goals which guide his handling
and evaluation of the (budget) requests?", the following response
patterns were found.
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TABLE 17
THE BUDGETARY GOALS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVES
Goals
#
Pi f-v A
% #
City B
%
Totals
# %
a. Hold the line
on t" n v i 1 ca a n H
8 40% 11 47.8% 19 44.2%
maintain
services
b. Hold the line
on taxes
8 O OC 1 a- 14 32.6%
(only)
c Mil in tain ;mdVa* • 4 1 1 1 1 1 < 1 III I J 1 1 1 1 nu u . u * 1 2.3%
improve*
services
d. other o 0% 1 4.3% 1 2.3%
e. Not sure 2 10% 4 17.4% 6 14.0%
f. No response
_1 5% JL 4.3% _2 4.7%
Totals 20 100% 23 99.9% 43 100.1%
X
2
.9760 (n . s. )
(Note: the chi- square statistic was calculated using a six cell
table obtained by collapsing categories d, e, and f into an "other"
classification. )
As can be seen
,
40 percent of City A 's subjects and nearly
48 percent of City B*
s
voluntarily cited both of the budgetary goals
which the model predicts as characteristic of chief executives. No
other goal category in either city accounted for larger proportions of
the respondents, although an equal percentage of City A's saw the
chief executive's goals in terms of tax restraint only.
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Since the respondents were given no specific verbal or written
suggestions as to what the proper responses might be, these propor-
tions provide good support for the notion that the chief executives
m
possess the predicted "incremental" budgetary goals. Indeed, if we
combine these responses with those which stress only one of the two
goals predicted (i.e., goal category b in the table), we find full or
partial support for this conclusion among 80 percent of City A's
respondents and among nearly 74 percent in City B.
Further support that the chief executives pursue "incremental"
goals was found by comparing each city's responses to an "ideal" of 90
percent support for such goals (i.e., eighteen of City A's twenty
officials and twenty-one of City B's twenty-three should give answers
of a pro- incremental nature) . To obtain the necessary number of
cells, goal responses a and b were collapsed into a pro-incremental
category while categories c, d, e, and f were collapsed into an "other"
category. The resulting chi-square for City A was only 0.1961 and for
City B 1.3618, neither of which are significantly different from the
"ideal" response pattern.
Before proceeding, it must be acknowledged that the combination
of goal categories a and b, employed above, suggests a possible modi-
fication of the model of municipal incremental ism developed here. The
linchpin between these two categories of responses is that both empha-
size that the chief executive pursues a goal of tax restraint, while
only one of the categories suggest this goal is balanced by a desire
to maintain services. Accordingly, it is possible to argue that the
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goal of tax restraint is more widely perceived than the service mainte-
nance goal. Therefore, it can be maintained that the tax restraint
goal may take precedence (or priority) over the maintenance goal.
This rather conjectural line of reasoning suggests that Anton's and
Wildavsky's role label of "budget balancer" for chief executives is
perhaps more accurate than the "revenue/service balancer" label used
.
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here.
Conversely, given the notion that more respondents might have
supported the dual goal category if they had reflected longer or if
they had been given more specific instructions, such a modification
might not be warranted. In either event, both goal category a and
category b are compatible with a_ model of incremental behavior, al-
though perhaps not the model developed here.
The second dimension of the chief executive's role is his actual
treatment of budget requests. As indicated, in an incremental model,
this actor is expected to be a consistent trimmer or cutter of such
requests. To determine if this is so, an agree/disagree statement was
made to the respondents with the following results.
Wildavsky, Budgeting , p. 118; Anton, "Roles," p. 34.
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TABLE 18
CHIEF EXECUTIVES AS BUDGET REQUEST CUTTERS
Statement: "Program
requests to be cut by
and department heads
the Chief Executive.
tend
ii
to expect their budget
#
A
% #
City B Totals
# %
a. Agree 19 95% 19 82. 6% 38 88.4%
b. Disagree 1 5% 2 8. 7% 3 7.0%
c. Other 0 0% 1 4. 3% 1 2.3%
d. No opinion/ 0 0% 1 4. 3% 1 2.3%
e. No response
Totals 20 100% 23 99. 9% 43 100.0%
X
2
= .6200 (n. s. )
(Note: The chi-square statistic was calculated using a four
cell table obtained by collapsing categories b, c, and d into a
"disagree/other" category.)
An overwhelming majority of interviewees in both cities support
the notion that their chief executives possess a cutting bias. This
includes both cities' chief executives and budget directors. In addi-
tion, neither city was significantly different from the "ideal" pro-
incremental response pattern of 90 percent. The chi-square of each
city against this standard were 0.0000 for City A and 0.1917 for City
B. These findings combined with findings on the goals of both chief
executives firmly support the contention that in general these execu-
tives behave in a fashion which is compatible with an incremental
budgeting system.
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Similar conclusions can be reached concerning the program and
agency heads of both cities. As will be recalled, our model predicted
that these individuals are "advocates" who pursue the goals of main-
taining services and/or improving (or upgrading or expanding) services.
To uncover perceptions on the actual goals of this category of offi-
cial, the following open-ended question was asked: "What would you
say are the general goals which guide you (or program and agency
heads) in the preparation and formulation of the budget requests for
your (or their) areas?" Table 19 presents the findings.
TABLE 19
THE BUDGETARY GOALS OF AGENCY AND PROGRAM HEADS
City A
# % #
City B
% #
Totals
%
a. Maintain
services
10 50% 9 39.1% 19 44.2%
b. Upgrade
services
1 5% 2 8. 7% 3 7.0%
c. Maintain
upgrade
services
and 5 25% 7 30.4% 12 27.9%
d. Other 3 15% 4 17.4% 7 16.3%
e. Not sure _x 5% _1 4.3% 2 4.6%
Totals 20 100% 23 99. 9% 43 100.0%
2
X = . 0557 (n. s. )
(Note: The chi- square statistic was calculated using a four
cell table obtained by collapsing categories a, b, and c into a pro-
incremental category and categories d and e into an "other" category.)
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Assuming some variation in goals for the advocate's role, we
find three types of responses in both cities compatible with that
role. These are goal categories a, b, and c. Together, these account
for 80 percent of the respondents in City A and slightly over 78
percent in City B. Comparing these three categories, totalled for
each city, against the 90 percent pro- incremental standard yields no
significant difference. The chi-square for City A is only 0.1961,
while City B' s is 0. 6740. Clearly, advocate-oriented goals are the
rule, not the exception in both cities.
Among the 15 percent of each city's respondents who fell into
the "other" category, no identifiable alternative goal emerges.
According to City A' s director of highways and streets and City B's
administrative director of public works, their budgetary goals are set
by their most bothersome problem. City B's planning director insisted
his was simply to assist the chief executive in making his budget
choices. And City A's council president stated that the real goal of
department heads was to get more money, period. As for the two "not
sure" respondents, they were City A's budget director and City B's
chief executive, both of whom indicate something to the effect that an
administrator's goals presumedly varied with the administrator.
Aside from possessing appropriate goals, "advocates" are further
expected to engage in appropriate behavior, the most noted of which is
to pad their budget requests. To determine whether this occurred (or
was thought to occur), the respondents were confronted with a rather
blunt agree/disagree statement, the responses to which follow.
134
TABLE 20
PROGRAM AND AGENCY HEADS AS BUDGET PADDERS
Statement: "Department
funds than they expect
and program
to receive."
managers generally ask for more
City A
# %
City
#
B
%
Totals
# %
a. Agree 17 85% 18 78.3% 35 81.4%
b. Disagree 3 15% 4 17.4% 7 16.3%
c. Other 0 0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
d. Don' t know/ 0 0% 1 4.3% 1 2.3%
no response
Totals 20 100% 23 100.0% 43 100.0%
2
X = 0.0301 (n.s.)
(Note: The chi-square statistic was calculated using a four cell
table obtained by collapsing categories b, c, and d into a non-
incremental category.
)
As can be seen, strong majorities in both cities recognize the
use of padding tactics by agency and program heads. Only seven of the
forty- three disavowed that they engaged in such behavior, with five of
these seven found among offices within the general government category
(City A' s city clerk and human services director; City B's tax title
custodian, human services director, and human right's director). Most
of these programs were relatively small and either performed rather
routine tasks or constituted relatively new and less established
programs. Neither city significantly differed from the 90 percent
pro- incremental ideal. The chi-square for City A was 0.0000 and for
City B 0.6740.
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Together with the findings on the goals of program and agency
heads, this set of data confirms the expectation that these individuals
fulfill the role of advocate. Accordingly, in combination with the
findings related to the chief executives, we have thus far developed a
strong case that City A and City B possess incremental budgeting sys-
tems which are fairly close to the model presented earlier.
The data on the goals and behavior of the city councils similarly
support an incremental budgeting scenario in both cities, but one in
City B markedly varied from our model. As stated earlier, city coun-
cils are expected to be rubber stamps for the executive's budget and
thus to possess highly variable budgetary goals, if any.
Accordingly, respondents in both cities were asked "What would
you say are the general goals which guide their (i.e., the council's)
handling of the (chief executive's) budget recommendations?" Table
21 presents the findings.
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TABLE 21
THE BUDGETARY GOALS OF THE CITY COUNCILS
Goals City A
# % #
City B
% #
iOtalS
%
a. Hold the line
on taxes and
maintain
services
2 10% 4 17.4% 6 14.0%
b. Hold the line
on taxes
3 15% 14 60.9% 17 39.5%
c. Other 11 55% 1 4.3% 12 27.9%
d. No response
To tals
_2
20
15%
100%
_4
23
17.4%
100.0%
_7
43
16.3%
100.0%
X
2
= 17.9590 (sig.)
(Note: The chi-square statistic was calculated using a four cell
table obtained by collapsing categories a and b, and categories c and
d.)
Here we find an obvious and statistically significant disagree-
ment between the two cities. On one hand, City A appears to conform
to the expectation of a varied, rather muddled pattern of responses.
Over one-half of the respondents fall into the "other" category (eleven
of twenty) . Of this group, seven argued that the budgetary goals of
councillors consisted of a concern for specific agencies or programs.
Several described this orientation in terms of the councillors having
"pet" projects which they sought to protect or to cut. Two of the
"others" argued the council's goal was to serve as an overseer or
reviewer of the budget process. The balance of these respondents had
views not shared by anyone else. The overall impression arising from
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the response pattern in City A is that the council's goals are rather
vague and/or limited, suggesting that the council is not strongly
involved with making budgetary choices.
Such is not the case in City B. Here a solid majority of 61
percent report that the council's goal is "holding the line on taxes,"
and a not insubstantial 17 percent concur, but balance this goal with
a service maintenance goal. In short, nearly 80 percent of City B
interviewees clearly see their council as concerned with tax restraint.
The differences between the two cities are fairly easy to
account for. At the time of the interviews, City B was in the throes
of a court-ordered reassessment of property values, reportedly brought
about by the city' s failure to increase property valuations throughout
the city in a timely, systematic, and comprehensive fashion. As a
result, substantial tax hikes are expected for many sections of the
city.
The council' s reaction to this "crisis" was to engage in a pre-
sumedly determined (and apparently vocal) campaign to cut department
budgets. Logically, reduced expenditures in the face of increased
revenues could mean substantial tax relief for the citizens, especi-
ally those just hit by the higher tax rates. This alleged cutting
bias had begun during the budget preparations for FY 1976 and had
continued during the FY1977 process, during and just after which the
interviews were conducted. With the interviews falling in the middle
of this "reassessment crisis," it seems rather obvious why City B's
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respondents believed that the "tax line" was of concern to their
council.
Further evidence that City B's council pursues a role deviating
from the expected is found in the responses to the agree/disagree item
on their behavior. The response patterns for both cities are reported
in Table 22.
TABLE 22
CITY COUNCILS AS RUBBER STAMPS
Statement: "The city council tends to accept the executive budget in
tact with few or no revisions."
City
#
A
% #
City B
% #
Totals
%
a. Agree 19 95% 11 47.8% 30 69.8%
b. Disagree 1 5% 10 43.5% 11 25.6%
c. Other 0 0% 2 8.7% 2 4.6%
d. Don' t know/
no response
_0 0% 0 0.0% _0 0.0%
To tals 20 100% 23 100.0% 43 100.0%
X
2
= 9.1609 (sig.)
(Note: The chi- square statistic was calculated using a four
cell table obtained by collapsing categories b, c, and d into a non-
incremental/other category.
)
Once again we find that City A's council appears to behave in
accordance with the model. Indeed, its response pattern does not
significantly differ from the 90 percent ideal (City A's chi-sguare
equalled 0.0000). On the other hand, the response pattern in City E
is split almost evenly between those who perceive the council
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rubber-stamping the executive budget and those who see it cutting
those recommendations (all of the respondents in the "disagree" cate-
gory indicated that the council' s behavior was now geared toward
reducing the requests)
.
The two "other" respondents indicated that
the council varied in employing rubber stamp versus cutting behavior.
As would be expected, the response pattern in City B was significantly
different from the ideal pattern of 90 percent acceptance of predicted
behavior.
Clearly, the role being pursued by the council of City B appears
to be both substantively and statistically distinct from the rubber
stamp role predicted. On one hand, it is widely perceived as pursuing
the specific goal of holding the tax line. On the other hand, over
half of the respondents believe that it is not consistently behaving
like a rubber stamp.
Two questions arise. First, why is City B's council deviating
from the model? And second, is its role (as yet undefined) incompat-
ible with the notion that City B's budgetary system is incremental in
nature?
In regards to the first question, the reasons for the council's
cutting bias clearly appear to be linked to the "reassessment crisis."
Although most interviewees responded to questions about the council in
highly general terms, support for this linkage can be found in the
comments of at least ten of the twenty- three respondents. With refer-
ences to the "reevaluation problem," the "current economic problem,"
and the "fear of the higher taxes," these individuals, including the
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chief executive, the head of the council, the planning director, and
the treasurer all discussed the council's cutting bias within the
context of the current pressures on the city. Moreover, five of this
group indicated that the council's cutting behavior had come about
only within the last couple of years. The overall impression that
emerges is of a council which has shifted from a rubber stamp to a
cutting behavior pattern as a result of a combination of political and
economic fears arising from a court-ordered reassessment of property
tax rates.
Whether or not the cutting bias of the council constitutes a
non- incremental role is a more intriguing and important question.
Logically, in order to do so, the cuts exacted by the council should
(a) threaten the base funds of municipal departments (and thereby
constitute a violation of the "safe base" decision rule) and/or
(b) result in no growth, even for inflation, in the departmental
budgets (and thereby constitute a violation of the "marginal growth"
decision rule). Neither of these conditions appear to hold true. As
noted earlier, roughly two- thirds of City B's respondents affirmed the
"safe base" rule, while nearly 80 percent supported the "marginal
growth" rule. Thus, the much feared cutting bias of City B's council
appears to be limited to only a limited portion of the requests for
increases over the funding base. In other words, as City B's fire
chief stated, "the (chief executive) cuts our budget back to size, and
the council nickels and dimes us to death."
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Thus, while City B's council is not conforming to the "rubber
stamp" role, its goals and behavior suggest that it is fulfilling a
role similar to the "guardian of the public purse" role described by
53Wildavsky. This means, in turn, that its "deviant" role is nonethe-
less compatible with an incremental budgetary system. Indeed, since
many municipalities are presumedly faced by worsening fiscal condi-
tions, it may well be that this "deviant" role is not so deviant, but
is becoming a major alternative (or replacement) for the rubber stamp
role.
The role system: a summary
.
Taking all of the data into consider-
ation, it appears that the budgetary systems of both City A and B
operate within a general incremental framework. Their chief execu-
tives are either revenue/service balancers or budget balancers who
pursue the goals of service maintenance and/or tax restraint, and who
tend to cut departmental budget requests. Departmental managers are
budgetary advocates for their departments who seek to maintain and/or
improve services and who tend to pad their funding requests. Finally,
the city councils are either rubber stamps of the chief executive's
budget recommendations who lack clearly identifiable goals, or "guard-
ians of the public purse" whose goal is to hold the line on taxes and
who tend to make cuts in agency requests beyond those made by the
chief executives.
53
Wildavsky, Politics , p. 47.
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How do these findings stack up with the expectations projected
by the model of municipal incremental ism set forth earlier? Basi-
cally, the model is sound, although some modifications should be con-
sidered. Figure 15 presents the model's original expectations con-
cerning budgetary goals and behaviors and compares them to the modifi-
cations suggested by data.
As the figure demonstrates, the actual role system found in both
cities closely approximate the system expected by the model. In com-
bination with the findings on the incremental decision rules presented
earlier, these findings give us very strong evidence that budgetary
actors in both cities perceive their decisional processes in incre-
mental terms.
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Position Expected Role Modified Roles Expected Goals
1. Chief
Executive
2 . Agency/
Program
Heads
Revenue/ser-
vice balancer
Advocate
Revenue/ser-
vice balancer
or budget
balancer
Advocate
Hold the line
on taxes and
maintain ser-
vices
Maintain and/or
improve services
3. City
Councils
Rubber stamp
Maintain and/or
improve services
Any number of
things: variable
or hold the line
on taxes
Rubber stamp or
guardian of the
public purse
Pads budget
requests
Approves execu-
tive budget with
little or no
revisions
Any number of
things
:
variable
Modified Behavior
Marginal cuts of
requests for
increases
Pads budget
requests
Approves execu-
tive budget with
little or no re-
visions or mar-
ginal cuts of
requests for
inc reases
Modified Goals Expected Behavior
Hold the line Marginal cuts of
on taxes and requests for
maintain ser- increases
vices or hold
the line on taxes
Figure 15. Models of Municipal Incremental Role Systems: Original
Expectations vs. Suggested Modifications
Some Conclusions and Final Observations
The unavoidable question which arises at this point in our
analysis is "so what?" In other words, what difference does it make
if budgetary actors perceive that their budget systems generally
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follow incremental decision rules, pursue incremental goals, engage in
incremental behavior, and manifest an incremental role system?
Regardless of whether he presumes a phenomenological linkage
between attitudes/values and behavior, or whether he assumes that
actual behavior shapes attitudes, 54 a proponent of incremental systems
could logically conclude that these budgetary systems are (a) incre-
mental systems that (b) produce incremental choices. Accordingly, the
analysis developed here could be viewed as significant because it
serves to further the acceptance of both incremental theory and the
notion that public budgeting is operationally incremental.
Unfortunately, such conclusions are only partially valid.
Clearly, the data presented thus far does tend to confirm that the
goals, behaviors, and roles predicted by incremental theory do exist
(or more precisely, are perceived as existing by participants).
However, at this point, we have no scientifically acceptable
,
empirical
evidence that the outputs of this presumed incremental system are
themselves incremental in nature. Therefore, we lack the most impor-
tant ingredient needed to conclude with finality that these budgetary
systems are in fact incremental budgeting systems.
Even though a more in-depth investigation might make it pos-
sible to develop a data base which could be used to determine the level
of association between attitudes/values and behavior, it would be im-
possible to determine which is cause, which is effect. An example of
social theorists who emphasize the procedure of attitudes/values is
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckraann, The Social Construction of
Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1967), Chapter 2 passim. An oppos-
ing line of argument is presented in B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and
Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1971), Chapter 1 passim.
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As discussed at length in Chapter I, the failure to provide this
final, necessary piece of the puzzle may be linked to the failure to
define incremental choice in adequately operationalized terms. Such a
definition is essential to the task and its lack has led to the develop-
ment of the ratio of shares indicator.
Accordingly, it is necessary to return to an examination of the
R
g
indicator. At this point it appears that we are dealing with
fairly predictable incremental systems. In the next chapter, we will
employ the R
g
indicator as a tool for defining incremental vs. non-
incremental budget choices. Employing this tool, related hypotheses,
and interview data, we will attempt to ascertain empirically
(a) whether the two cities engage in incremental decision making and
(b) the conditions which result in decisions not predicted by the
incrementalists, i.e., which result in non- incremental decisions.
CHAPTER IV
AN APPROACH TO DEFINING INCREMENTAL AND
NON- INCREMENTAL BUDGETARY CHOICES
Introduction
The evidence presented in the two previous chapters supports a
general conclusion that budgeting in City A and City B is incremental
in nature. In Chapter II, a mathematical model of an ideal incremen-
tal system was applied to both cities with the finding that they
appear to conform generally to this model. In Chapter III, a behav-
ioral model was presented and the cities approximated that model as
well.
However, such findings are rather general and non-specific.
Like the regression models of Wildavsky et al.
,
they suggest that the
appropriations systems being studied belong under the rubric of
"incremental" systems. But the relative incidence of incremental and
non- incremental decisions remained unestablished; the reasons for non-
incremental choices, if any, are left unexplored, and our ability to
identify variants of incremental budgeting systems, a distinction
requiring far more specific knowledge than presented thus far, is
virtually non-existent. The situation is not unlike that of a naive
economist who readily concludes that both the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany have, generally speaking , "mixed"
1
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary
Process"; their "On the Process of Budgeting II"; and their "Toward
a Predictive Theory."
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capitalist economies. While such an assertion is true, it fails to
provide a sufficiently informed grasp of the substantial variations
which exist between these two systems. The obvious point is that a
single
,
general classification may possibly mask as much information
as it reveals.
Those of us concerned with the study of budgetary decision
making should expect and demand more complete information, information
which takes us beyond the realm of general conclusions and into the
realm of a more detailed and comprehensive grasp of our topic. In
particular, we need more specific information about how to distinguish
between incremental decisions and non- incremental decisions; about the
incidence of each type of choice within any given budgetary system;
and about the causes of deviant (i.e., non-incremental) choices. Only
then will we be able to conclude that there are or are not significant
sub-types of incremental systems; only then will we be able to uncover
the existence of non- incremental systems; only then will we be able to
develop an understanding of the interaction between the forces pro-
moting incremental choice and the forces promoting non- incremental
choice.
To this researcher, the sine qua non of attaining this more
comprehensive grasp of budgetary choice is the development of a
methodology that enables us to distinguish non- incremental from incre-
mental decisions. The achievement of this classification in an empir-
ically sound fashion would open a metaphorical door in the incremental
wall and permit us to move beyond its overly general facade.
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It is the primary objective of this chapter to describe and test
one particular approach to this end. In the sections that follow,
relevant hypotheses will be presented and the methodology to test them
will be discussed; the results of these tests will be noted and some
conclusions based on them will be offered and examined; and finally
the perceived causes of unambiguously defined non- incremental deci-
sions will be presented and the significance of these factors for
otherwise incremental systems will be explored.
Before proceeding further, it is important to re-stress that
this chapter is largely exploratory in nature. As noted in Chapter I,
little empirically sound work has been done in this area, and those
classification schemes that have been offered are notably simplistic
2
and unconvincing. In light of this paucity of previous sound re-
search, the attempt here to uncover a firm empirical distinction
between incremental and non- incremental choices may be likened to the
efforts of early explorers to find the source of the Nile: no defin-
itive "map" (or final truths) should be expected; the best which can
be hoped for is an improved grasp of the directions which future
researchers should pursue.
Methodological Matters: The Hypotheses
In Chapter I, three hypotheses were offered by which to oper-
ationalize the definitions of incremental and non- incremental choices.
2
See above in Chapter I of this study, pp. 9-10.
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As rephrased in light of Chapter II, these are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Adjusted ratios of shares which fall within plus
or minus one standard deviation unit of the ideal (or expected) mean
of 0.00 (i.e., the E [adj
.
R
g
] = 0.00) will indicate probable incre-
mental decisions
.
Hypothesis 2: Adj. R
s
's which fall beyond plus or minus one
standard deviation unit, but which do not exceed plus or minus two
standard deviation units around the E(adj. R ) of 0.00 will indicate
s
possible non- incremental decisions.
Hypothesis 3: Adj. R ' s which fall beyond plus or minus two
standard deviation units around the E(adj. R ) of 0.00 will indicate
s
probable non- incremental decisions.
Reflected in these hypotheses are a number of methodological
assumptions which need to be discussed. First, the rationale for
using variation from the E(adj. R ) of 0.00 versus variation from an
obtained mean is that this research is concerned with deviation from
the incremental model. As may be recalled from Chapter II, an ob-
tained mean itself may indicate the presence of wide-spread non-
incremental decision making. Accordingly, standard deviations around
such a mean can hardly serve as a standard or criterion by which to
define non- incremental or incremental decisions.
Conversely, the deviation of adj. R
g
values from the ideal
incremental mean seems more likely to yield information appropriate to
the task. After all, it is the variation of decisions from the
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incremental ideal which (presumedly) permits us to say that one deci-
sion is more incremental than another. Thus, since an adj. R of
S
0.00 would occur if all decisions were equally and ideally incremental
in nature (i.e., if all adj. R
g
's were themselves 0.00), then, accord-
ingly, it is variation from this ideal mean which should indicate that
one set of decisions is relatively incremental whereas another set of
decisions (further from the ideal mean) is relatively less incremental.
The above explains why the E(adj. R
g
) of 0.00 is employed to
calculate the standard deviation units, but it does not explain why
such units per se are used to categorize decisions as opposed to some
other scheme of classification. There are two reasons for pinning the
hypotheses upon these units. First, while the R
g
statistic clearly
suggests a mean value indicative of an ideal incremental system, it
offers no useful guidance as to what range of variation should typi-
3
cally occur around the mean.
All we know at present, as was noted in Chapter II, is that the
bulk, of decisions made within an incremental system should be roughly
clustered around this mean, while non- incremental decisions should be
fewer in number and at considerable variance from the ideal. In
short, the distribution of budget decisions, while not normally dis-
tributed, should form a fairly smooth, unimodal curve. Given such a
distribution, given that incremental choices should be clustered
around the mean, given that non- incremental choices should be in the
3
Ideally, the standard deviation around the E(adj. Rg ) should
also be 0.00, since all cases would have values of 0.00.
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tails of the curve, it is logical to assume that standard deviation
units might be an appropriate tool for separating incremental from
non- incremental decisions. 4 Accordingly, for the purposes of initial
exploration, it was decided to use this measure of variation as a
device for classifying the data.
The second reason for framing the hypothesis around standard
deviation units is simply that the demands of a coherent research
design required some sort of plausible device to serve as an organiz-
ing principle. Standard deviation units constitute a starting place
for classifying decisions which is as good as any other, and probably
better than many. No presumption is being made here that such units
are or will prove to be the best way to classify decisions. As will
be seen, their utility as classifiers are double-checked against five
other approaches in the next chapter.
4
It should be noted that no assumption is being made here that
the standard deviation units are defining a fairly exact percent of
the cases as incremental or non- incremental . The distribution shown
in Chapter II and Appendix B are, for the most part, "... smooth,
unimodal, and (with a) mode . . . (falling) within one standard devi-
ation of the mean . . . . " In such distributions, ± one s unit
around the mean will include at least 56 percent of the cases versus
68.26 percent on a normal curve; ± two s units will include at least
89 percent of the cases versus 95.54 percent; and beyond t two s units,
roughly 11 percent or less of the cases will fall versus 4.46 percent
on the normal curve. The key words here are "at least" and
"roughly." They signify that the application of standard deviation
units to such nonnormal distributions gives us, at most, a rough divi-
sion of cases, a division separating those which are centrally clus-
tered from those which are further and further out in the tails of the
curves. However, this ability is all that is necessary for the pur-
poses of this research. The quote and the percentages cited in this
note are from Freeman, Elementary Applied Statistics , p. 62.
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Standard deviation units were calculated for each organizational
category of the data by year, i.e., separate units were calculated for
agency-level data, for public works program data, and for the general
government program data for each year studied. This was done because
it seemed plausible that incremental and non- incremental decisions
within each of these organizational categories might involve different
sized R ' s within any given year. For example, since agencies gener-
ally involve much more funds than programs do, it might be that
smaller annual funding changes (and hence smaller R 's) would be
s
viewed as non- incremental shifts at the agency level than is the case
at the program level. Similarly, given the stop-and-go nature of many
public works programs (e.g., sewer construction, highway construction,
and others), participants in that category might also have somewhat
different perceptions of incremental versus non- incremental decisions
than exist within the more stable general government area."*
Thus, given differences in size, the nature of the enterprise,
and tradition, it was thought that different levels of variation might
characterize the different organizational categories, with the result
that participants in those categories would have slightly different
conceptions of the types of budget choices being made. In other words
there is a possibility that each of these organizational categories
5
This breakdown of the data into different organizational cate-
gories reflects in part arguments raised by Natchez and Bupp that non-
incremental choice will be more common at the program level than at the
agency level. See Natchez and Bupp, "Policy Priority," 951-963.
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might constitute a sub- type of an incremental system within an overall
municipal incremental system. Accordingly, standard deviation units
for each of these categories were tabulated and applied to the data. 6
A Test for the Hypotheses
In considering ways to check the validity of the hypotheses, one
basic notion was used to provide guidance. This was that the over-
riding and essential concern of this paper is with how decisions are
made. This single point has a number of implications for constructing
a test.
First, budget data by themselves cannot confirm or deny how they
came about. Only the people involved in making the decisions can do
that. Accordingly, it was evident that a test of the hypotheses would
have to employ interview data as a basis for confirming or denying the
validity of these classifications.
Moreover, those interviewed would have to be individuals in-
volved in the making of specific decisions. Since the terms incre-
mental and non- incremental have no meaning for such officials, a
logical alternative for formulating the "verifying" question was
needed. Accordingly, they were asked whether or not a particular
decision was made in a typical or an atypical fashion, with the defi-
nition of typical decision making defined previously in the interview
through a series of open-ended and agree/disagree statements. (This
6
The breakdown of the R data from both cities into Pbl, PsNI,
and PbNI categories is presented in Appendix A.
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latter type of information was reported in Chapter III, where we saw
that "typical" decisions were largely defined by respondents in "in-
cremental" terms.
)
A major problem of interview-based research is, of course, the
constraint of memory, a factor compounded in organizational research
by the additional problem of employee turn-over. To reduce the effects
of such difficulties, the particular decisions about which individual
officials were asked were drawn from the last two funding change
periods (i.e., from data for FY1975 and FY1976) . Thus, in summary, a
specific official was confronted about a particular decision made
during (at that time) the last two years and was asked the following
question:
Would you describe this decision as typical of the decisions
normally made during the budgetary process? If yes, why?
If no, why not?
This question (and others) were posed to selected program and
agency heads in both cities. The individuals interviewed were chosen
indirectly as a result of drawing a decision on their program as part
of a random sample of decisions.
The pool of decisions from which the sample was drawn was com-
prised of budget data from each city's general government area, public
works area, and agency-level data for FY1975 and FY1976.
7
The overall
7
As stated in Chapter I, the reasons for drawing the data from
these organizational categories was due to the ready availability and
longitudinal comparability of budget data on the program and agency
elements of these categories. The composition of these categories is
presented in Appendix A.
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sample of decisions was actually composed of six samples, one each
drawn from the three organizational categories in both cities for the
two-year period. Each of these samples were stratified to yield a
proportion of Pbl, PsNI, and PbNI choices corresponding as closely as
possible to the proportion of such choices found in each category
during the two-year period. The reason for drawing six separate
samples as opposed to only two, one each for each city, was that the
six sample approach yielded a far larger number of cases. 8
Altogether, questions were asked about forty-one (of ninety-
seven) decisions in City A and about fifty (of ninety-seven) decisions
in City B. Five stratified random samples from each organizational
category were drawn. To obtain a maximum of consistency in percep-
tion, the one random sample which provided the greatest number of
duplicate programs or agencies per category was used to determine
which officials to interview.
Reflecting this duplication of programs and agencies, and the
overlapping responsibilities of some of these officials (e.g., the
chief executive of City B was interviewed about the budget for his own
office and about the budget for the general government "agency"), the
resulting breakdown of total decisions, non-duplicated organizational
units, and number of officials interviewed is presented in Table 23.
In City A, the multiple sample approach required the investiga-
tion of forty-one decisions versus only fifteen decisions required by
the single sample technique. In City B, the multiple and single
sample approaches specified forty-one versus forty-one decisions for
study, respectively.
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Again, it should be kept in mind that the number of officials
interviewed in both cities is a non-duplicated, mutually exclusive
count. Using the same example given above, City B's chief executive
is counted only once in the table (in the general government program
row) although he was queried not only about his own program (i.e., his
office budget) but also about the agency-level category of "general
government." Similarly, the director of City B's Public Works De-
partment (counted in the agency-level row) was questioned not only
about his agency, but also about the "administration" program cate-
gory, about the "street lighting" program account (which is centrally
controlled in his office), and about the "water" program unit (also
centrally administered). Thus, this one interview accounted for four
of the twenty-nine non- duplicated organizational units about which
information was sought in City B. Hence, the number of officials
actually interviewed is smaller than both the number of decisions
comprising the samples, and the number of non-duplicated organiza-
tional units represented by those decisions.
After interviewing these forty- two officials, their responses of
"typical" or "atypical" were compared to the Pbl, PsNI, and PbNI
classifications. Agreements and disagreements between the perceptions
and the classifications were then tabulated.
Once the number of agreements and disagreements were tabulated,
chi-square tests were used to determine whether any significant dif-
ferences occurred between: (a) the number of "s unit" versus "agreed-
upon" incremental and non- incremental decisions; and (b) the number of
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TABLE 23
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL DECISIONS
, NONDUPLICATED ORGANIZATIONAL
UNITS, AND NUMBER OF INTERVIEWED OFFICIALS BY
ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORY BY CITY
Organizational
Category
Total Decisions
in Sample
Non-duplicated
Orgn. Units
City A
# of Inter-
viewed
Officials
Gen'l Gov't
Programs 22 14 12
Public Works
Programs 12
Agency- Level
Data
TOTAL
_1_
41
_5
25
_4
20
City B
a. Gen'l Gov't
Programs 20 13 12
b. Public Works
Programs 14 7 4
c. Agency-Level
Data 17 9 6
TOTAL 51 29 22
"agreed-upon" incremental versus non-incremental decisions found in
each city and in their corresponding organizational categories. This
first set of tests was used to confirm an obvious statistical simi-
larity between the s unit classifications and the "agreement" classi-
fications. The second set of chi-squares was used to determine
whether either city, or their organizational categories, was
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significantly more incremental (or more non-incremental) than their
counterpart.
Most importantly, the chi-square test was also employed to deter-
mine whether the three classes of indicators (i.e., Pbl, PsNI, and
PbNI) produced distributions of agreements and disagreements which were
significantly different from a hypothetically random distribution.
Assuming conditions in which the classifications possessed no valid-
ity, this hypothetically random distribution was defined as a set of
interview responses resulting in an even split between agreements and
disagreements. This procedure was used to determine whether the number
of "agreed-upon" predictions generated by each hypothesis was signif-
icantly different from the number which would occur solely by chance.
As such, this set of chi-squares constitutes a formal test of the
hypotheses* usefulness as classifiers of choice types. This procedure
is discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter.
To summarize the methodology employed here, the following
research design was followed:
1. Each city's budget data for FY1975 and FY1976 was broken down
into Pbl, PsNI, and PbNI categories in accordance with the three
hypotheses stated earlier.
2. A stratified random sample of decisions was drawn from each of
the organizational categories in both cities.
3. From this sample, a list of officials to be interviewed was
determined. These officials were interviewed about budgetary decision
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making as typically practiced and about whether specific choices with
which they were involved constituted typical or atypical decisions.
4. By comparing classifications of types of decisions with per-
ceptions of their typicality and atypicality, the number of decisions
on which agreement and disagreement occurred was calculated.
5. The chi- square test of significance was applied to the data
as organized in a number of ways just enumerated. Most importantly,
the number of agreements and disagreements generated by each set of
classifications was compared to a hypothetically random distribution
to determine which hypotheses produced or demonstrated a significant
degree of usefulness as identifiers of incremental and non- incremental
budget choices.
Findings on the Validity of the Hypotheses
In this section, the findings derived from the procedures de-
scribed above are presented. As a first step in examining the utility
of the hypotheses, Table 24 was developed. This compares the number
of incremental and non- incremental classifications generated by the
s-unit technique to the number of incremental and non- incremental
agreements found when the s-unit classifications are compared to the
interview-based classifications. The data is broken down into organ-
izational categories by city.
The purpose of these comparisons is to determine whether the
"agreement" data is significantly different from the raw s-unit
classifications. Chi-square tests confirm that not only are there
no
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TABLE 24
THE NUMBER AND PERCENT OF S UNIT-BASED INCREMENTAL AND
NON- INCREMENTAL CLASSIFICATIONS COMPARED TO THE NUMBER
AND PERCENT OF AGREED-UPON INCREMENTAL AND NON-
INCREMENTAL DECISIONS: BY ORGANIZATIONAL
CATEGORY, AND BY CITY
Org. Category
S-unit
Classifications
Agreement
Data
City A
1. DPW Prgs.
a. Inc.
b. N.I.
6(50%)
6(50%)
6(55%)
5(45%)
2. Gen' 1 Gov* t Prgs.
a. Inc.
b. N.I.
15(68%)
7(32%)
15(71%)
6(29%)
3. Agency Level
a. Inc.
b. N.I.
4(57%)
3(43%)
4 (57%)
3 (43%)
4. Totals
a. Inc.
b. N.I.
25(61%)
16(39%)
25 (64%)
14 (36%)
City B
1. DPW
a. Inc.
b. N.I.
9(64%)
5(36%)
9(64%)
5(36%)
2. Gen' 1 Gov'
t
a. Inc.
b. N.I.
11(58%)
8(42%)
11 (65%)
6(35%)
3. Agency Level
a. Inc.
b. N.I.
10(59%)
7(41%)
9(60%)
6(40%)
4. Totals
a. Inc.
b. N.I.
30(60%)
20(40%)
29 (63%)
17 (37%)
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statistically significant differences between the two, but that such
differences as do exist are highly negligible, the largest X 2 obtained
being 0.1741.
Having established an overall congruence between the s-unit
classifications and the "agreement" data, the next question is to what
extent do each of the three s-unit classifications generate agreements
versus disagreements? Table 25 presents this information organized by
type of s-unit classification by city.
As this table shows, all of the disagreements which occur in
categorizing non- incremental choices occur in the PsNI classification,
and over eighty percent of all disagreements fall in this classifica-
tion. Conversely, over 95 percent agreement is found in the Pbl cate-
gory in both cities, a finding which suggests that this s-unit classi-
fication has considerable, but not absolute strength in identifying
choice types. And finally, the PbNI category is clearly the most
reliable in pinpointing a type of choice. The complete lack of
"errors" in this classification strongly supports the notion that
9
R 's which fall beyond two s-units are non- incremental decisions.
S
In short, the table shows that the classifying powers of both
the Pbl and PbNI classifications are substantial. The weak link is
PsNI category. However, even though this classification is the
technically, one error did occur. What appeared to be a PbNI
choice for City B's Human Service Department was actually the result
of a change in accounting procedures. Given the peculiar nature of
this "error," it was decided that it should be netted out of the data.
Accordingly, it does not appear in any of the tables in this chapter,
with the exception of Table 23.
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TABLE 25
THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF AGREEMENTS WITHIN EACH S-UNIT
CATEGORY FOR EACH CITY AND FOR BOTH CITIES COMBINED
# of S unit % of
Agreements Classifications Agreements
1. Pbl Category 25
2. PsNI Category 4
3. PbNI Category 10
4. Totals 39
City B
1. Pbl Category 29 30 97
2. PsNI Category 4 7 57
3. PbNI Category 13 13 100
4. Totals 46 50 92
Both Cities
Combined Totals 85 91 93
City A
25
6
10
4
100
67
100
95
primary source of disagreements, it is important to bear in mind that
it is an accurate identifier in a majority of cases in both cities.
Consequently, purely on the basis of this raw data, it appears intui-
tively reasonable to accept the first and third hypothesis, and pos-
sibly even the second hypothesis.
Further evidence is, of course, necessary in order to accept or
reject any of the hypotheses on statistical grounds. As stated
earlier, a test was devised to determine whether any of the hypotheses
constitute statistically significant successful identifiers of incre-
mental and non- incremental choice.
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Since decisions within any of the classifications may be per-
ceived either as typical or atypical by respondents, it follows that
the distribution of agreed-upon decisions would be roughly equal to
the number of disagreements, if there were no statistical validity in
the classifications
.
In other words, if the responses of "typical" or
"atypical" were caused by random factors, it follows that there
should be a roughly "fifty-fifty" split among these responses within
each of the s-unit classifications.
Accordingly, using either a chi-square test or the Fisher exact
test, it is possible to determine whether the number of successful
predictions (i.e., agreements) is significantly different from that
which would occur randomly. Thus, one of these two significance tests
was applied to the sets of data. Table 26 shows which of the sets of
classifications was significantly different from the hypothetical
random distribution at the .05 and .01 levels of significance.
The table demonstrates that the level of agreements generated
by the Pbl and PbNI classifications are significantly different from
the random distribution. Therefore, on the basis of these tests, we
may accept the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Adjusted ratios of shares (i.e., adj. Rg's) which
fall within plus or minus one standard deviation unit of the ideal (or
expected) mean of 0.00 (i.e., Eladj. Rg ] = 0.00)
indicate probable
incremental decisions (i.e., Pbl decisions).
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TABLE 26
IS THE NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS GENERATED FROM THE Pbl,
PsNI, AND PbNI CLASSIFICATIONS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM A
SPECIFIED RANDOM DISTRIBUTION WHEREIN THE NUMBER OF
AGREEMENTS IS EQUAL TO THE NUMBER OF DISAGREEMENTS?
1. Pbl 2. PsNI 3. PbNI
City A
1. a = .05 Yes* No*** Yes***
2. a = .01 Yes** No*** Yes***
City B
1. a = .05 Yes* No*** Yes***
2. a = .01 Yes** No*** Yes***
* The chi-square value must be greater than 3.84, when df = 1.
** The chi-square value must be greater than 6.64, when df = 1.
***The Fisher Exact Test of Significance was employed.
Hypothesis 3: Adj. R
s
's which fall beyond plus or minus two
standard deviation units around the E(adj. R
g
) of 0.00 indicate
probable non- incremental decisions (i.e., PbNI decisions).
However, we cannot accept the second hypothesis. Thus, our
conclusion is as follows: Adjusted R
s
's which fall beyond plus or
minus one standard deviation unit, but which do not exceed plus or
minus two standard deviation units around the E(adj. Rg ) of 0.00 do
not indicate possible non- incremental decisions to_ a_ statistically
significant degree .
Although we cannot accept this hypothesis, it should be kept in
mind that in both cities the PsNI hypothesis was a successful iden-
tifier of choice types in a majority of cases. Therefore, it is pos-
sible to argue that this classification might have a limited degree o
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value. However, before accepting such a conclusion, it would be
necessary to do additional research applying it in a larger number of
cities. If it did prove to be a stable, though statistically non-
significant classifier in a majority of cases, its continued use as an
indicator could be justified only in combination with a strong measure
- 10
of caution.
Beyond Testing the Hypotheses
As indicated in the second section of this chapter, chi-square
tests were applied to the data as organized in ways other than for
testing the hypotheses. In sum, the focus of these tests is whether
10
An alternative idea is that the demarcation line between in-
cremental and non- incremental decisions may fall within ± one and ±
two s units. For example, incremental decisions might fall below
±1.3 s units while non-incremental decisions might fall above ±1.3
s units. If this were the case, the PsNI category would be discarded.
Unfortunately, with only six PsNI cases in the City A sample and seven
in City B's, there is not a sufficient number of cases to generate a
clear pattern. Thus, for example, the PsNI "errors" in City A have z
scores of -1.07 and -1.26, while the "validated" choices have scores
of 1.06, 1.14, 1.34, and 1.46. In City B the PsNI "errors" have z
values of 1.08, 1.12, and 1.26, while the "validated" decisions have
scores equal to 1.23, -1.60, -1.73, and -1.76. These values indicate
that PsNI "errors" tend to fall toward the low end of the range of
PsNI values. However, a number of the "validated" PsNI choices do
likewise. Thus, it might be accurate that decisions falling toward
the low end of the PsNI range tend to be incremental decisions, while
those falling in the middle and toward the high end of the range are
non- incremental. A dividing line of ±1.3 s units would indeed reduce
the number of errors from five to three (i.e., from two in City A to
two; from three in City B to one) . However, with such a small number
of PsNI cases in each city's sample, it would be impossible to prove
whether this is a significant improvement or an improvement due to
random factors. Obviously, the basic idea is worthy of further
research. However, its validity cannot be proven or disproven here.
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any of the sets of budget data are significantly more or less incre-
mental than any other.
Specifically stated, the objective of these tests is to deter-
mine whether the number of "agreed-upon" incremental and non-
incremental decisions within the "public works" program, "general
government" program, and "agency- level" categories of one city are
significantly different from the number of such decisions in the same
organizational categories of the other city. Table 27 compares the
resulting distribution tables and cites the resulting chi-square
values.
The findings reported in Table 27 confirm that none of either
city's organizational categories nor either city was significantly
more or less incremental during the FY1975 and FY1976 funding per-
iods. 11 Overall, given the general preponderance of incremental
choices in both cities, we may generally conclude that incremental
decision making dominated the budgetary processes of both cities
during the time period under review.
It should be noted that the distributions of incremental and
non- incremental decisions within each organizational category were
also compared to the distributions in all other categories. For ex-
ample, not only were City A's public works programs compared to City
B' s, but they were also compared to City A's general government pro-
grams and agencies and to City B's general government programs and
agencies. None of these additional comparisons yielded chi-squares
which were significant at the .05 level. Furthermore, a comparison of
the distribution of incremental and non- incremental decisions within
each city's combined program- level data versus its agency-level data
produced no significant differences. Hence, no evidence was found
supportive of Natchez and Bupp' s "policy entrepreneur" theory, which
predicts more non- incremental choice at the program level than at the
agency level.
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On the other hand, as this table illustrates and as Table 24
confirms, non- incremental decision making in both cities appears to be
a fairly common phenomena. Indeed, referring again to Table 24, non-
incremental decisions comprise roughly 36 percent of agreed-upon
decisions in both cities. In other words, for these two cities during
this two-year period, better than one in three decisions were non-
incremental in character. Accordingly, while incremental decision
making is the dominant mode of choice in City A and City B, non-
incremental decision making is a fairly common and apparently integral
part of these erstwhile incremental budgeting systems.
The implications of this finding depend, of course, on the
reasons why non- incremental decisions occur. To obtain some infor-
mation on this topic, the officials interviewed were, as may be re-
called, asked to cite reasons as to why "their" particular funding
decisions were typical or atypical. Focusing upon only the "agreed
upon" incremental decisions, nearly all of the respondents cited such
factors as inflation and/or salary increases as the reasons for the
typical, "marginal" increases they received.
On the other hand, recipients of "agreed upon" non-incremental
boosts or cuts cited a wide variety of factors which they viewed as
"causing" such decisions. These factors were combined into mutually
12
exclusive categories and the results are presented in Table 28.
In a few instances, respondents attributed a non-incremental
decision to more than one factor. When this occurred, each of the fac
tors cited were counted separately and placed into different cells of
the table. For this reason, the number of factors cited slightly
exceeds the number of "agreed-upon" non- incremental decisions.
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TABLE 27
A COMPARISON OF AGREED-UPON INCREMENTAL AND NON- INCREMENTAL
DECISIONS BY ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORY AND BY CITY, TO
INCLUDE THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC
City A City B
a. Inc. Decs. 6 Q
b. N.I. Decs. 5 5
c. X
2
=
.0457*
Z. OGil X vjOV U.
—
a. Inc. Decs. 15
b. N.I. Decs. 6 6
C X2 = .0485*
"3 A t~T c\ r\ f~* \ T— T a \ 7 1j. Ayency mvei
a. Inc. Decs. 4 9
b. N.I. Decs. 3 6
c. X
2
= .0049*
4. Totals
a. Inc. Decs. 25 29
b. N.I. Decs. 14 17
c. x
2
= .0003*
*Indicates that the chi-square statistic is not statistically
significant at the .05 level of significance.
This type of fairly detailed breakdown yields limited informa-
tion on which to base any sort of general conclusions as to why non-
incremental decisions occur. Clearly in over half of the cited
reasons (nineteen of thirty- three, or 57 percent), the moving force
was the federal or state government. However, the balance of the
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TABLE 28
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF FACTORS RESULTING IN
AGREED-UPON NON- INCREMENTAL DECISIONS
Perceived Causes City A City B Total
1. Federal Mandates
or Grants 7 (44%
)
2. State Mandates
or Grants 3(19%)
3. Govt. Reorganization
of Services 2(12%)
4. Atypically Large
Collective Bargaining
Settlements 1(6%)
5. Racial Tensions 1(6%)
6. The "Budget Crunch" N. A.
7. Implementation of New
Service Facility N.A.
8. Weather Conditions 1(6%)
9. Decision to Join St.
League of Cities &
Towns 1(6%)
10. TOTALS N=16(99%)
9(53%)
N.A.
4 (23%)
1(6%)
1(6%)
1(6%)
1(6%)
N.A.
N.A.
N=17(100%)
16(48%)
3(9%)
6(18%)
2(6%)
2(6%)
1(3%)
1(3%)
1(3%)
1(3%)
N=3 3(99%)
"perceived causes" constitute a hodgepodge lacking any sort of obvious
continuity.
Accordingly, it becomes necessary to look for "not-so-obvious"
linkages between the categories. In reviewing the literature, it was
noted that a number of authors have suggested that incremental choice
is made within the context of a routinized incremental role system
13
largely insulated from external environmental factors. Moreover, in
13
See e.g., Jackson, "Budgetary Process," pp. 42-43; Sharkansky,
Spending in the States , pp. 14b-lbl; and
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works such as Jackson' s, much energy has been spent attempting to
establish a role for "external" forces within these otherwise insu-
lated, bureaucratic processes. 14
Following this line of argument, the "perceived causes" were
broken down into "external" and "internal" categories. Defining
"external" factors to mean factors over which the bureaucratic hier-
archy has limited to no control (therefore including collective bar-
gaining contracts as well as federal mandates and grants), rows 1, 2,
4, 5, and 8 in Table 28 were grouped together. Defining "internal"
factors to mean decisional considerations apparently under the full
control of the hierarchy (such as the reorganization of services) or
as any type of other factor which is ambiguous (such as the "budget
crunch"), rows 3, 6, 7, and 9 from Table 28 were placed in the "inter-
nal" factor category. Table 29 shows the results.
TABLE 29
RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF FACTORS RESULTING IN AGREED-UPON
NON- INCREMENTAL DECISIONS, AS REORGANIZED INTO "INTERNAL"
AND "EXTERNAL" FACTOR CATEGORIES
Source of
Factor City A City B Total
1. Internal 3(19%) 6(35%) 9(27%)
2. External 13(81%) 11 (65%) 24 (73%)
3. TOTALS 16(100%) 17 (100%) 31 (100%)
2
X between City A and City B = £.45623
NOTE: The above value of the X statistic is statistically insignif-
icant at the .1 level of significance.
Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving , pp. 12-19.
1
Jackson, "Budgetary Process," pp. 48-58.
171
The picture which emerges of both cities from this table is one
suggesting that the dominant cause of non- incremental decisions tends
to derive from forces external to the control of the decision making
hierarchy. However, internal forces do appear to be responsible for a
considerable number of such types of decisions (roughly one in four,
overall). Still, if the making of non- incremental decisions were
totally dependent upon the "insulated," "routinized, " "bureaucratic"
hierarchy, such types of decisions would indeed be as rare as they are
often thought to be.
In contradistinction, the budgetary processes of City A and City
B appear to be quite porous (or poorly "insulated") and thus fairly
frequently impacted upon by external influences. This suggests that
the debate between incremental and systems theorists appears to be
considerably overstated. This matter will be discussed at greater
length in the final chapter.
Summary
In this chapter, a methodological approach was developed to test
the utility of operationalized definitions for incremental and non-
incremental budget decisions. This approach focused primarily upon
the " R
s
/s unit" technique, the utility of which was compared to an
interview-based device for classifying decisions, the "typical choice"
approach. The procedure of comparing the extent to which these two
techniques agreed with one another was, not surprisingly, referred to
as the "agreement approach."
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When the data was organized by organizational category and by
city, no significant difference was found in the classification
yielded through the "R
g
/s unit" and agreement techniques. Likewise,
high levels of congruence were found between these approaches when the
data was organized by the s unit-derived categories of Pbl, PsNI, and
PbNI. Overall, the s-unit device appeared to classify accurately
ninety-three percent of the cases in the sample.
However, the apparent success of the s-unit approach rests pri-
marily upon the Pbl and PbNI categories. While tests indicate that
the data within these two categories are significantly different from
a hypothetical random distribution, such was not the case for the PsNI
classification. Accordingly, only two of the three major hypotheses
of this chapter were accepted.
Having been somewhat successful in classifying non-incremental
decisions, an analysis was next undertaken of their incidence and
causes. In both cities, it was found that this type of choice
occurred in slightly over one in three cases, a finding which suggests
that non- incremental decisions are a surprisingly common feature
within erstwhile incremental budgeting systems.
As for their causes, over half were due to responses made by the
two cities to federal and/or state actions. Indeed, nearly three of
four non- incremental choices could be ascribed to factors external to
the control of the municipal decision making hierarchy. In short, it
appears that incremental budgetary processes are not as well insulated
from their environments as is sometimes suggested.
1 7 (
In sum, this chapter produced three findings of considerable im-
portance. First, the attempt to opcrationalize incremental and non-
incremental decisions through the "R
(
,/s unit" approach was largely
successful. More research is needed, but, at the least, the technique
appears to be promising. Secondly, a somewhat unexpected finding was
that non- incremental decision making seems a rather common feature
within the incremental budgeting systems of the two municipalities.
And finally, while the dominance of incremental choice appears to
support the importance of bureaucratic routines and incremental role
systems within municipal budgeting, the nature of non- incremental
decisions indicates the importance of factors external to the formal
hierarchy as causal agents of budgetary choice.
CHAPTER V
A COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS TO CLASSIFY INCREMENTAL
AND NON- INCREMENTAL DECISIONS
In the previous chapter, our focus was testing only one method
for identifying incremental and non- incremental decisions. While the
results have been fairly impressive, the question remains as to whether
the s unit device is as good or better than other possible identifying
mechanisms.
Accordingly, five other ways were developed by which to divide
the data into choice categories, three based on approaches used in the
literature, and two suggested during consultations with Dr. Craig L.
Moore of the University of Massachusetts. These five alternative ap-
proaches are described and explained below:
1. The Wildavsky Alternative: In The Politics of the Budgetary
Process
,
Wildavsky argues that an afc of ±30 percent constitutes a
rough dividing line between incremental and non-incremental deci-
sions."1" Decisions involving annual funding changes (afc's) of less
than ±30 percent presumably represent incremental decisions, while
those greater than this level are non- incremental ones. In accordance
with this approach, the sample of data employed earlier in this chap-
ter was broken down into I and NI classifications based upon whether
the afc's involved were greater or less than the 30 percent level.
"Kfildavsky, Politics, p. 14.
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2. The Fenno Alternative: In The Power of the Purse
, Richard
Fenno suggested that an afc of ±20 percent can be used to divide
incremental from non- incremental decisions. Decisions below this
level could be viewed as incremental choices, while those above are
2
non- incremental ones. Following this model, the sample of budget
data was yet again divided into corresponding incremental and non-
incremental categories.
3. The Modified Bailey and O'Connor Alternative: In its pure
form, the Bailey and O'Connor model for identifying types of choice
involves dividing decisions into three classifications: the incremen-
tal, in which decisions with afc' s ranging from 0 percent to ±10 per-
cent are placed; the intermediate, wherein decisions with afc's of ±11
percent to ±30 percent are lumped; and the non- incremental in which is
3placed all decisions with afc's of greater than ±30 percent.
Two problems exist with this model. First, their "intermediate"
category serves to confuse efforts to identify incremental and non-
incremental decisions. Containing between roughly one-fourth to one-
4
half of the arrays of budget data examined, this classification con-
signs a large number of decisions to a conceptual "limbo," caught
between the "heaven" of incrementalism and the "hell" of non-
incrementalism. The second problem with their classification is
simply that if we were to apply their definition of non- incremental
2
Fenno, Purse
,
p. 352.
3
Bailey and O'Connor, "Measuring the Muddles," pp. 64-65.
4
Ibid. , p. 65.
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choice as it stands (i.e., such decisions are those with afc's of
greater than ±30 percent)
,
we would simply be repeating the Wildavsky
procedure.
Therefore, it was decided to drastically alter their approach in
order to develop a third possible alternative. In reviewing a more
5detailed breakdown of their data, it was noted that, for their Ameri-
can data (i.e., their budget data from non-foreign sources), there is
a remarkably consistent division occurring at the afc level of ±20
percent. At this point, we find that roughly three-quarters of their
data falls below the 20 percent level, while one-quarter falls above.
Therefore, rather than simply duplicate the Fenno alternative, a third
was developed wherein the sample of data used here was rank ordered by
value of afc, and the "highest" 12.5 percent of the positive afc's
were defined as non- incremental along with the "lowest" 12.5 percent
of the negative afc's. The balance of the afc's (i.e., those falling
between these "high" and "low" poles) were classified as incremental
decisions.
This procedure is admittedly arbitrary, but unfortunately,
Bailey and O'Connor neglect to inform us of the incidence of negative
to positive afc's within their distribution. Accordingly, since the
5
Ibid.
,
p. 64.
6
This rank-ordering was accomplished by placing the largest pos-
itive afc at the top and ranking each positive afc in descending
order
down to the point where negative afc's began. At this point,
the abso-
lute afc values began to increase so that the largest
negative afc was
at the bottom of the rank ordering. In essence, the
ordinal scale thus
created ranked each case along a positive- negative continuum.
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budget data (in R
g
form) from City A and City B was more-or-less
normally distributed, this type of breakdown seemed as logical as any
other.
4. The Decile Alternative: In a manner quite similar to the
modified Bailey and O'Connor alternative, the same rank ordering of
the sample was employed to calculate positive and negative deciles.
Decisions falling within the d (negative) and d (positive) ranges
1 9
were labelled as non- incremental. Decisions between these two ranges
were classified as incremental. Not surprisingly, given the sample
size, this procedure yielded a distribution identical to the Bailey
and O'Connor distribution. Consequently, it is included in the com-
parisons solely on the grounds of attempted thoroughness. In the
table that follows, the two alternatives are in the same column.
5. The Quartile Alternative: A further suggestion was to use
quartile ranges as a means of classification. Accordingly, (nega-
tive) and (positive) ranges were derived from the rank ordered
sample and decisions falling above these ranges were classified as
non- incremental decisions, while decisions between Q and were
labelled incremental.
The resulting five sets of classified data were then individ-
ually compared to the "typical choice" classifications, a procedure
undertaken in the preceding chapter for the s-unit classifications.
To repeat, if a particular choice was categorized as incremental and
labelled by a respondent as "typical," then that choice was counted as
a "validated" incremental decision. Similarly, if a decision was
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classified a non- incremental choice and labelled "atypical," then that
choice was treated as a "validated" non- incremental decision. Those
choices on which disagreement occurred (i.e., "incremental-atypical,"
or "non- incremental- atypical" ) were considered unvalidated classi-
7fications. The results of this procedure, to include its application
to the s-unit classifications, are presented in Table 30.
TABLE 30
A COMPARISON OF THE SIX QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS: THE NUMBER AND
PERCENT OF VALIDATED CHOICE TYPES (I.E., AGREEMENTS) FOR
EACH INDICATOR BY CITY AND FOR BOTH CITIES COMBINED
s unit Wildavsky Fenno Bailey/O' Connor Quartile
# (%) # (%) # (%)
(Decile
)
# (%) # (%)
1. City A
(N=41) 39 (95. 1) 36 (87.8) 38 (92.7) 37 (90.2) 33 (80.5)
2. City B
(N=50) 46 (92. 0) 42 (84.0) 46 (92.0) 44 (88.0) 38 (76.0)
3. Both Cities
(N=91) 85 (93. 4) 78 (85.7) 84 (92.3) 81 (89.0) 71 (78.0)
As Table 30 demonstrates, all of the alternative indicators
generate fairly high levels of agreement with the "typical choice"
classifications. Moreover, employing chi-square tests and a .05 level
7
The term "unvalidated" is used in preference to the term "in-
valid" because there is no empirically based reason for assuming that
the "typical choice" approach is a more accurate indicator than other
approaches. Hence, while it is assumed that an agreement constitutes
a validated classification, nothing can be assumed about a disagree-
ment. Logically, one or the other of the indicators is correct
but
there is no way of knowing which is right, which is wrong.
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of significance, none of the quantitative indicators had a signifi-
cantly higher number of validated classifications than any of the
others. Thus, from a purely statistical point of view, this initial
comparison permits us to rule out none of these techniques as useful
indicators of incremental and non- incremental decisions.
However, since an indicator' s unvalidated classifications could
consist of either incremental (I) or non- incremental (NI) classifica-
tions, it follows that the different indicators could have "erred"
differently, one approach erring in an incremental direction, another
in the non- incremental direction. If this were the case, then the
apparently similar success rates of each of these indicators could be
due to different strengths and weaknesses.
Comparing each technique's success in classifying first I and
then NI decisions does indeed reveal some differences. Combining the
data from both cities, we find, for example, that the Fenno and
Wildavsky approaches made no "errors" in classifying incremental
decisions, while the "decile" technique made only one such "error."
Conversely, the "s-unit" approach labelled five choices as non-
incremental which the "typical choice" method classified as incremen-
tal, while the "Quartile" technique made nineteen such "errors."
Thus, it may be concluded that the Fenno, Wildavsky, and "decile"
approaches appear to be superior to the "s-unit" and "Quartile"
indicators when it comes to categorizing incremental decisions.
On the the other hand, the "s-unit" and "Quartile" mechanisms
are superior to the Fenno, Wildavsky and "Decile" techniques in
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successfully pinpointing non- incremental choices. Out of a total of
thirty- two decisions classified as non- incremental by the "typical
choice" approach, the "s-unit" and "Quartile" indicators labelled only
one of these as incremental, whereas the Fenno approach made all of
its seven "errors" in this manner, the "Decile" method made nine (out
of ten) of its unvalidated classifications in this fashion, and the
Wildavsky technique made thirteen such "errors."
Table 31 summarizes these findings. The first row in this
table, labelled "typical choice," reveals the number of incremental
and non- incremental classifications made by the interview-based
approach. Since this approach constitutes the standard of comparison
for the others, no unvalidated classifications are attributed to it.
Accordingly, the numbers reported in the first two cells of this row
may be considered as the "ideal" number of cases against which the
numbers in the cells beneath them may be compared.
The " I error" column may be interpreted as containing those cases
which the quantitative methods classified as non- incremental, but which
the "typical choice" approach labelled as incremental. Similarly, the
"NI error" column contains those cases which the quantitative indi-
cators labelled incremental, but which the "typical choice" technique
cateogized as non- incremental.
Using a .05 level of significance, chi-square tests were run
between all six of the quantitative indicators to determine if there
were any significant differences in their ability to identify, first,
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TABLE 31
THE NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE "TYPICAL
CHOICE" INDICATOR AND THE SIX QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS
FOR BOTH CITIES COMBINED
I Agree-
ments
NI Agree-
ments
I Errors NI Errors Totals
1. Typical
Choice 59 32 N.A. N.A. 91
2. s-unit 54 31 5 1 91
3. Wildavsky 59 19 0 13 91
4. Fenno 59 25 0 7 91
5. Bailey/
0' Connor
(Decile)
58 23 1 9 91
6. Quartile 40 31 19 1 91
incremental decisions and, next, non- incremental decisions. These
tests revealed that the "Quartile" technique was significantly weaker
in classifying incremental decisions than the "best case" indicators,
9
the Fenno and Wildavsky approaches. However, these "best case"
methods were not significantly better than any of the remaining indi-
cators in identifying incremental decisions.
On the other hand, the best indicators of non- incremental decis-
ions, the "s-unit" and "Quartile" devices were significantly better at
categorizing such decisions than were the "Decile" and Wildavsky
8
In order to use this statistic, the Fenno and Wildavsky ap-
proaches, "perfect" classifiers of incremental choice, were each
attributed with one error.
9
It should be noted that the "Quartile" method is also signifi-
cantly weaker than the "s-unit" approach.
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methods. Indeed the difference between the Fenno approach and these
"best case" NI techniques came very close to being significant as well
(X
2
= 3.57143; p = .0555).
These findings suggest that we can probably dismiss the "Quar-
tile" approach for failing to indicate incremental decisions ade-
quately; and they raise doubts about the ability of the "Decile" and
Wildavsky methods as classifiers of non- incremental decisions. Accord-
ingly, the weaknesses of these three techniques suggest that future
research on choice- type indicators can perhaps disregard these three
approaches.
On the other hand, future research should definitely include the
"s-unit" and Fenno techniques. The former is among the "best case"
classifiers of non- incremental decisions, the latter among the "best
case" classifiers of incremental choice, and neither is significantly
weaker than the other in classifying incremental or non-incremental
decisions, respectively. In short, of the various quantitative tech-
niques tested, these two appear to be the most promising.
Based on research done in only two cities, these conclusions
are, of course, only tentative. Before anything approaching a defin-
itive conclusion can be drawn, all of the techniques discussed here
(and others yet to be developed) need to be applied in a far larger
number of cities, to budgeting in different levels of government, and
to budgeting as practiced under a variety of social, political, and/or
economic conditions.
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Some Concluding Comments
Whether one accepts the findings reported in the previous sec-
tions of this chapter or the findings of Chapter IV depends upon
whether one accepts that the methodology employed is a valid construct
upon which to base those conclusions. And whether one accepts the
methodology' s validity depends in turn upon whether one accepts some
basic assumptions which have guided and shaped the construction of
that methodology. Ultimately, all research, but especially that of
the social sciences, builds its empirical artifice upon a bedrock of
assumptions. If the validity of the assumptions is denied, the arti-
fice crumbles, and the conclusions will be rejected.
^
An effort has been made to stress the tentative, exploratory
nature of both the research design and the conclusions presented
herein. However, more should be done. The basic assumptions which
have informed this study need to be summarized, to be thrown into bold
relief. As a result, the reader may better judge for him or herself
the validity of this study. Like virtually any other behavioral
study, this work cannot make a definitive, incontrovertible statement
about its subject matter. Human behavior is too rich and too complex,
and our ability to conceptualize and interpret that behavior too
limited for any such claim to be made.
10
The argument presented in this paragraph is loosely drawn
from Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," Social Struc-
ture and Political Theory , eds. William E. Connolly and Glen Gordon
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), pp. 16-39.
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For the sake of brevity, no attempt will be made to elucidate
all of the possible assumptions which have been employed here (indeed,
it is doubtful if the author is even aware of all of his assumptions).
Accordingly, our focus will be upon a few basic assumptions which seem
to go to the heart of this research project.
The first of these assumptions is that the dichotomy between
incremental and non- incremental choice is an essentially valid classi-
fication scheme. Two arguments may be raised against this assumption.
First, there may be a better set of classifications which are being
overlooked. This may be true. However, the behavioral model of the
incremental paradigm appears to hold as an explanation of much bud-
geting, as is confirmed by the findings and observations of Wildavsky,
Fenno, Anton, Crecine, and Chapter IV of this paper. To the extent
this model is valid, then the "output" categories of incremental and
non- incremental choice should follow logically as the primary means of
classifying the choices made within the model.
The second criticism which may be raised is that the categories
are too broad, and thus lead to inadequate differentiation among types
of budget choices. This also may be true. However, if we accept the
general categories as valid, then what is being called for would
essentially come down to sub- categories of the primary classifica-
tions. Two points may be made about creating sub-categories. First,
the basis of the general categories (i.e., afc's or adj. R^s) would
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easily permit the generation of any number of sub-categories. 11
Secondly, and more importantly, the call for sub-categories is pre-
mature. That is, before one begins any effort to creat sub-categories,
it is first necessary to demonstrate the utility of the primary clas-
sifications, operationalized in a sound fashion. Accordingly, this
has been the overriding goal of this paper. Sub-categories are viewed
as a refinement which will come later, if at all.
A second basic assumption of this research has been that the
"typical choice" approach, while perhaps marred to an unspecified, but
limited degree by faulty memory or mis-statement, is essentially
accurate in classifying the data. On the grounds of this assumption,
the use of the "typical choice" approach as a standard of comparison
for the quantitative indicators has been justified. And on the
grounds of this justification, the "agreement technique" has been used
as the means for validating both the nature of an individual choice,
and the utility of the different quantitative indicators.
This assumption about the general accuracy of the "typical
choice" approach rests in turn upon three corollary assumptions.
11
Indeed, based upon a careful analysis of the "agreement tech-
niques" result, it is even possible to justify a case for including
a classification somewhat similar to Bailey and O'Connor's "intermed-
iate" classification. Comparing the disagreements generated by the
Fenno and "s-unit" techniques, it was found that all of their dis-
agreements with the "typical choice" device fell within either a pos-
itive afc range of 7.3 percent to 18.2 percent, or a negative range
of -2.6 percent to -16.9 percent. While a majority of decisions with-
in these ranges were "agreed-upon" cases, the fact that the errors of
the two best methods all clustered within these ranges suggest that
something akin to an intermediate, conceptual "no-man's land" may
exist between the clearly incremental and clearly non- incremental
decisions
.
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First, given the structure of the interview format, the typical choice
technique is firmly based upon the incremental paradigm, and, there-
fore, the labels of "typical" and "atypical" may be equated to the
concepts of incremental and non- incremental
,
respectively. Secondly,
because respondents may reject the incremental model during the general
interview and because they may reject the notion that a particular
choice is incremental, the "typical choice" approach is more capable
than the quantitative techniques of confirming or denying the validity
of the incremental model. This is a centrally important assumption
because, given either funding constraints on budgeting or their own
operating mechanics, the quantitative techniques all tend to assure
that at least half or more of the decisions classified will be label-
12
led incremental. Thus, these approaches are more likely than the
"typical choice" technique to be subject to the charge of "self-
fulfilling prophecy."
Finally, the validity of the "typical choice" technique as a
standard of comparison also rests upon the assumption that the source
of its classifications, viz . , relevant decision makers, is a source
superior to that of the other approaches, viz . , the mechanical
12
For example, since annual increases in the general fund
accounts of both cities did not exceed either a 20 percent or a 30
percent level, it is simple mathematical logic that a majority of the
decisions made in the two cities would be incremental according to
the Fenno and Wildavsky approaches, respectively. Moreover,
given
the nature of a normal distribution, one could only expect
that the
"s-unit" technique would predict a majority of cases to be incremen-
tal Likewise, the modified Bailey/O' Connor and "Decile"
devices
would always predict that 75 percent or 80 percent of all
cases, re-
spectively, were incremental. Even the "Quartile" approach
predicts
that a flat 50 percent of the cases will be incremental.
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application of quantitative/statistical devices to the data. This
line of reasoning is based upon the premise that relevant decision-
makers possess a fuller knowledge of the making of a particular choice,
a better sense of how decision making generally occurs than do the
inanimate, mechanical quantitative approaches.
If the assumption is accepted that the "typical choice" tech-
nique is a valid (if imperfect) standard of comparison, then a third
major assumption of the research design follows: viz
.
, that the "agree-
ment technique" is an acceptable approach for validating the classi-
fication of individual decisions. This is a crucial assumption be-
cause, if it is in error, then the conclusions drawn about the various
quantitative devices may also be in error. Frankly, there appears to
be no way to prove empirically the validity of the "agreement tech-
nique." However, there does appear to be a way by which its validity
can be disproven .
The first step in constructing a "test of non-validity" is to
assume that there is no reason to accept the validity of an agreement
between two different indicators if the aggregate level of agreement
is not significantly different from what might occur by chance.
Logically, if a level of agreement is the result of chance factors,
then any and all of its component agreements may be the result of a
chance pairing.
The next step is to construct a possible random distribution of
agreements and disagreements. Since there are only two possible out-
comes (i.e., agreement or disagreement), it follows that a purely
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random distribution should consist of fifty percent agreements and
fifty percent disagreements.
Employing this "ideal" random distribution, it thus becomes pos-
sible to use a chi- square test (where a - .05) to determine whether an
actual distribution approximates or is significantly different from
this random pattern. If the actual distribution is significantly
different, then it can be argued that the level of agreement probably
did not occur by chance. And therefore, it cannot be proven that the
level of agreement (and the agreements which comprise that aggregate
level) are invalid.
The results of these tests of significance reveal that all of
the six indicators generate an overall level of agreement with the
"typical choice" method which is significantly different from the
hypothetical "fifty-fifty" split. However, in terms of only incre-
mental choices, the "Quartile" technique is not significantly differ-
ent from such a random distribution. And in terms of non- incremental
decisions, neither the Wildavsky nor the "Decile" approaches are
significantly different. Accordingly, the levels of agreement
achieved by these three methods could be due to random pairings.
However, the levels of agreement generated by the "s-unit" indi-
cators, and by the Fenno method are significantly different from the
random distribution, both at an overall level (where N = 91), and
within each category of choice (i.e., I and NI) . Therefore, for these
two approaches, their concurrence with the "typical choice" technique
cannot be rejected as having occurred due to random factors. Clearly,
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the, are indicate somethl„9 about the budget data, still, we can
identified.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This chapter has three purposes. First, it offers some final
observations on the methodologies employed in the previous chapters.
Next, it presents the substantive findings on municipal budgeting
found in the two cities. And finally, it assesses the relationships
between the incremental model and the other models of urban policy
analysis.
Methodological Conclusions
This work has examined the utility of three different methodo-
logical approaches designed to determine the extent to which a munic-
ipal budgeting is incremental in nature. First, t tests of signifi-
cant differences between obtained and expected means were used as an
indicator of whether annual sets of budget data were incremental or
non- incremental. Next, a behavioral model of municipal budgeting was
developed and a sample of municipal officials were interviewed to see
if their perceptions of budgeting were congruent with it. And fin-
ally, the "Rg/s unit" and "typical choice" techniques were used to
classify individual decisions, and to measure the extent to which
incremental vs. non- incremental choice characterized the two city
governments under study.
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In regards to the use of tests of significant differences between
means as an indicator of incrementalism, the choice of this approach
rested upon certain implications of the R
g
statistic, implications
suggesting that a hypothetically ideal incremental process should gen-
erate a hypothetical ideal mean wherein the adj. R
g
= 0.00.
1
This ideal value was used to calculate t-scores to show whether
a statistically significant difference occurred between the ideal mean
and the mean obtained from a set of data. If so, it could be suggested
that the budget process in question performed non-incrementally
. If
not, the process was presumably an incremental one.
As an indicator of incremental and non- incremental budget pro-
cesses, these tests were found to be flawed. A comparison of the
"non- incremental" and "incremental" processes showed that the former
often had fewer (presumably) non- incremental decisions.
The weaknesses of the tests were clearly illustrated when they
were paired with their corresponding data distribution graphs. Erro-
neous results appear to have occurred in distributions that were uni-
modal, but considerably to the left or right of the ideal mean, in
distributions which were unimodal and centered around the ideal mean,
but which possessed NI decisions clustered on the positive or negative
end of the graph, and in distributions that were flat and dispersed,
but evenly spread along the positive-negative axis.
^or a detailed discussion of this aspect of the adj. Rg con-
cept, see Chapter II, pp. 36-37.
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After examining these misleading types of distributions, incre-
mental processes were redefined as processes producing not only a
relatively low rate of NI choice, but also a high rate of "central
clustering", i.e., distribution where most incremental (I) choices
fall between adj. R
g
values of +1.00 and -1.00. Comparing the classi-
fications generated by this technique to the original classifications
generated by the tests yielded a number of tentative conclusions about
the utility and limitations of the test of means approach. These were
as follows:
First, the tests are inappropriate when applied to flat, dis-
persed but evenly split distributions. This type of distribution
accounted for one-half of the apparent errors (thirteen of twenty-
six) .
Next, when a set of data contains less than approximately fif-
teen cases, the tests are more successful as indicators if R values
greater than 6.00 are treated as outlyers. Apparently R
g
values
greater than 6. 00 simply possess too much mathematical weight when
calculating t- scores for such small data sets. In any event, when
such R values were omitted from calculations, the tests were success-
S
ful indicators 62.5 percent of the time for public works data and
93.75 percent of the time for agency-level data, sets of data where
2
the number of cases was consistently less than fifteen.
Finally, when the number of cases was greater than fifteen, the
tests were more successful if no Rg
values were excluded. An
2
Ibid., p. 68.
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87.5 percent "success rate" was achieved in such instances, all of
which involved the "general government" data sets. 3
Overall, it appears that the test of means technique possesses
limited utility as an indicator of budgetary incrementalism and non-
incrementalism. If used at all, the results should be double-checked
against graphs of the distribution pattern, against estimates of the
incidence of non- incremental choice, and against some measure of the
extent of central clustering around the ideal mean. If the tests and
these double-checks concur, then it seems likely that the tests may be
relied upon. However, when these factors conflict, the researcher
should proceed with great caution.
The kind of highly general information provided by this pro-
cedure (and its double- checks) does not provide any direct proof that
budget-making is occurring within an incremental process or that the
decisions being made are actually incremental or not. Accordingly, a
more rigorous investigation of budgeting in the two case cities was
undertaken (a) to determine whether the budgetary process of each city
possessed roles, values, and behavior patterns congruent with an
4incremental process model, and (b) to test the utility of techniques
5
by which to classify individual decisions as I or NI. A general
behavioral model of municipal budgetary processes was developed, based
3
Ibid . , p. 68.
4
See Chapter III, pp. 106-143 passim.
5
See Chapters III and V, pp. 159-165 and 177-182, respectively.
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upon the works of writers like Crecine, Wildavsky, and Anton. 6 Armed
with this incremental model, a questionnaire was developed and admin-
istered to a sample of officials in both cities.
On the whole, the interviews suggested that the budgetary pro-
cesses in the case cities approximated the model. Some deviance was
found (as in the case of City B's council), but even this wasn't gen-
erally compatible with a model of incremental budgeting (if not with
the model of municipal incrementalism posited)
.
It must be stressed that these findings were interpreted as, at
best, only partial proof that budgeting in the case cities was incre-
mental in nature. The interviews had demonstrated that the budgetary
processes of the two cities generally conformed to the roles, values,
and behavior patterns predicted by the incremental model. However,
this did not constitute proof that incremental decision making actu-
ally occurred as a result of these characteristics. The most that
could be claimed was that such characteristics infer or suggest that
incremental choices were being made.
Accordingly, the next step was to examine a sample of recent
budgetary decisions from both cities to determine whether incremental
decision making was actually occurring and, if so, to what extent.
This, of course, demanded that a way be found to operationalize the
definitions of incremental and non- incremental decisions. Just as
6
See, e.g., Wildavsky, Budgeting , Chap. 6 passim; Crecine,
Governmental Problem-Solving , esp. Chap. 4 and Chap. 12 passim; and
Anton, Expenditure in Illinois , esp. Chap. 7 passim.
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importantly, a way to check the validity of this (or any other)
approach also was needed.
Accordingly, lacking access to the realm of Platonic ideals, it
was therefore decided that the best way to proceed was to create two
systems of operationalized definitions, each resting upon different
methodological approaches. The first scheme of classification was
based upon the deviation of R
g
values from the ideal mean value of
0.00. Choices falling within one s-unit were labelled probably incre-
mental; choices falling between one and two s-units were categorized
as possibly non- incremental; and decisions beyond two s-units were
classified as probably non- incremental. Aside from being rooted in
the incrementalist notion of budgetary "fair shares," this approach
had the basic advantage of being a quantitative technique of classi-
7
fication. If found useful, it would therefore be a relatively inex-
pensive and rapid way for classifying choice types.
The second, "double- checking" approach was based upon interview
data. Having established through the earlier questions how budgetary
decisions were usually or typically made in both cities, and having
found that typical decision making appeared to operate largely in
incremental terms, the interviewees were also asked if specific deci-
sions with which they had been involved were made in the typical
fashion or not. If yes, then the specific decision in question was
7
The linkage between the R value and the "fair share" concept
is discussed in more detail in Chapter I, pp. 23-25,
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labelled incremental. If no, the decision was classified as non-
incremental.
These two sets of classifications were then compared, thereby
creating what was referred to as the "agreement technique." While a
small number of disagreements were revealed, no statistically signif-
icant differences were found between the interview-based classifi-
cations and the Pbl and PbNI classifications. However, while a
majority of classifications concurred, there was a significant differ-
ence between the interview classifications and the PsNI category.
Accordingly, the quantitative system appeared to be quite successful
in identifying clearly incremental and non- incremental decisions, but
less reliable in classifying the "middle-range" of decisions, where
incrementalism seems to shift, somewhat uncertainly, into non-
incrementalism.
In an effort to determine the relative utility of the "R /s
unit" approach, a number of other quantitative indicators were also
compared to the "typical choice" classifications. Presented in the
previous chapter, the results of these comparisons confirmed the
strength of the "R /s unit" approach. Only one of the five other
9
quantitative indicators examined appeared to have comparable utility.
In sum, the methodological innovations developed here appear to
be promising. However, there are still "bugs" which need to be worked
8
A more detailed discussion of these findings is in Chapter IV,
pp. 164-165.
9
This was the Fenno Technique. See Chapter V, pp. 181-182.
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out. The fact that the concepts of incremental ism and non-
incrementalism can apparently be operationalized opens new doors for
future research on budgeting. However, the presence of the "bugs"
suggests the first door we should open is one leading to further
research on operationalizing these concepts.
Substantive Conclusions
Although the primary concern of this work was to explore new
methodological approaches to the study of budgeting, a number of
interesting substantive points about budgeting in municipalities were
also found. This section summarizes such points.
First, the distribution graphs and the obtained means showed a
tendency for budget data to cluster around the ideal adj. R
g
of 0.00.
This evidence in turn supports the "fair share" notion and, more
generally, the belief that municipal budgeting tends to be incremental
in nature.
Secondly, budgetary priorities, measured by the size of Rg
values and correlated using Pearson's r, appear to shift frequently at
the municipal level. During the ten year period examined no_ long-term
patterns of priorities emerged within any of the sets of data or in
either city. Accordingly, short-term, shifting priorities appear to
11
characterize incremental municipal budgeting systems.
10
See Chapter II, pp. 44-49 and pp. 53-54.
i:L
Ibid.
, pp. 78-80.
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Thirdly, behavior patterns and attitudes among city officials
tend to conform to an incremental model. Such officials appear to
share a common set of expectations in regards to their own behavior
and that of other actors. In addition, they also share common percep-
tions of the goals which guide their behavior. Together these behav-
ioral expectations and goal perceptions appear to coalesce to form a
role system congruent with an incremental model. 12
In general, budgeting in the two case cities appears to be quite
similar to the incremental models of budgeting found by Crecine in
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Detroit, and by Wildavasky and Meltsner in
13
Oakland. This model congruence suggests that what Wildavsky refers
1 4
to as "revenue budgeting" holds not only in one city on the West
coast and in three cities in the Midwest, but in two more fairly
sizable cities in New England. Obviously, no valid inferences can be
made from such a non-random sample, but the similarities in these
geographically dispersed communities are suggested.
However, it should also be noted that variation in municipal
budgetary role systems is possible, as demonstrated by the distinctive
roles pursued by the city councils of the two cities studied here.
Moreover, it further appears that some incremental decision rules are
more widely perceived (and perhaps employed) than others. For
These findings are discussed at length in Chapter III, pp.
141-143.
13
See Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving , Chapter 4 passim;
and Wildavsky and Meltsner, "Leave City Budgeting Alone!"
14
Wildavsky, Budgeting , pp. 10-12.
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example, the "safe base" and "marginal growth" rules were overwhelm-
ingly acknowledged as valid. Conversely, the "fair share" rule was
generally not perceived by line officials, although most overview
officials accepted it.
Such findings as these suggest that "real world" incremental
systems may deviate to an undetermined extent from the "ideal-type"
models which researchers often attempt to postulate. This point is
quite important because it also suggests that several "species" of the
"genus," incremental systems, may exist.
From the comparison of the quantitative classification schemes,
a logical conclusion is that incremental decision making is the
dominant mode of decision making occurring within incremental budget-
ing systems. However , the incidence of non- incremental decisions
(i.e., decisions not conforming to how budget choices are typically
made within incremental processes) can be quite high. Roughly one in
three decisions was non- incremental in both cities. Such findings
strongly indicate that we need to re-examine the tacit belief that
non- incremental decision making is largely irrelevant to an under-
standing of urban policy processes.
15
A more detailed discussion of these findings may be found in
Chapter III, pp. 123-124.
16
See, e.g., Wildavsky, Budgeting , Chap. 6 passim; and Crecine,
Governmental Problem-Solving , Chap. 4 passim.
17
A fuller development of this argument is presented in Chapter
IV, pp. 170-171.
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However, it also appears that municipal budgeting would be far
more incremental than it is, if it were not for the impact of external
forces upon the system. Interestingly, the major external forces
causing non- incremental decisions are the federal and state govern-
18
ments. This suggests that, at a minimum, the relationship between
municipal budgeting and inter-governmental relations needs closer
examination.
In addition, it also suggests that the commonly accepted belief
that incremental budgetary systems are largely insulated from external
pressures is erroneous. It may be true (as Crecine claims) that
municipal budgeting is largely unresponsive to community-based inter-
. . 19
est group politics. However, as the impact of the federal and state
governments on Cities A and B demonstrates, it may also be true that
other types of external forces do have a significant impact on budget-
ing. In other words, before assuming that budgeting is insulated from
the environment, it is perhaps wiser to keep one's mind open to the
possibility, and to search more thoroughly for "external-internal"
relationships.
In sum, the substantive findings of this research supports the
conclusion that municipal budgeting is incremental budgeting. How-
ever, variations in these incremental processes may exist, and bud-
getary choice is perhaps less incremental than often assumed. In
addition, external forces appear to play a rather important role in
18
See Chapter IV, pp. 168-69.
19
Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving , p. 219,
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municipal budgeting, a point often overlooked because of the misguided
belief that budgetary systems are insulated by ritualized, bureau-
cratic routines. In short, while municipal budgeting may be incre-
mental in nature, a more complete grasp of such decision making
processes will seemingly require not only more and better designed
research, but also an awareness that incremental budgeting is not
necessarily the neat, simple, closed system that is frequently pre-
s umed
.
Incrementalism and Other Models of Urban Policy Analysis
The purpose of this section is to discuss possible linkages
between the incremental model and other models of urban policy anal-
ysis. While there are a myriad of "competitors," the "other models"
which will be dealt with here are the community power, systems, and
political culture models.
One reason for this theory-building exercise is that it will
hopefully enable us to broaden our understanding of both budgeting and
incrementalism. Another is that such an~ endeavor may prove useful by
suggesting additional avenues for future research.
To provide some sort of organizing principle to the discussions
which follow, one question was chosen to serve as a theme: viz., to
what extent, if any, does this model help us to understand
municipal
budgeting? While some speculation was unavoidable, the answers
given
to this question try to reflect implications drawn from
the substan-
tive findings.
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It should be noted here that all three of the models discussed
below essentially posit government policy as the "effect" of "causes"
external to government. Thus, the power model argues that policy
occurs in response to an elite or to group power struggles. Thus, the
systems model sees policy as the output of any of a number of environ-
mental inputs. Thus, the political culture model assumes that policy
reflects the cultural values which a society holds, or the ideological
values which the dominant class propagates.
In contradistinction, the incremental model has generally main-
tained that budgetary choice, one important form of policy-making, is
primarily determined by factors internal to government, factors like
the budgetary role system, bureaucratic routines, and internalized
decision rules. As noted earlier, this "internal focus" of the model
places it in apparent conflict with the "external focus" of the other
models.
Of course, the seriousness of this apparent conflict is highly
21
questionable in light of a number of the substantive findings.
However, the concern of the discussions which follow is not whether
these other models are inferior or superior to the incremental model.
Instead, an attempt will be made to combine them with the incremental
approach. In short, the question to be examined is whether these
other models help us to understand municipal budgeting. And to answer
20
A more detailed discussion of the "internal-external" debate
is presented in Chapter IV, pp. 169-71.
21
Ibid., pp. 167-71.
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this question, it is necessary to determine to what extent these
models can account for budgetary incrementalism.
Before proceeding, two caveats must be entered. First, because
the boundaries for this research precluded the pursuit of definitive
answers to such theoretical matters, the discussions which follow are
quite impressionistic. Second, for the sake of brevity, no effort is
made here to explicate fully the intricacies of either the models per
se or of the linkages seen between the models. As a result, the
discussion that follows should be viewed as only suggestive, not
definitive.
The community power model
. There will be two questions examined here.
First, to what extent do community power structures, as traditionally
defined, help to explain municipal budgeting? And, secondly, within
that part of the city's "power structure," which Hofferbert refers to
22
as the "governmental elite," to what extent does the distribution of
power among public officials affect the nature of budgetary choice?
In simplified terms, the community power model may be divided
into two fundamentally opposed camps. On one hand, there are the
elitists, a group which contends that urban policy decisions tend to
reflect the interests and concerns of the city's "power structure."
This power structure is often pictured as monolithic in nature, and as
22
Richard I. Hofferbert, "Elite Influence in State Policy For-
mation: A Itodel for Comparative Inquiry," Polity (Spring 1970),
pp. 329-30.
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composed largely of "economic notables." 23 Bluntly stated, this line
of argument claims that municipal policy largely reflects the inter-
ests of a ruling class.
On the other hand, there are the pluralists. They envision
municipal policy as the outcome of conflicts and/or compromises between
shifting coalitions of community leaders, be they private citizens or
public officials. Such leaders tend to represent constituencies of
politically active groups within the community. Presumably, policy
tends to reflect primarily the interests of such contending groups.
However, the interests of the "apolitical masses" are also taken into
account because, again presumably, the activists anticipate their
reactions, especially reactions which might occur if the public is
dissatisfied with a decision or unhappy about violations of the "rules
24
of the game."
23
This summary of the elitist position is based on a discussion
found in David Ricci, Community Power and Democratic Theory: The
Logic of Political Analysis (New York: Random House, 1971), Chap. 5
passim. Some of the "classics" in elitist-oriented community power
studies would, of course, include Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd,
Middletown (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929); Lloyd
Warner et al.
,
Democracy in Jonesville (New York: Harper and Row Pub-
lishers, 1949); and, especially, Floyd Hunter, Community Power Struc-
ture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
24
This outline of the pluralist position is drawn from Ricci,
Community Power and Democratic Theory , Chap. 7 passim. Some of the
"classics" of this approach would include Robert Dahl, Who Governs?
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); and Nelson Polsby,
Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1963). Useful summaries of the community power debates may be
found in Jack Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy,"
American Political Science Review 60(June 1966) : 285-295; and Thomas
Anton, "Power, Pluralism, and Local Politics," Administrative Science
Quarterly 7 (March 1963) : 425-457. Interestingly, later studies sug-
gested that there appeared to be many types of power structures. See
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No evidence emerged during the course of this study which sug-
gests that budgetary decision-making is greatly affected by "competing
interest groups" within either city. To some extent, fears about
"declining tax bases" appear to reflect a concern about the loss of
private enterprise. And therefore, it is possible to argue that
"economic notables," as a generalized class rather than as specific
individuals, have an important, if indirect influence on budgeting. 25
However, the concern over tax base erosion also reflects a process of
anticipating undesired reactions by the "apolitical masses," especi-
ally that part of the "masses" which pays property taxes. Obviously,
this fear of the "taxpayers" undermines the proposition that budgeting
is incremental because of fiscal constraints imposed by a monolithic
elite of "economic notables." Accordingly, the explanatory power of
the elitist model must also be questioned.
It may be possible that understanding local budget-making is
better served by focusing upon the power relationship which exists
within the "governmental elite"; i.e., that part of the community
power structure composed of formal office holders. Unfortunately,
Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expen-
ditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," American
Sociological Review 33 (August 1968) : 576-594; Claire Gilbert, "Commun-
ity Power and Decision-Making: A Quantitative Examination of Previous
Research," in Terry N. Clark (ed. ) , Community Structure and Decision-
Making (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 139-
159; and Amos Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success,"
American Journal of Sociology 68(June 1968) : 422-431.
25
This point and the one preceding it (i.e., concerning "com-
peting interests") are similar to findings reported by Crecine,
p. 219.
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here too a rather clouded pictures emerges. In City A, where the
council plays a "rubberstamp" role, Wildavsky's notion of "executlve
dominance" appears to hold. 26 However, in City B where the council
pursues a more active "guardian" role, the extent of such dominance is
a matter of debate.
Moreover, it is conceivable that the question of "who has power"
is largely irrelevant to understanding budgetary choice. Agency heads
may be able to structure the range of choice available to their polit-
ical superiors, and may be capable of withholding key services if
27their base funds are cut too greatly. However, they do not expect
rapid budget expansion, and accept the fact that higher authorities
will almost inevitably trim back their requests. Chief executives may
be formally empowered either to increase or to cut budget submissions.
However, they seldom, if ever, engage in the former, and are quite
restrained in doing the latter. Moreover, even when able to "domi-
nate" a "rubberstamp" council, their apparent power may well rest upon
council indifference, so long as tax hikes are minimized and services
are maintained. And for their part, councils may possess the formal
authority to approve, cut, or reject all or part of the executive
budget. However, their employment of this power appears to be
2 ^
Wildavsky, Budgeting , p. 128.
27,1 Off the record," but reliable sources in City B reported that
once, when the Traffic Engineering Department received an unexpected
cut in funding, its director responded by placing black hoods over
traffic signals in and around the downtown area. This "withholding
of key services" resulted in prompt action on a supplemental appro-
priation for the department.
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limited largely to approving submissions and/or to making a limited
number of minor cuts.
In short, since budgetary choice is played out within sets of
mutual expectations concerning prescribed behavior and acceptable
goals, power, defined as the ability to impose one's preferences on
others, may possess little explanatory utility for budgeting. 28 in
other words, it may make more sense to argue that the role system
itself is the most powerful "actor" in the system. Viewed in less
reified terms, this means that the various players, regardless of
position or formal authority, operate within a well-defined system of
power in which "proper" behavior is enforced by the actions and
reactions occurring between the sets of players.
Support for this proposition is available from the interview
data presented in Chapter III. Here we find support for the existence
of an incremental role system complete with incremental behavior,
incremental goals, and incremental expectations. In addition, in
Chapter IV, we also find that most decisions are incrementally geared
toward making marginal, maintenance-oriented adjustments to on-going
programs. And non- incremental decisions occur largely because the
actors are forced (or highly pressured) to make them by such external
phenomena as other levels of governments. In short, budgetary choice
PR
Frank Parkin, Class, Inequality and Political Order (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 45.
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appears to be a function of each actor's inability to resist the
pressures imposed upon them by other actors and/or by external
29forces.
Summary: the community power model
. In sum, the findings of
this research do not suggest that the community power literature is
capable of contributing much to our understanding of municipal budget-
ing. From the pluralist point of view, the evidence supports the
notion that public officials are concerned with anticipating the
reactions of the (tax paying) general public. However, no evidence
was found indicating that interest group competition had much, if
anything, to do with making budgetary decisions. From the elitist
orientation, it is possible to argue that "economic notables" have an
indirect effect upon budgeting. However, this must be balanced
against the influence of the general taxpayers. Which, if either of
these groups have more influence is impossible to judge on the basis
of the data. Accordingly, the utility of the elitist model must also
be questioned.
As for power relationships within the "governmental elites" of
Cities A and B, it appears that both operate within a role system,
which in one sense can be viewed as a "power system." That is,
29
For the sake of conciseness, the picture painted here is per-
haps too deterministic. In fairness, it should be noted that the
various actors do appear to have some control over the items contained
within the incremental funding decisions being made, and that they are
also capable of "breaking out" of the system to make an occasional
non- incremental choice on their own volition (as, e.g., when they are
engaged in governmental reorganization efforts).
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budgetary choices are generally made in conformance with the "dictates"
of that system, not in accordance with the dictates of more powerful
actors or sets of actors. Thus, as a general rule, the question of
"who has power" within budgetary processes also possesses limited
utility as an approach for better understanding such processes.
The systems model
. Turning now to the systems (or "input-output")
model, its general assumption is that policy decisions are shaped by
inputs from forces external to the so-called "black box," i.e., the
governmental decision making hierarchy. As in the previous case,
there are essentially two camps among the advocates of this model:
(a) those who attempt to demonstrate the importance of "political/
governmental" inputs like inter-party competition or "reformism";
and (b) those who attempt to demonstrate the importance of socio-
31economic inputs like per capita income or industrialization.
30
E.g., see Robert Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism
and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science
Review 61 (September 1967) : 701-717; Allen Palsinher and James J.
Weatherby, "Malaportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional
Distribution of Government Expenditures," American Political Science
Review 62 (December 1968) : 1207-1219; Charles Cnudde and Donald McCrone,
"Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the United States,"
American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969) : 858-866; Bryan
Fry and Richard Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," American
Political Science Review 64 (June 1970) : 508-522 ; Ira Sharkansky and
Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Policy," in Hebert Jacob
and Kenneth Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States 2nd ed.
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 315-353.
31
See, e.g., Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-
party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the
American States," Journal of Politics 25 (May 1963 ): 265-289; Robert
Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Political and Socioeconomic Characteris-
tics of Cities," in The Municipal Yearbook: 1965 (Chicago:
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However, as Phillip Coulter has suggested, both of these camps en-
deavor to explain the effects of their variables largely in terms of a
pluralist scenario wherein policy decisions result from the conflicts,
bargains, and compromises which occur between contending political,
social, and/or economic groups within the community. 32
As noted before, there is little if any evidence found here sug-
gesting that budgetary decisions are directly and immediately influ-
enced by such pluralist competition. A partial exception might be the
two non- incremental decisions, one per city, that were responses to
rioting.
On the other hand, discarding the pluralist "cargo" from the
systems approach, it is still possible to cite a number of governmen-
tal, political and economic "inputs" which may indeed affect municipal
budgeting, and help to create both incremental and non-incremental
"outputs." The most obvious source of incremental outputs is, of
course, the "governmental input" of the role system . And this input
may itself be (at least in part) the output (or intervening variable)
brought about by such real or potential inputs as negative voter
International City Management Association, 1965), pp. 82-97; Robert
Alford and Eugene Lee, "Voting Turnout in American Cities," American
Political Science Review 62 (September 1968) : 796-814; Thomas R. Dye,
Politics, Economics, and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966);
plus his "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational
Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science 11 (June 1967) : 353-380.
32
Phillip B. Coulter, "Comparative Community Politics and Public
Policy: Problems in Theory and Research," Polity 3 (Fall 1970): 23-24.
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reactions to declining services or higher taxes (a political input),
and erosion of the tax base (an economic input). In short, incremen-
tal decision making may be as much a function of anticipated "inputs"
from the external environment as it is a function of internal bureau-
cratic routines.
In addition, external political and economic factors also appear
to affect municipal budgeting through non-incremental decision making.
For example, one way of looking at the intervention of the state
and federal governments into "local affairs" is that these governments
serve as conveyor belts for inputs by economic, social, and political
forces. Thus, national concern for the environment may prompt the
federal government to require cities to reduce sewage pollution (this,
in fact, occurred in City A with the result of a non-incremental
33budget decision). Similarly, economic conditions, both locally and
nationally, influence the amount of CETA funds which flow into commu-
nities, funds used in at least one of the cities to absorb (or more
precisely, as an excuse for) non- incremental cuts in locally funded
34
labor costs.
Summary: the systems model . To summarize, if we were to inter-
pret municipal budgeting in terms of the systems model, the first
point which might be made is that municipal budget-making is strongly
33
Interview with Director, Bureau of Sewers, City A, 20 August
1976.
34
Interview with Personnel Director, City B, 18 August 1976.
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affected by the "governmental variable" of a budgetary role system.
Within this role system, the goals and decision making behavior of
different actors appear to be fairly regularized, if not routinized.
However, this role system appears to be, at least in part, a
response to economic and political pressures from the community, pres-
sures which, if not responded to by officials, could prove to be
destabilizing to the governmental system, the political process,
and/or the community's well-being in general. And finally, in addi-
tion to these "incrementally oriented" pressures, other environmental
pressures, fed into the system by such agents as the state and federal
governments, effectively demand (if not require) the creation of non-
incremental outputs as well.
In short, by providing a conceptual framework which links the
"black box" of incrementalism to the external environment, the systems
model is not only compatible with the incremental approach, but ap-
pears to offer potentially useful insights as to why incremental
processes arise and as to why such processes sometimes behave non-
incrementally. In other words, unlike the community power model, the
systems approach is able to account for incrementalism, and thus helps
to expand our grasp of municipal budgeting.
The political culture model . Turning now to the political culture (or
more precisely, the phenomenological) model, it also possesses two
camps within it: (a) those who see policy outputs affected by the
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conflicts between a variety of value systems, 35 and (b) those who see
policy outputs largely in terms of a response to a single value sys-
tem, such as cultural values or a dominant ideology. 36 From the
outset, it bears repeating that this study finds little evidence sup-
porting a conflict model, regardless of whether the conflict flows
from competing interests, conflicting social classes, or contending
value systems. Accordingly, "camp A," the multiple value system
model, seems largely inappropriate as an explanation for municipal
budgeting. Therefore, the focus of this discussion will be the single
value system variant.
One approach to applying this type of model would be to argue
that municipal budgeting is a decision making process in which a
variety of political and economic "realities" give rise to certain
types of values (e.g., tax restraint and service maintenance) among
city officials. These values in turn generate a system of congruent
behavior patterns within city hall. And together, these values (or
35
See, e.g., James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-
Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Polit-
ical Science Review 58 (December 1964) : 868-887; and Rovert Agger,
Daniel Goldrich, and Burt Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965).
See, e.g., Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975); Donald J. Devine, The
Political Culture of the United States: The Influence of Member
Values on Regime Maintenance (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1972); Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), especially pp. 81-116;
Kenneth Dolbeare and Murray Edelman, American Politics 2nd ed.
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974); and
Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few (Boston: St. Martin's Press,
1975) .
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goals) and the resulting behavior patterns give definition to what is
known as an incremental decision-making process. The operation and
outputs of this process tend to satisfy the dominant values, and,
through a system of immediate and anticipated penalties embedded
within it, the system reinforces continued adherence to the values.
In short, the objectification of an "incremental ideology" appears to
provide a useful explanation for understanding how and why most budget
decisions are made.
This "incremental ideology" may or may not be a response to a
more general system of values. If not, then the most that can be said
is that a phenomenological approach appears to be of some use in
analyzing budgeting, but that the political culture model per se is
irrelevant.
On the other hand, if we make a theoretical "leap of faith" and
assume that "political culture" does affect municipal budgeting, then
we can begin to speculate on ways to apply this approach. Unfortu-
nately, this task is made quite difficult because there are a variety
of such models, each with different assumptions and/or different geo-
graphical foci. In light of this problem, only a single (and simple)
illustration of the model's application will be presented here.
Viewed on a large canvas, municipal incrementalism might be seen
as the resultant of a national political culture. Here, the key ele-
ments are the societal values which give rise to those political and
economic "realities" which in turn generate the incremental "response."
For example, the focal point of analysis might be the acceptance by
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Americans of values like "grass roots democracy" (giving impetus to
what Robert Wood has called our suburban "republics in miniature") 37
and "limited government" (which presumably underlies our preference
for fragmented political power). 38 Such values as these (and others,
such as Macpherson's "liberal individualism") 39 could be viewed as the
"key" variables accounting for municipal taxpayers' attitudes toward
taxation, the "freezing" of middle-class assets in suburban areas, and
the self-defeating competition between cities to attract and/or keep
tax-generating businesses. In this line of reasoning, the objectifi-
cation of traditional values over time has placed our municipalities
in a situation where incremental budgeting is an unavoidable neces-
sity, and where the "incremental ideology" is the only viable response
for city officials. In other words, city officials are trapped within
the "social realities" borne of a national political culture.
^
37
Robert Wood, "Republics in Miniature," in Politics in the
Metrojx>lis: A Reader in Conflict and Cooperation
, ed. Thomas R. Dye
and Brett W. Hawkins (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc.,
1967), pp. 326-334.
38
Vincent Ostrum, The Intellectual Crises in American Public
Admins tration (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press,
1973), p. 77.
39
C. B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 6-8.
40
This line of reasoning is drawn from Peter L. Berger and
Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in
the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1966), pp. 19-21 and 60-61. A flaw in the argument is, of course,
that incremental budgetary systems have allegedly been found in for-
eign nations. See, e.g., Heclo and Wildavsky, The Private Government
of Public Money .
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Such analysis as this, of course, is highly speculative, not to
mention virtually impossible to prove in an empirical sense. Its sig-
nificance, if any, is that it suggests linkages between budgeting and
the cultural milieu in which budgeting takes place. Such linkages may
in turn be instructive to would-be budget reformers, because it sug-
gests that far more sweeping reforms are necessary to abolish "mind-
less" incrementalism than simply converting public officials to a
counter- ideology of "efficiency and effectiveness." That is, if
incremental budgeting is in fact a response to and symptomatic of a
much larger socio- cultural system, then "meaningful" reform (whatever
that may be) may entail the reform of that larger system first. In
turn, changes in incrementalism and what Schick refers to as the
"control orientation" may then more readily follow.^
A second advantage for students of budgeting is that this
approach, unlike the systems model posited, adds an historical dimen-
sion to the explanation of why incremental choice dominates municipal
budgeting. Its essential thrust is that traditional social values
have over time brought about political phenomena which make incre-
mental budgeting necessary.
Unfortunately, this historical dimension, as developed here, is
presented in overly simplistic terms. To paraphrase Allison's cri-
tique of the "rational actor" model, what has occurred here is that
those "basic" American values which seem to fit the facts have been
41
Schick, Budget Innovation , p. 4 and p. 6.
posited as explaining those facts. 42 No doubt other values could be
used for explanatory purposes.
Moreover, there is little doubt that the importance and impact
of different values have shifted over time. For example, if suburbs
reflect, as Wood insists, the ideals of Jeffersonian "grass roots
democracy," why is it that incorporated suburban "rings" did not begin
to really develop until, as Lowi notes, the 1930' s?43 And, more
importantly, was municipal budgeting prior to this time incremental in
nature? Was it incremental when "machine" politics dominated the
44
cities? Or did it only become incremental after the progressive
values of "neutral competence" and "strong executives" displaced the
45
corruption wrought by Jacksonian "representativeness"?
The point of such queries is that, if one wishes to explain
incremental budgeting using a "political culture" model, then great
care must be taken to avoid simplistic and unilinear linkages between
"old" values and "current" conditions. The history of American cities
42Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 35.
43
Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy,
and the Crises of Public Authority (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, Inc., 1969), p. 195.
44
Allen Schick provides a useful list of characteristics for
nineteenth century budgeting, a list which clearly illustrates the
sharp procedural differences between budgeting under unreformed,
"machine" politics and budgeting today with its legalistic "control
orientation." See Schick, Budget Innovation , pp. 14-15.
45
Herbert Kaufman, "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Pub-
lic Administration," American Political Science Review 50 (December
1956) :1057-1973.
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suggests anything but a neat linear development, either for value
orientations or for governmental structures and procedures. Obviously,
explaining incrementalism in terms of this model would require an
enormous amount of historical research and of testing (if possible)
the "fit" of different "value scenarios." And, even then, the con-
clusions would no doubt still be subject to challenge and debate.
It should be stressed that the example of the political culture
approach presented above is meant to be taken not as a definitive
explication but simply as a tentative illustration. As such, it is
hopefully suggestive of avenues of research seldom considered by most
researchers.
Summary: the political culture model . To summarize, the single
value system variant of the phenomenological model seems to have some
potential for expanding our comprehension of municipal budgeting.
From a short-term perspective, the "grip" of an "incremental ideology"
offers a possible explanation for the dominance of incremental deci-
sion making. And from a more historical frame of reference, a "polit-
ical culture" approach suggests reasons why incrementalism has re-
peatedly "defeated" opposing "rational" reforms, as well as insights
into how incrementalism is reinforced (even caused) by the "social
realities" which surround it.
Overall, the insights offered by the model are only suggestive,
indeed speculative. Nevertheless, like the systems model, it too is
able to accommodate the findings of this study, and to offer new
avenues for research.
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Comparing the Models
Overall, of the three models of urban policy analysis discussed
above, the systems and political culture approaches appear to be the
most useful. Power structure models, as normally defined, seem to be
largely irrelevant to broadening our insights into municipal budget-
ing. Conversely, the other two models enable us to view budgetary
behavior as it occurs within socio-economic and/or cultural contexts.
Although the pictures they provide are admittedly fuzzy and impres-
sionistic, a clear enough image emerges to raise doubts that municipal
incrementalism is a process "insulated" from environmental factors.
In addition, both the system and political culture models sug-
gest rationales for why incremental choice is the dominant mode of
decision making within municipalities. Along these lines, the systems
approach appears to be less historical than the political culture
model, and more concerned with immediate causation.
Conversely, while the political culture approach appears better
able to provide an historical dimension, its ability to do so ade-
quately may be plagued by the problem of oversimplifying complex his-
torical realities and/or of getting lost in the "forest" of those
complexities. In any event, the complexities of urban history undoubt-
edly will render any such effort subject to doubt and challenge.
While the system model may be ahistorical, it nonetheless
possesses one great advantage over the culture approach: viz., unlike
the latter, it seems better able to account for non-incremental
deci-
sions. Thus, if it is potentially less capable of offering a
full
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explanation of the dominance of one type of choice, it is superior in
that it can offer rationales for both types of decision making. The
political culture approach, no doubt, might be stretched to incorpo-
rate such phenomena, but given their particularistic causes (e.g.,
recent concern over the environment, recent economic problems), such
stretching would require specialized explanations for each type of
immediate cause. On the whole, it appears that the "culture" model is
better suited to offering long-term explanations of general, recurring
phenomena, whereas the systems model is more appropriate for suggest-
ing immediate, short-term explanations for both general, recurring and
specific non- repetitive events. Hence, the latter model is less
historical in its explanations, but able to deal with a broader range
of phenomena.
Whatever the relative merits of these two approaches, it should
also be pointed out that both may offer incomplete explanations of
municipal incrementalism. The discussions offered here have sought to
suggest explanations for this phenomenon. However, available evidence
indicates that incremental choice dominates public budgeting at the
state level, in the federal government, and even in foreign nations.
This point suggests that budgetary incrementalism may not be a
function of either socioeconomic or cultural factors. Instead, it may
be the inevitable result, as Wildavsky asserts, of human kind's innate
inability to handle the complex calculations required by more
46
"rational" modes of decision making.
46
Wildavsky, Politics, pp. 206-207.
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If true, then the systems and culture models may be useful only
for illustrating the different types of conditions and values to which
incrementalism can adapt. In other words, it is possible that cul-
tural and environmental factors are able to explain variants of the
incremental model (and/or deviations from it), while our intellectual
limitations explain the wide use of the model per se.
Accordingly, incremental budgeting, perhaps slightly improved by,
e.g., productivity systems and selective analysis, may be the only
viable way for humans to make budgetary decisions. And "grand" theo-
ries, like the systems and culture models, may be found to have only
incidental relevance for explaining incremental choice.
Final Comments
In this chapter, a review has been presented of the methodo-
logical and substantive findings of this study. The implications of
these findings for different models of urban policy analysis were
discussed, and the utility of these models for broadening our under-
standing of municipal budgeting was examined. Rather than rehashing
these topics (or summarizing the summary chapter), a few closing
comments concerning the goals of this research project seems apropos .
First, this study tried to develop and to examine new methodol-
ogical approaches for the study of budgeting. To this end the ratio
of shares (R^) statistic was developed to indicate the extent to which
any given budget choice approximates an ideal "fair share" value of
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was
1.00 (or, adjusted, a value of 0.00). In turn, this ideal value
used as the mean of a hypothetically ideal incremental process, and,
employed in tests of significant differences between means to indicate
if a set of budget data was the output of an incremental process (this
procedure produced rather mixed results). And finally, standard
deviation units around this ideal mean were used to indicate whether
specific budget choices are incremental or non- incremental decisions.
Double-checked against respondents' perceptions of the typicality or
a typicality of selected decisions, this procedure appears to be gen-
erally reliable as an indicator, indeed significantly more so than a
number of other possible approaches.
Overall, the principal lesson to be drawn from these new ap-
proaches is that it does appear feasible to develop useful quanti-
tative indicators through which to classify budget decisions and,
even, budgetary processes. However, given the small number of cases
studied (i.e., two cities), plus the exploratory nature of the work
itself, it is evident that more work and research is necessary to
refine these procedures and/or to develop better ones.
The second basic goal of this research was to provide additional
evidence by which to confirm or to deny the validity of the incre-
mental budgeting model. As was noted in Chapters I and IV, previous
works have concentrated upon demonstrating the existence of roles,
values, and behavior patterns consistent with that model. However,
none of these works have adequately advanced the process of proof one
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step further by determining whether (and to what extent) incremental
decisions actually occurred as a result of these characteristics.
The evidence presented in this study supports the notion that
incremental decisions do indeed flow from incremental processes. How-
ever, it also suggests that the incidence of non- incremental decision
making is substantially greater than often assumed.
In sum, while it appears that the incremental model is a valid
explanation for much, indeed most budgetary decision making, more
research needs to be undertaken to determine whether variants of the
basic model exists, to examine the causes (and the implications) of
non- incremental choice, and to explore the interplay between the
forces of incrementalism and those of non-incrementalism.
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APPENDIX A
THE VALUES AND CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE BUDGET DATA
This appendix contains tables which show the afc values, adj. R
s
values, and choice-type classifications of the entire array of budget
data. The data is organized by organizational category (i.e., general
government data, public works data, agency-level data), by year, and
by city. Altogether this yields six tables. In the last two columns
of each of these tables (i.e., the columns for the 1973-75 and 1975-76
funding change periods) , a number of the items are underlined. This
designates the budgetary decisions which were part of the stratified
random sample of decisions.
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APPENDIX B
This appendix includes the distribution charts of the adj . R
g
data, organized by year, by organizational category (i.e., public
works programs, general government programs, agency- level organiza-
tions, and combined categories), and by city. The X axis measures the
adj. R values in .5 adj. R units. The Y axis is the frequency of
s s
cases per .5 adj. R increment.
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APPENDIX C
LIST OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED, BY TITLE AND CITY
City A
1. Mayor
2. Council President
3. Auditor/Budget Director
4. Treasurer
5. City Clerk
6. Planning Director
7. Personnel Director
8. Director, Law Department
9. Director, Data Processing Department
10. Director, Human Services Department
11. Assessor
12. Director, Civic Center
13. Commissioner, Public Works Department
14. Chief, Fire Department
15. Director, Department of Veterans Affairs
16. Director, Department of Parks and Recreation
17. Director, Traffic Engineering Bureau
18. Director, Bureau of Sewers
19. Director, Streets and Highways Bureau
20. Director, Solid Waste Bureau
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City B
1. City Manager
2. Mayor (Council President)
3. Budget Director
4. Treasurer
5. City Clerk
6. Budget Director, Planning Department
7. Personnel Director
8. Budget Officer, Law Department
9. Director, Data Processing Department
10. Director, Human Services Department
11. Director, Human Rights Commission
12. Director, Purchasing Department
13. Custodian of Tax Titles
14. Assistant Commissioner, Public Works Administration
15. Chief, Fire Department
16. Director, Department of Veterans Affairs
17. Director, Department of Parks and Recreation
18. Director, Health Department
19. Chief, Police Department
20. Director, Traffic Engineering Department
21. Director, Sewer Department
22. Director, Department of Streets
23. Director, Sanitation Department
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APPENDIX D:
THE QUESTIONNAIRE
OPENING REMARKS
I'm interested in investigating how budgetary decision for various
programs and services in the General Fund Budget are made.
Specifically, I want to ask you how funding recommendations and
decisions are made at the various levels of the annual appropriations
process.
These interviews are being conducted not only in but
in another city as well. As is usual in all social science research,
your identity will be kept confidential in the event I should decide
to cite or quote any of the comments you should make in the course of
this interview. This confidentiality will be observed despite the
noncontroversial nature of the matters which will be discussed.
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS
1. Title:
2. City:
3. Date:
4. How many years have you served in your current position:
Part II: General Perceptions
Instructions: I will now ask you a series of questions concern-
ing your general views of how budgetary decisions are made. If any of
the questions seem unclear or ambiguous, tell me and I will attempt to
clarify them.
A. Agency Heads
1. How would you describe the typical manner, if there is one,
in which" you (or department heads) go about preparing and formulating
your annual budget request?
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2. (Would you say that) department and program manager gener-
ally ask for more funds than they expect to receive?
Agree Disagree Uncertain
Comments:
3. What would you say are
program and agency heads) in the
requests for your (their) area?
the basic goals which guide you (or
preparation and formulation of budget
B. City Councils
1. How would you describe the typical response, if there is
one, of the city council in their handling of the budget recommen-
dations sent to them by the Chief Executive?
2. (Would you say that) the council generally tends to cut or
tends to accept in tact the budget recommendations submitted to them
by the Chief Executive?
Accept Cut Other
Comments:
3. What would you say are the basic goals which guide their
handling and evaluation of the budget recommendations?
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C. Chief Executive
1. How would you describe the typical responses, if there isone, of the Mayor (City Manager) in his handling and evaluation ofbudget requests from the city's departments and programs?
2. (Would you agree or disagree that) program and agency heads
can tend to expect their requests to be cut by the Chief Executive?
A9ree Disagree Uncertain
Comments:
3. What would you say are his (the Mayor's, the City Manager's)
basic goals which guide his handling and evaluation of the requests?
Part III: Decision Rules
Instructions: I will now read you a number of statements with
which I will ask you to agree or disagree. The range of answers which
may be given are on the card I am giving to you. They are agree,
disagree, uncertain, other (please specify). If you don't wish to
answer a question, you may decline to do so.
A. The Maintenance Rule (A)
The city government is as concerned with determining the need
for and establishing new services as with keeping existing services
operating at acceptable levels.
Agree
Disagree
Uncertain
Other (please specify)
Comments:
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B. The Safe Base Rule
In most cases, a department or program head can assume that
their current year' s funding level will be continued with little
question or challenge from one year to the next.
Agree
Disagree
Uncertain
Other (please specify)
Comments:
C. The Increase Focus Role
In the budgetary review process, more time is spent justifying
and questioning a department' s entire request than is spent on its
requests for increases only.
Agree
Disagree
Uncertain
Other (please specify)
Comments:
D. The Fair Share Rule
The budgets of most departments and programs grow or decline by
roughly the same percent that city revenues grow or decline.
Agree
Disagree
Uncertain
Other (please specify)
Comments:
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E. The Marginal Growth Rule
In general, departments and programs can expect a limitedamount of additional funds for a coming fiscal year over what theyreceived during a current fiscal year.
Agree
Disagree
Uncertain
Other (please specify)
Comments:
F. The Maintenance Rule (B)
In the budgetary process, there is a major emphasis upon main-
taining the services of existing departments and programs at existing
levels.
Agree
Disagree
Uncertain
Other (please specify)
Comments:
Part IV: Specific Decision Making Cases
Instruction: I will now ask you for your opinions concerning why
certain specific funding decisions were made for the 1975 and 1976
fiscal years. If you do not have any recollections of a particular
decision, please state so.
A. Background
In 197 , a decision was made to increase/cut the budget of the
by
$ , i.e., by %. The budget of this
department/program went from $ in 197 to $
in 197 .
Do you have any recollections of this decision?
Yes (proceed)
No (abort)
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B. Classifying Questions
1. Would you describe this decision as typical of the decisions
normally made during the budgetary process? If yes, why? If no, why
not?
2. (Follow-up) What were the primary reasons for making this
decision?
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APPENDIX E
SUB-TABLES OF SELECTED QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS
This appendix contains sub-tables in which the aggregated re-
sponse patterns cited in Chapter IV are broken down into different
categories of officials. The categories used include overview offi-
cials (i.e., the chief executives, council presidents, and budget
directors), general government program heads, public works program
heads, and agency-level officials. The nine agree/disagree items
cited here are in the same sequence in which they appear in Chapter IV.
These items concern the incremental decision rules, and the behavior
patterns of the chief executive, the council, and the agency/program
heads.
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TABLE 38
THE SAFE BASE RULE
Statement: "In most cases, a department or program head can assume
that their current year's funding level will be continued with little
question or challenge from one year to the next."
a.
City A
Overview Officials
# % # % #IT %
Agree 3 100.0 2 66.7 5 83.3
Disagree 0 0.0 1 33.3 1 16.7
Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Totals 3 100.0 3 100.0 6 100.0
b. General Government Officials
Agree 7 77.8 6 60.0 13 68.4
Disagree 1 11.1 3 30.0 4 20.1
Other 1 11.1 1 10.0 2 10.5
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0
_0 0.0 _0 0.0
Totals 9 100.0 10 100.0 19 99.0
c. Public Works Officials
Agree 3 75.0 2 50.0 5 62.5
Disagree 1 25.0 1 25.0 2 25.0
Other 0 0.0 1 25.0 1 12.5
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Totals 4 100.0 4 100.0 8 100.0
Agree
Disagree
Other
D.K./N,R,
Totals
d. Agency-Level Officials
2 50.0 5 83.3
1 25.0 1 17.7
1 25.0 0 0.0
0 0.0 p_ 0.0
4 100.0 6 100.0
7
2
1
_0
10
70.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
100.0
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TABLE 39
THE INCREASE FOCUS ROLE
Statement: "In the budgetary review process, more time is spent justi-
fying and questioning a department's entire request than is spent on
its requests for increases only." (Emphasis added orally.)
a. Overview Officials
City A City B Totals
# % # % # %
Agree 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Disagree 2 66.7 3 100.0 5 83.3
Other 1 33.3 0 0.0 1 16.7
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Totals 3 100.0 3 100.0 6 100.0
b. General Government Officials
Agree 3 33.3 3 30.0 6 31.6
Disagree 6 66.7 4 40.0 10 52.6
Other 0 0.0 2 20.0 2 10.5
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0
_1 10.0 5.3
Totals 9 100.0 10 100.0 19 100.0
c. Public Works Officials
Agree 2 50.0 1 25.0 3 37.5
Disagree 2 50.0 1 25.0 3 37.5
Other 0 0.0 2 50.0 2 25.0
D.K./N.R. 0_ 0.0 0 10.0 0 0.0
Totals 4 100.0 4 100.0 8 100.0
d. Agency--Level Officials
Agree 3 75.0 4 66.7 7 70.0
Disagree 0 0.0 2 33.3 2 20.0
Other 1 25.0 0 0.0 1 10.0
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 _0 0.0
Totals 4 100.0 6 100.0 10
100.0
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TABLE 40
THE FAIR SHARE RULE
Statement: "The budgets of most departments (or programs) grow or
decline by roughly the same percent that city revenues grow or
decline.
"
a. Overview Officials
City A City B Totals
# % # % #IT %
Agree 2 66.7 3 100.0 5 83.3
Disagree 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Other 1 33.0 0 0.0 1 16.7
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Totals 3 100.0 3 100.0 6 100.0
b. General Government Officials
Agree 0 0.0 3 30.0 3 15.8
Disagree 7 77.8 6 60.0 13 68.4
Other 2 22.2 1 10.0 3 15.8
D. K./N.R. 0 0.0 _0 0.0 _0 0.0
Totals 4 100.0 10 100.0 8 100.0
c. Public Works Officials
Agree 1 25.0 1 25.0 2 25.0
Disagree 2 50.0 2 50.0 4 50.0
Other 1 25.0 1 25.0 2 25.0
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Totals 4 100.0 4 100.0 8 100.0
d. Agency--Level Officials
Agree 0 0.0 3 50.0 3 30.0
Disagree 3 75.0 3 50.0 6 60.0
Other 1 25.0 0 0.0 1
10.0
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 _0 0.0
Totals 4 100.0 6 100.0 10
100.0
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TABLE 41
THE MAINTENANCE RULE (A)
Statement: "The city government is just as concerned with determining
the need for and establishing new services as it is with maintaining
existing services at acceptable levels."
Overview Officials
City A City B Totals
# % # % # %
Disagree 3 100.0 2 66.7 5 83. 3
Agree 0 0.0 1 33.3 1 16.7
{J I J 1 ' - f o 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
n K /N R o 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
1 Otdl fc> 0.0 3 100.0 6 100.0
b. General Government Officials
Disagree A4 44.4 2 20.0 6 31.6
Agree CD 55.6 5 50.0 10 52.6
r~\+- V> a yuuiex o 0.0 3 30.0 3 15.8
U.lS../lN.r\. o 0.0 _0 0.0 _0 0.0
Totals 9 100.0 10 100.0 19 100.0
c. Public Works Officials
Disagree 1 25.0 1 25.0 2
25.0
Agree 2 50.0 2 50.0
4 50.0
Other 1 25.0 1 25.0
2 25.0
D.K./N.R- 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
0.0
Totals 4 100.0 4 100.0
8 100.0
d. Agency-Level Officials
Disagree 1 25.0 1 16.7
2 20.0
Agree 2 50.0 4
66.7 6 60.0
Other 1 25.0 1
16.7 2 20.0
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 _0
0.0
Totals 4 100.0 6
100.1 10 100.0
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TABLE 42
THE MAINTENANCE RULE (B)
Statement: "In the budgetary process, there is a major emphasis upon
maintaining the services of existing departments and programs at
existing levels."
Overview Officials
City A
Agree
Disagree
Other
D.K./N.R.
Totals
Agree
Disagree
Other
D.K./N.R.
Totals
Agree
Disagree
Other
D.K./N.R.
Totals
Agree
Disagree
Other
D.K./N.R.
Totals
#
3
0
0
0
3
9
Q
0
0
9
4
0
0
0
4
4
0
0
0
4
City B Totals
%
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
#
3
0
0
0
3
%
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
b. General Government Officials
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
8
1
1
_0
10
80.0
10.0
10.0
0.0
100.0
Public Works Officials
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
75.0
0.0
25.0
0.0
100.0
d. Agency-Level Officials
100.0 6 100.0
0.0 0 0.0
0.0 0 0.0
0.0 0 o.o
100.0 6 100.0
#
6
0
0
0
6
17
1
1
_0
19
7
0
1
0
8
10
0
0
_0
10
%
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
89.5
5.3
5.3
0.0
100.1
87.5
0.0
12.5
0.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
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TABLE 43
THE MARGINAL GROWTH RULE
Statement: "In general, departments and programs can expect a
limited amount of additional funds for a coming fiscal year over what
they received during a current fiscal year."
a. Overview Officials
City A City B Totals
# % # % Tr %
Agree 3 100. 0 3 100.0 6 100. 0
Disagree 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Totals 3 100.0 3 100.0 6 100.0
b. General Government Officials
Agree 8 88.9 8 80.0 16 84.2
Disagree 1" 11.1 2 20.0 3 15.8
Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 _0 0.0 _0 0.0
Totals 9 100.0 10 100.0 19 100.0
c. Public Works Officials
Agree 4 100.0 2 50.0 6 75.0
Disagree 0 0.0 1 25.0 1 12.5
Other 0 0.0 1 25.0 1
12.5
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
0.0
Totals 4 100.0 4 100.0
8 100.0
d. Agency-Level Officials
Agree 3 75.0 5 83.3
8 80.0
Disagree 1 25.0 1 16.7
2 20.0
Other 0 0.0 0
0.0 0 0.0
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 _0
0.0
Totals 4 100.0 6
100.0 10 100.0
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TABLE 44
CHIEF EXECUTIVES AS BUDGET REQUEST CUTTERS
Statement: "Program and department heads tend to expect their budqet
requests to be cut by the Chief Executive."
Agree
Disagree
Other
N.R.
Totals
Agree
Disagree
Other
N.R.
Totals
Agree
Disagree
Other
D.K./N.R.
Totals
Agree
Disagree
Other
D.K./N.R.
Totals
#
3
0
0
0
3
8
1
'0
0
9
4
0
0
0
4
City A
%
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
Overview Officials
City B
#
3
0
0
0
3
%
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
b. General Government Officials
88.9
11.1
0.0
0.0
100.0
8
2
0
_0
10
80.0
20.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
c. Public Works Officials
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
4
0
0
0
4
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
d. Agency-Level Officials
100.0 4 66.7
0.0 0 0.0
0.0 1 16.7
0.0 1 16.7
100.0 6 100.1
Totals
#
6
0
0
0_
6
16
3
0
_0
19
8
0
0
0
8
8
0
1
_±
10
%
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
84.2
15.8
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
80.0
0.0
10.0
10.0
100.0
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TABLE 45
PROGRAM AND AGENCY HEADS AS BUDGET PADDERS
Statement: "Department and program managers generally ask for more
funds than they expect to receive."
a. Overview Officials
City A City B Totals
# % # % # %
Agree 3 100.0 3 100.0 6 100.0
Disagree 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
D. K. /N. R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Totals j 100.0 3 100.0 6 100.0
b. General Government Officials
Agree 7 77.8 7 70.0 14 73.7
Disagree 2 22.2 3 30.0 5 26.3
Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
D. K. /N. R. U 0.0 _0 0.0 0 0.0
Totals Q 100.0 10 100.0 19 100.0
c. Public Works Officials
Agree 4 100.0 2 50.0 6 75.0
Disagree 0 0.0 1 25.0 1 12.5
Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 I 25.0 _1 12.5
Totals 4 100.0 4 100.0 8 100.0
d. Agency--Level Officials
Agree 3 75.0 6 100.0 9 90.0
Disagree 1 25.0 0 0.0 1 10.0
Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
0.0
D.K./N.R. 0 0.0 0 0.0 _0 0.0
Totals 4 100.0 6 100.0
10 100.0
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TABLE 46
CITY COUNCILS AS RUBBER STAMPS
Statement: "The city council tends to accept the executive budget in
tact with few or no revisions."
Agree
Disagree
Other
D.K./N.R.
Totals
Agree
Disagree
Other
D.K./N.R.
Totals
Agree
Disagree
Other
D.K./N.R.
Totals
Agree
Disagree
Other
D.K./N.R.
Totals
a. Overview Officials
City A
#
2
1
0
0
3
9
.
0
0
0
9
4
0
0
0
4
4
0
0
0
City B
%
66.7
33.3
0.0
0.0
100.0
#
1
2
0
0
3
%
33.3
66.7
0.0
0.0
100.0
General Government Officials
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
5
3
2
_0
10
50.0
30.0
20.0
0.0
100.0
c. Public Works Officials
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
75.0
25.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
d. Agency-Level Officials
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
2
4
0
0
6
33.3
66.7
0.0
0.0
100.0
Totals
#
3
3
0
0
6
14
3
2
_0
19
7
1
0
0
8
6
4
0
_0
10
%
50.0
50.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
73.7
15.8
10.5
0.0
100.0
87.5
12.5
0.0
0.0
100.0
60.0
40.0
0.0
0.0
100.0

